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“Like anyone, blacks risk devaluation for a particular incompetence, such as a failed test 
or a flubbed pronunciation. But they further risk that such performances will confirm the 
broader, racial inferiority they are suspected of. Thus, from the first grade through 
graduate school, blacks have the extra fear that in the eyes of those around them their 
full humanity could fall with a poor answer or a mistaken stroke of the pen.”  
(Claude Steele, 1992) 
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ABSTRACT 
Stereotype threat is a psychological phenomenon that occurs when individuals 
become aware that their behavior could potentially confirm a negative stereotype. 
Though stereotype threat is a widely studied phenomenon in social psychology, there has 
been relatively little scholarship on it in philosophy, despite its relevance to issues such 
as implicit cognition, epistemic injustice, and diversity in philosophy. However, most 
psychological research on stereotype threat discusses the phenomenon by using an overly 
narrow picture of it, which focuses on one of its effects: the ability to hinder 
performance. As a result, almost all philosophical work on stereotype threat is solely 
focused on issues of performance too.  
Social psychologists know that stereotype threat has additional effects, such as 
negatively impacting individuals’ motivation, interests, long-term health, and even their 
sense of self, but these other effects are often downplayed, or even forgotten about. 
Therefore, the “standard picture” of stereotype threat needs to be expanded, in order to 
better understand the theoretical aspects of the phenomenon, and to develop broader, 
more effective interventions. This dissertation develops such an “expanded picture” of 
stereotype threat, which emphasizes how the phenomenon can negatively impact both 
self-identity and epistemic agency. In doing so, I explore the nature of stereotypes more 
  viii 
generally and argue that they undermine groups’ moral status and contribute to what is 
called “ontic injustice.” I also show how stereotype threat harms members of socially 
subordinated groups by way of coercing their self-identity and undermining their 
epistemic agency, which I argue is a form of epistemic injustice. Lastly, I analyze the 
expanded picture’s implications for addressing the low proportion of women in 
professional philosophy. I critically engage recent arguments that these low numbers 
simply reflect different interests women have, which if innate or benign, would require 
no intervention. My expanded picture shows the mistakes in this sort of reasoning, which 
is also present in discussions on the underrepresentation of women in science. The 
expanded picture of stereotype threat that this dissertation develops is not only practically 
important, but also advances key philosophical debates in social epistemology, applied 
ethics, and social metaphysics.  
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PREFACE 
As social creatures our sense of self is tied up with various social identities.  
Many of these social identities are associated with stereotypes, which form associative 
clusters of identities and features.  Some of these clusters are accepted and expected in 
many societies: White, male, philosopher; Black, male, basketball player. Other clusters 
are met with resistance: Black physicist, male ballerina, gay parent. One broad goal of 
this dissertation is to show how research in social psychology on issues of social identity 
is deeply relevant to philosophy.  The other broad goal is to demonstrate that stereotype 
threat is worthy of more philosophical attention than it has received. Stereotype threat is a 
psychological phenomenon that occurs when individuals become aware that they could 
potentially be viewed through the lens of a negative stereotype. Though stereotype threat 
is “one of the most widely studied social psychological concepts of the past 20 years” 
(Inzlicht & Schmader 2011, p. 3), philosophers have conducted relatively little 
scholarship on this phenomenon, despite its relevance to debates in ethics, epistemology, 
and social ontology.  
The narrower goal of this dissertation is to explain how stereotype threat can 
affect self-identity in subtle ways, and what the philosophical implications of this are. My 
motivation for adopting these goals is twofold. The first motivation is that of analyzing 
harm reduction and fairness. Stereotype threat is already known to cause harm to 
individuals and to affect some groups disproportionately, so it is important to investigate 
the full scope of this harm and unfairness. The second motivation is that of understanding 
  x 
the self. Insofar as stereotype threat seems capable of affecting our sense of self, it is 
relevant to philosophical investigations into the self and what it means to be human.  
In the first part of the dissertation, I point out a problem with current research on 
stereotype threat, specifically that it often offers an incomplete picture of the 
phenomenon. Stereotype threat’s most studied effect is its ability to hinder performance. 
Researchers know that stereotype threat has additional effects. It can also affect 
individuals’ motivation, interests, long-term health, and even their very sense of self. The 
problem is that these other interesting and important effects are often downplayed, or 
even forgotten about, in the ways that researchers and reporters frame stereotypes as 
being primarily, or solely, about performance. That is, the “standard picture” of 
stereotype threat needs to be expanded and updated.  
I then spend the rest of the dissertation fleshing out aspects of this expanded 
picture, to show why it is helpful to develop and maintain an expanded picture of 
stereotype threat—that is, why it is helpful to keep these effects beyond performance in 
the forefront of our thought. This is a project that philosophers are especially well-
equipped to contribute to. Philosophical analysis can tease out implications in a body of 
research as well as spell out the chains of reasoning that support or challenge these 
implications. Philosophy can also help connect research in one area to empirical and 
theoretical work in other areas—helping to sketch out a big picture of the phenomenon, 
and how it relates to other phenomena.  
While my project criticizes the standard picture of stereotype threat as too narrow, 
this does not mean it is wholly wrong or inaccurate. My point is instead that the way that 
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the phenomenon is standardly framed is too narrow to serve as a comprehensive snapshot 
of what is going on. It focuses too much on performance, which is not necessarily its 
biggest or most important effect.  I acknowledge that there are reasons why it makes 
sense for researchers to focus on performance. For one, performance is comparatively 
straightforward and easy to measure, compared to things such as “motivation” and 
“identity.” Furthermore, issues of performance are what catalyzed stereotype threat 
research in the first place, as I will discuss in Chapter One. And lastly, experimenters 
need to be able to operationalize their hypotheses and theories. That is, they need to take 
these big, complex phenomena and determine what simpler proxies they can detect or 
measure in order to run their experiments. For instance, when scientists study subatomic 
particles, they often use their impact on other materials—their “trails” through these 
materials—as their operationalization. Similarly, researchers studying stereotype threat 
often use its impact on test performance as a concrete and manageable handle on the 
phenomenon. The key, though, is to keep in mind that the phenomenon itself extends 
beyond what any one operationalization can capture. 
Simply put, the standard picture is not the whole picture. Current research has 
made some tantalizing suggestions about what this whole picture may look like, but few 
people have spelled out how these suggestions may fit together with what we already 
know. Many people seem to be waiting for more empirical evidence on the matter. But 
since these suggestions and implications are already there in the literature, this is a place 
that philosophical analysis can help piece together what this bigger picture may look like. 
Philosophy can help think through the initial hypotheses and research questions, compare 
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different research programs, and even project where future research should go. These 
things are not a substitute for actual empirical research, but they are not mere armchair 
speculation either. They are a mix of fleshing out what is logically implied by current 
research, as well as forecasting where future research should go, based on which 
questions we are interested in asking. 
A reason it is useful to have philosophical commentary on scientific work is to 
help guard against oversimplified stories that make their way into the popular press. As I 
show in Chapter One, a problem arises when researchers, other scholars, or the popular 
press tries to distill a comprehensive picture of stereotype threat from experiments that 
focus on only one of its effects. Studies on performance and achievement dominate so 
much of the stereotype threat literature that non-experts, and maybe even the researchers 
themselves, have their attention monopolized by them. So, one thing philosophy can do is 
help point out such lacunae and the unequal distribution of attention towards a particular 
operationalization. Another thing philosophy can do is explain the significance of 
research. With stereotype threat, researchers make various observations and theoretical 
points that, due to the sociological nature of scientific publications, have not been fleshed 
out or expanded upon in depth. Philosophers tend to have good intellectual tool sets for 
doing just that. So that is what I do in this dissertation: I help explain the potential 
significance of current research of stereotype threat. I focus on philosophical 
conversations that involve issues of social identity—gender, race, sexuality, class, etc. 
Specifically, I show how results from this research bear on current philosophical 
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conversations involving the metaphysics of stereotypes, epistemic agency, epistemic 
injustice, and the current demographics in the philosophy profession. 
While the study of social identity has often been viewed as ultimately irrelevant to 
the sorts of questions that are fundamental to philosophy, this simply is not the case, 
unless one is using an overly narrow view of philosophy. Matters of social identity are 
deeply philosophical because social categories are not superficial decals for our lives, or 
mere noisy clutter that drowns out the deeper facets of being human. Social identity is 
more fundamental and significant to our lives than something like our favorite color—
even though we can form social identities based around things that in themselves seem 
insignificant, such as our favorite color.  In fact, research in social psychology suggests 
that just about anything can count as a social identity, not just our gender, race, class, 
religion, sexuality, age, or ability, but also our professions, hobbies, political affiliations, 
and aesthetic preferences. We seem to be willing to pick up new social identities quite 
easily, even if these identities seem superficial, and are inaccurate labels.  
This was shown in an experiment (Tajfel 1970) where a group of teenage students 
were asked to count various sets of dots, and were then categorized as being more likely 
to overestimate or underestimate the number of dots. (Which categorization they were 
given was completely random and actually had nothing to do with how they actually 
counted the dots.) When the students were then given the opportunity to give out money 
to other participants, they showed favoritism towards the students who had been 
categorized the same way they themselves had been. 
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In fact, we seem willing and capable of turning almost anything into a social 
identity, and then using that identity to guide our behavior. For instance, similar results to 
those discussed above were found when the experiment was tried again, this time 
grouping the students according to whether they had shown preference for paintings by 
Klee or Kandisky. Again, the assignment of ‘preference’ was actually randomized and 
had nothing to do with which paintings the students had preferred. One of the most 
striking findings of the experiment is that the students would prefer to give out money in 
a way that allowed members of their in-group to receive more than members of an out-
group—even if there was an option to give both members more money, but an equal 
share of it. In this experiment, group status and advantage was prioritized over net 
material benefit, all for the sake of an in-group that was created earlier that day, based off 
of superficial activities, and was not even an accurate categorization of the individuals. 
This suggests that we use our social identities as guiding frameworks for how to relate to 
others.  
And as we know from a history of the world, these guiding frameworks can 
become culturally entrenched. They become the social waters we live in. So when we 
investigate ourselves, that entails investigating these social waters too. In order to ask 
questions about the self, about the “I”, we need to also ask questions about the various 
“we”s that shape it. Investigating the effects of stereotype threat is one way to get at how 
such group identities can impact the construction of the self. In this way, social identities 
and forces (e.g., politics, religion, cultural values, etc.) are not cloudy pollution standing 
in the way of true self-understanding—which sometimes philosophy acts as if they are. 
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But trying to immediately abstract away from group affiliation is actually more likely to 
hinder our understanding, if these group affiliations impact our sense of self in significant 
ways, which they seem to do. In this way, understanding social identity is critical for 
understanding self-identity. 
This dissertation demonstrates that stereotype threat is worthy of more 
philosophical attention than it has received thus far. It will demonstrate this by expanding 
our picture of stereotype threat in four ways. First, it will expand its definition, which is 
currently too narrow (Chapter One). Second, it will not only expand the definition of 
stereotyping more generally, but also expand upon moral analyses of stereotyping in the 
philosophical literature, both of which have implications for how we think about the 
“threat” in stereotype threat (Chapter Two). Third, it will flesh out the significance of 
stereotype threat as a phenomenon whose impact and costs are not distributed equally 
across humanity—even though the phenomenon itself might be a universal human 
experience. But the effects of stereotype threat can harm members of socially 
subordinated groups more deeply than it can members of dominant groups (Chapter 
Three). Lastly, this dissertation will flesh out more fully the relationship stereotype threat 
has to demographic issues in philosophy—specifically concerning the proportion of 
women in the field (Chapter Four). Together, these chapters will make the case that 
stereotype threat is relevant to many philosophical conversations in social epistemology, 
applied ethics, and social metaphysics. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
EXPANDING OUR PICTURE OF STEREOTYPE THREAT 
“Stereotypes about a person's group, through the threat of judgment […], 
can have profound effects on a person's behavior, […] and, beyond that, to 
the very nature of his personal and social identity” (Steele, Spencer & 
Aronson 2002, p. 432). 
 
Section 1.1: Introduction to Stereotype Threat 
Subsection 1.1.1: A Brief History of Stereotype Threat 
“Stereotype threat” is a term coined by social psychologists Claude Steele and 
Joshua Aronson to describe a phenomenon they first observed in the mid-1990s (Steele & 
Aronson 1995).  They were studying the performance gaps in education between racial 
groups in American schools, especially between Black and White students.
1
 This is a gap 
that shows up at all grade levels and persists even when skill level and preparation are 
accounted for (Steele, Spencer & Aronson 2002, p. 379). Since psychologists considered 
it implausible that this gap was caused by innate racial differences, they were left with a 
puzzle: what could be responsible for the remaining gap? Some suggested that 
stigmatized groups, such as Black students, might be internalizing the stereotype that they 
are not as smart as their White counterparts. Even if the stereotype itself is false, the 
doubt caused by this internalization could explain why Black students underperform. 
However, Steele and others were not satisfied with this hypothesis. It did not explain why 
                                                        
1
 I capitalize “Black” and “White” when used as racial categories to denote that they are complex group 
identifiers and not mere descriptions of skin color.  
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even the most confident and skilled students contribute to the performance gap as well 
(Steele 2011).  
 Psychologists noticed that when Black students did not care very much about 
how well they performed, accounting for skill and preparation eliminated nearly all of the 
performance gap. It seemed that one’s psychological state, as opposed to one’s race, 
might be the main factor in play. Since social psychologists focus their research on how 
individuals’ psychological states interact with social structures and environments, Steele 
and Aronson tested whether certain psychological states like worrying, that plausibly 
could contribute to the performance gap, could be triggered by environmental or 
situational factors, as opposed to being primarily products of those individuals’ 
personalities or stable dispositions. Steele and Aronson found that performance-inhibiting 
states could be triggered by cues in one’s environment. The specific trigger was bringing 
to individuals’ attention a negative stereotype that could potentially apply to them. When 
Black students who cared significantly about academic success were subtly reminded that 
their performance on a test could confirm or deny the stereotype that they were 
intellectually inferior, their performance suffered. Steele and Aronson had confirmed that 
this portion of the performance gap was not about race itself (if such a thing exists). 
Rather, part of the gap may be due to the threat of a negative racial reputation, as 
embodied in a stereotype. They called this phenomenon “stereotype threat.”  
Stereotype threat has now become “one of the most widely studied social 
psychological concepts of the past 20 years” (Inzlicht & Schmader 2011, p. 3). It is 
discussed not only in social psychology and education policy, but also in philosophical 
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research on implicit bias and cognition, which ranges from philosophy of mind and 
cognitive science to epistemology and ethics. The multitude of studies conducted on this 
phenomenon have given us a clear picture of how it can affect individuals in the sorts of 
settings that Steele and Aronson single out in their original research. But this picture is 
not the whole story. There is a laundry list of other effects that stereotype threat can 
cause. Psychologists know this, yet continue to frame the phenomenon as revolving 
around underperformance. I argue that defaulting to this “standard picture” is 
unwarranted, since it obscures the full impact of stereotype threat, which goes well 
beyond issues of performance. Stereotype threat can also affect our epistemic agency, our 
sense of belonging, and even our sense of self. Thus it can erode our well-being on a 
much deeper level than a focus on underperformance indicates. The standard picture, 
which continues to frame the majority of work on stereotype threat, only shows us the tip 
of the iceberg. 
 
Section 1.2: The Standard Picture of Stereotype Threat 
Subsection 1.2.1: The Standard Picture in Social Psychology 
The “standard picture” of stereotype threat is a framing of the phenomenon as 
something that primarily affects performance on evaluative tasks. Specifically, it is that 
“[t]he fear of confirming derogatory stereotypes can hinder academic performance” 
(Cohen, Garcia & Jabr 2013). This standard picture arises from psychologists’ 
descriptions of the phenomenon that emphasize the underperformance effect and the 
application of the phenomenon to testing environments.  
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However, social psychologists have always known that the effects of stereotype 
threat go “beyond performance” (Derks, Inzlicht & Kang 2008, p. 165). They have also 
more recently noticed the relative lack of attention these other effects have received.  
Davies, Spencer, and Steele note: 
In stark contrast to the abundance of research on performance, there has 
been a complete lack of research on how stereotype threat can influence 
the aspirations of stigmatized individuals […]. This despite the fact that 
Steele has always spoken of the two-pronged consequence of stereotype 
threat—undermining both performance and aspirations among stigmatized 
individuals in targeted domains. (Davies, Spencer & Steele 2005, p. 278)
 2
 
Even though researchers have written on stereotype threat’s broad reach, beyond 
performance, this reach has been largely under-emphasized. Moreover, we now know 
that stereotype threat is not just two-pronged, but multi-pronged. It affects not just 
performance and aspiration, but also one’s sense of social belonging (Walton & Carr 
2011) and one’s “self-concept,” which is psychology’s catch-all term for self-knowledge 
and self-identity.
3
  
In the past decade these other effects have received more attention.  However, 
despite this expansion of research, many social psychologists continue to use and discuss 
the standard picture as a kind of paradigm case. For instance, even when researchers give 
broad definitions of the phenomenon, their examples are usually ones that illustrate only 
underperformance. This is especially problematic in overviews of the phenomenon. For 
instance, one overview gives a definition of stereotype threat as being the “sense that one 
might be judged in terms of a negative stereotype” when one is “at risk, by dint of their 
                                                        
2
 For some of Steele’s remarks on this issue, see Steele & Aronson 1995 and Steele et al. 2002.  
3
 See Weiten, Dunn & Hammer 2012. 
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actions or behaviors, of confirming negative stereotypes about their group” (Inzlicht & 
Schmader 2011, p. 5-6). This definition identifies the phenomenon as a kind of 
awareness—not as the consequence of underperformance specifically. However, the 
overview illustrates this phenomenon by focusing only on underperformance. It explains:  
For example, because African Americans are well aware of the negative 
stereotypes impugning their intellectual ability, whenever they are in a 
situation requiring them to display said ability—say, a standardized 
testing situation—they may fear confirming the stereotype. Ironically, this 
fear of stereotype confirmation can hijack the cognitive systems required 
for optimal performance and result in low test performance. (Inzlicht & 
Schmader 2011, p. 6; emphasis mine) 
Though they point out that this is just an example of stereotype threat, overviews 
consistently choose examples of underperformance as the go-to example of the 
phenomenon. Granted, the standard picture is not used all of the time in social 
psychology.
 
It is not the only picture that researchers present, but it is one of the most 
popular ones, if not the dominant one.
4
 The result of this is that much research on 
stereotype threat ends up implying that underperformance is its central or most important 
effect. It suggests that the standard picture is a comprehensive account of the 
phenomenon, which it is not meant to be, and it should not be used as, as I will argue in 
the following sections. 
                                                        
4
 For examples of psychologists using a more expanded picture, see Aronson et al. 1999, p. 30; Schmader 
2002, p. 194; Aronson & Inzlicht 2004, p. 830; Shapiro 2011, p. 71; Walton & Carr 2011, p. 89; Logel, 
Peach & Spencer 2011; Kray & Shirako 2011, p. 172; Richeson & Shelton 2011; Cohen, Purdie-Vaughns 
& Garcia 2011, p. 281; Stone, Chalabaev & Harrison 2011, p. 217; and Steele 2011. 
For examples of psychologists using the standard picture, see Stone 2002, p. 1667; Bosson, Haymovitz & 
Pinel 2002, p. 247; Cadinu et al. 2005, p. 572; Rosenthal & Crisp 2006, p. 502; Cole et al. 2006, p. 518; 
Carr & Steele 2009, p. 853; Alter et al. 2010, p. 166; Looby & Earleywine 2010, p. 834; Inzlicht & 
Schmader 2011; Murphy & Taylor 2011, p. 18; Schmader & Beilock 2011, p. 34; Mendes & Jamieson 
2011, p. 51-2; Inzlicht, Tullett & Gutsell 2011, p. 106; Marx 2011, 124; Shih, Pittinsky & Ho 2011, p. 141; 
Croizet & Millett 2011, p. 187; Chasteen, Kang & Remedios 2011, p. 205; Sackett & Ryan 2011; Aronson 
& Dee 2011, p. 264; and Shapiro & Aronson 2013. 
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Subsection 1.2.2: The Standard Picture in Philosophy 
We can see evidence of this miscommunication in the field of philosophy, which 
has recently become interested in the phenomenon, its effects, and its implications for the 
social organization of the profession. Many philosophers who discuss stereotype threat do 
not realize or acknowledge that the standard picture is a truncated account of the 
phenomenon. For instance, Tamar Gendler describes stereotype threat as “a well-
documented phenomenon […] associated with impaired performance” (Gendler 2011, p. 
48). Thus, when Gendler discusses the potential epistemic costs of stereotype threat, she 
only considers those that stem from the underperformance effect. More recently, Lauren 
Freeman has described stereotype threat in an APA newsletter as being “the way that a 
person’s awareness of his or her own group membership can negatively affect his or her 
performance on a given task” (Freeman 2014). These descriptions perpetuate the standard 
picture as the only picture of the phenomenon.
5
 
 A few philosophers have acknowledged and called for an expanded picture. For 
instance, Ron Mallon points out that stereotype threat does not solely concern 
performance (Mallon forthcoming); anxiety can also be an important feature for 
philosophers to consider. Rachel McKinnon provides an extensive discussion of 
stereotype threat, one that focuses on effects beyond performance (McKinnon 2014).  She 
                                                        
5
 Other examples of philosophers adopting the standard picture in professionally published work include 
Saul 2012 and Alfano 2014. In more informal publications, examples include Jennings 2014 and Huerter 
2014. Examples of the standard picture in the popular press include Adelson 2013; Whitbourne 2012; 
Gorlick 2009; Paul 2012; Wang 2014; Wu 2013; Diversity Inc 2010; and Cohen, Garcia & Jabr 2013. For a 
paradigmatic example of the standard picture in the popular press, see Pacific Standard 2014. Some of the 
few examples where effects beyond performance are discussed front and center include Cottom 2013 and 
Shellenbarger 2013. 
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provides one of the only explicit arguments for why philosophers should expand their 
understanding of stereotype threat. She argues that if we focus our attention solely on 
performance, 
such a discussion ignores the many social effects (other than cognitive 
performance), such as situational avoidance, that are also important to 
discussions of stereotype threat in feminism. Moreover, ignoring these 
aspects of stereotype threat leaves a potentially powerful explanation for 
the gender disparity in philosophy (and other areas of academe) 
unclaimed. (McKinnon 2014, p. 861) 
In describing various experiences of stereotype threat, such as those often faced by trans 
women, McKinnon highlights some ways that disengagement and situational avoidance 
are of more philosophical interest than underperformance.   
For instance, she describes the experience of a third-generation Chinese-Canadian 
student who is assumed not be a native English speaker by a professor. This experience 
could likely make such a student feel anxious and vulnerable to accusations of 
incompetence (draft of McKinnon 2014, p. 1-2). McKinnon also observes that many trans 
women feel uncomfortable or anxious if they are witnessed doing certain activities (such 
as reading a book entitled How to Be a Woman),
6
 for fear that others will view them as 
inauthentic in their identity—a common stereotype faced by trans women.  These 
examples each involve a kind of performance, but what McKinnon challenges here is the 
idea that performance is the most salient aspect of these experiences. Instead, she points 
to how issues of anxiety, belonging, and safety may be just as or more salient. 
Likewise, some of Sally Haslanger’s recent work has also been pushing 
philosophers to consider issues beyond performance, though she does not explicitly 
                                                        
6
 The book is actually a humorous description of the various sorts of sexism the author has encountered in 
her life (Moran 2011). 
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discuss stereotype threat. She argues that when looking at the achievement gap in 
education between Black and White students, there is more than just immediate 
achievement at stake (which I will take up further in Chapter Three). Haslanger argues 
that disengagement and ego depletion (which stereotype threat can cause) can force one 
into a “narrow range of conversations that do not enable one to form a self that is fully 
integrated into public space” (Haslanger 2014, p. 122). Haslanger argues that being 
alienated in this way can present obstacles for a person to fully develop their rational 
capacities, and for them to explore and embody a satisfying process of self-formation as 
they grow up.  
Apart from McKinnon’s and Haslanger’s projects, the majority of discussions in 
philosophy that involve stereotype threat do not venture beyond the standard picture. In 
the rest of this dissertation I show what an expanded theoretical picture of stereotype 
threat looks like, and argue why both social psychologists and philosophers should 
consider explicitly adopting it more often than they currently do—especially if they are 
concerned with issues of injustice and equal access to public goods such as education. 
Haslanger rightly notes, “the problem [of inequality in education] goes deeper than 
achievement, for schools are contexts in which we develop self-understandings and 
identities that situate us as members of society” (Haslanger 2014). Not only is stereotype 
threat a phenomenon that can exacerbate inequalities in performance levels, it can also be 
a pernicious influence on the identity and self-knowledge of people in marginalized and 
oppressed groups—which I will discuss more at length in Chapter Three.  In this chapter, 
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I will first point out that if we focus too much on performance, we can miss these other 
negative effects.  
 
Section 1.3: An Expanded Picture of Stereotype Threat 
To recap, the broad scientific definition of stereotype threat is: “a situational 
predicament in which individuals are at risk, by dint of their actions or behaviors, of 
confirming negative stereotypes about their group. It is the resulting sense that one might 
be judged in terms of a negative stereotype that is “in the air”” (Inzlicht & Schmader 
2011, p. 5-6). This sense of a threat is a psychological state, conscious or unconscious, 
that occurs when certain cues in one’s environment triggers one’s awareness of how 
negative stereotypes might be in play in that environment.  Whereas the standard picture 
focuses on how this awareness can trigger certain cognitive processes that ultimately 
inhibit individuals’ performance, an expanded picture of stereotype threat surveys the 
entire range of consequences that this heightened awareness can bring about.  
Other effects of this awareness include things like psychological disengagement, 
which is the state of caring less about, and being less motivated to excel in, a given 
domain.
7
  The student who sits at the back of the class and does not pay attention is an 
example of someone who is disengaged. Another effect is situational or domain 
avoidance, where a person avoids a specific domain—physically, psychologically, or 
socially.
8
  A person who drops a class after feeling uncomfortable or stops playing video 
                                                        
7
 For evidence of disengagement, see Major et al. 1998; Forbes, Schmader & Allen 2008. 
8
 For evidence of domain avoidance, see Davies et al. 2002; Davies, Spencer & Steele 2005; and Oswald & 
Harvey 2000. 
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games with their friends because they find it too stressful are examples of domain 
avoidance. Another effect is belonging uncertainty, where a person becomes unsure of 
whether they are welcome or socially accepted in an environment.
9
 A person who looks 
around a classroom of thirty people and only sees one other person who shares their 
social identity is an example of someone who is probably experiencing belonging 
uncertainty. And lastly, general anxiety and feelings of doubt are also recorded effects of 
stereotype threat.
10
 To illustrate this difference, the standard picture describes stereotype 
threat as affecting how well people perform on something like a math test. The expanded 
picture, however, presents stereotype threat as also affecting whether individuals are 
motivated to do math, whether they think of themselves as a math person, whether they 
can easily connect with other people in a math setting, whether they experience 
heightened anxiety in a math setting, and whether exposure to math settings will diminish 
their reserves of self-control for a period of time. 
The expanded picture also encourages us to pay more attention to stereotype 
threat as a psychological state. Stereotype threat is not just a cluster of observable effects; 
it is a general state of anxiety and heightened vigilance. In fact, it is theorized as being 
one specific version of a broader kind of vigilance. Stereotype threat is sometimes 
postulated as a subcategory of a larger phenomenon called “social identity threat.” Social 
identity threat is the psychological state a person is in when something in their 
environment makes them feel like they could be devalued due to one of their social 
                                                        
9
 For evidence of belonging uncertainty, see Walton & Carr 2011 and Murphy, Steele & Gross 2007. 
10
 For a further list of effects caused by stereotype threat, see ReducingStereotypeThreat.org. 
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identities (Steele, Spencer & Aronson 2002, p. 416). Negative stereotypes are one way 
that a person could be devalued through their social identity, but there are other ways too. 
For instance, low numerical representation in an environment could signal that people 
who share that specific social identity do not belong in that environment or do not tend to 
successfully contribute as much to that environment.  Likewise, a pattern of 
microaggressions (e.g., lack of eye contact, lack of uptake when one participates in a 
conversation, etc.) could also trigger social identity threat, signaling that persons with a 
specific social identity are not high-status members or are not taken seriously in that 
environment.
11
  
Steele, Spencer, and Aronson observe that all forms of social identity threat might 
have the potential to create an underperformance effect, but they emphasize that these 
threats could also cause “conflicting motivations” and “pressure the person to disengage 
or dis-identify with the setting.” Therefore, social identity threat is more than just a 
source of underperformance; it is “an ongoing pressure against […] full engagement” in a 
given domain (Steele, Spencer & Aronson 2002, p. 419).  Since this is what social 
identity threat is more generally, the expanded picture frames stereotype threat as a 
specific instance of it— that is, as a latent threat that exists wherever a person encounters 
environmental cues that they could be devalued in that environment based on a negative 
stereotype. This latent threat exists whether or not we see its common effects 
(underperformance, disengagement, etc.).  Those effects require other factors besides the 
threat itself in order to manifest themselves. For instance, they might require a certain 
                                                        
11
 See Steele, Spencer & Aronson 2002, p. 419-22 for a list of other social identity threat triggers.  
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level of engagement in the stereotyped domain, a certain degree of identification with the 
social identity under threat, tasks of a certain difficulty level, a lack of counter-balancing 
cues that could “inoculate” one from these effects, etc.  In this way, the expanded picture 
helps us grasp the different sorts of responses people have to stereotype threat, and what 
sorts of factors are likely mediating their responses. Steele and Aronson point out in 1995 
that it was only a certain set of students (highly motivated high-achievers) who were most 
at risk for underperformance. The standard picture obscures this sort of qualification; it 
presents stereotype threat as affecting everyone in roughly the same manner.  
The research, however, has shown just the opposite. People respond to stereotype 
and social identity threat in various ways (Steele, Spencer & Aronson 2002, p. 418). 
While some might respond by becoming more motivated to disconfirm a negative 
stereotype—thus increasing their risk of underperformance due to the cognitive processes 
such motivation can trigger—other people might not. Rather, they might become 
motivated to seek other sources of self-esteem outside the domain in which they are 
negatively stereotyped, and thus increase their potential for disengagement in that 
domain. Or they might simply avoid all situations in which that stereotype is salient in 
order to lower their stress levels. Those people are more likely to engage in domain 
avoidance. Thus, under the expanded picture, underperformance is not so much a direct 
effect of stereotype threat as it is an effect of one common response to the threat. 
Underperformance is no longer the heart of the phenomenon, though it does remain a 
salient feature of it.  
 
  
13 
Section 1.4: Why the Standard Picture Is An Un-Ideal and Dangerous Paradigm 
Subsection 1.4.1: An Un-Ideal Paradigm 
As mentioned in the beginning of this paper, the problem is not that the standard 
picture is wrong. Underperformance is real and is the most well-studied aspect of 
stereotype threat. It is a robustly corroborated effect and it is an incredibly salient effect 
when researchers are interested in addressing known performance gaps between social 
groups in educational and academic contexts. However, when the standard picture is used 
as a general paradigm of the phenomenon, it perpetuates misunderstanding that in some 
policy contexts could end up being quite dangerous to public health. First, I will argue 
that the standard picture does not theoretically deserve to be the paradigm of the 
phenomenon. Then I will argue why even when researchers do not mean to use the 
standard picture as a paradigm, in the absence of an expanded picture they are likely to 
do so, with some dangerous consequences. 
 Some might think that underperformance really is the most direct effect of 
stereotype threat, and that all the other effects I have mentioned are side-effects or 
responses to the phenomenon, but not part of the phenomenon itself. A proponent of 
underperformance’s centrality might concede that anxiety is a direct effect of stereotype 
threat, but since it is such a common effect of so many psychological phenomena, it is not 
as unique of a direct effect as underperformance. Granting that, the more pressing issue 
then becomes whether disengagement and domain avoidance are direct effects of 
stereotype threat to the same degree as underperformance. Some researchers have implied 
that underperformance is a direct effect of the anxiety triggered by stereotype threat, 
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whereas disengagement and situational avoidance are indirect effects because they are 
effects of peoples’ coping mechanisms in the face of that anxiety. 
However, as mentioned earlier, underperformance is as much of an indirect effect 
as disengagement and domain avoidance. They are all effects of peoples’ responses to the 
heightened awareness that is stereotype threat.  In fact, disengagement and domain 
avoidance are direct effects of peoples’ coping strategies whereas underperformance is 
not.  That is, disengagement and domain avoidance are direct effects of peoples’ efforts 
to seek self-affirmation and avoid stress, respectively. However, underperformance is a 
side-effect of a person’s efforts to respond to stereotype threat. When a person 
experiences underperformance, it is because they are making an effort to prove the 
negative stereotype wrong. Underperformance happens because this motivation to 
counter the stereotype has the side-effect of cognitively distracting the individual, which 
interferes with their performance if the task at hand is difficult or requires concentration.  
Therefore, there is not a currently compelling reason to emphasize 
underperformance as an especially central effect of the phenomenon. The standard 
picture is not an adequate comprehensive picture of the phenomenon. However, 
acknowledging this is not enough. Psychologists have always known that there are other 
effects besides underperformance. However, in the absence of a replacement picture, the 
standard one creeps in and can trip up even the experts.  
 
Subsection 1.4.2: A Dangerous Paradigm 
There are two major costs to using the standard picture when one is not narrowly 
interested in underperformance. The first is that the standard picture can lead to 
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inaccuracies and factually misleading statements. Occasionally, social psychologists slip 
up and present the standard picture as a comprehensive definition or account of the 
phenomenon. For instance, one study claims that stereotype threat occurs “when 
individuals believe that a group to which they belong is inferior, resulting in poor test 
performance” (Looby & Earleywine 2010, p. 834). This might simply be rushed wording 
for an abstract, but the definition is inaccurate. Stereotype threat does not require an 
explicit belief about inferiority, and in fact often precludes such a belief.  Furthermore, 
this definition portrays poor test performance as the phenomenon’s inevitable and only 
effect, when it is in fact neither.  This is a particularly stark case of inaccuracy, but it is 
not the only one.  
Other stereotype threat researchers make similar slips regarding performance, 
even when they are accurate in describing other aspects of the phenomenon. For instance, 
one study correctly states that “[s]tereotype threat is defined as the predicament felt by 
people in situations where they could conform to negative stereotypes associated with 
their own group membership” (Rosenthal & Crisp 2006, p. 502). However, the authors 
then use the standard picture in a misleading manner. They write, “The result of this 
threat is that individuals may underperform on a task associated with the threatened 
domain” (Rosenthal & Crisp 2006, p. 502).  Using “the result” instead of “one result” 
implies that this is the only, or the major result, which is not accurate. Therefore, this use 
of the standard picture is somewhat misleading. So psychologists have used the standard 
picture in an inaccurate manner, both when giving correct and incorrect definitions of 
stereotype threat.  Therefore, these inaccuracies can be laid at the feet of the standard 
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picture itself, rather than being due to the quality of the research or the inevitability of an 
inaccuracy here or there among hundreds of scientific studies.  
If this were the only limitation of the standard picture, it would not be that large 
of a problem since it is easily remedied. We could maintain the standard picture but 
simply advocate a more nuanced use of it, where the underperformance effect is 
explicitly described as “an effect” of stereotype threat and not “the effect.” This is a good 
thing to do, for the sake of clarity and communication. However, this is not the only 
problem with the standard picture.  
The second cost of using the standard picture is the temptation to implicitly use it 
as a paradigm. Even if researchers explicitly qualify underperformance as one of many 
effects, they should also refrain from constantly using underperformance as the go-to 
example of a manifestation of stereotype threat—again, unless they are specifically 
concerned with issues of performance. But in general discussions of the phenomenon, 
consistently defaulting to underperformance limits our theoretical understanding of the 
phenomenon and it distracts researchers into ignoring the other effects of stereotype 
threat. This in turn can lead researchers to make bad policy suggestions. That is, an over-
emphasis on underperformance can lead researchers to suggest strategies for coping with 
stereotype threat that could fail to diminish, or even exacerbate, its other negative effects. 
 
Subsection 1.4.3: An Illustration of the Costs of the Standard Picture 
One example where this over-emphasis happens is in Jenessa Shapiro and Joshua 
Aronson’s overview of stereotype threat. Both of these social psychologists have 
acknowledged an expanded picture of stereotype threat in other places in their work, so 
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one would expect them to not forget about the range of stereotype threat’s various 
effects.
12
 So if even their use of the standard picture leads them to ignore important 
implications of stereotype threat’s other effects, then I think we have strong reason to 
discourage the dominance of the standard picture.  
In a recent overview article, Shapiro and Aronson provide a detailed and accurate 
listing of the known effects of stereotype threat. However, when they discuss the 
phenomenon in general, they use the standard picture in a way that marginalizes a large 
portion of the research that they previously acknowledged. For instance, they summarize 
stereotype threat as how “being confronted with negative stereotypes can levy an 
“emotional tax” that interferes with performance” (Shapiro & Aronson 2013, p. 95). They 
single out stereotype threat’s effect of performance here despite the fact that a few pages 
later they give a very detailed list of all the other things with which this emotional tax 
interferes: 
 Stereotype threat also yields reduced self-efficacy (Aronson and Inzlicht 
2004); lowered confidence that one will do well in the stereotyped domain 
(Stangor et al. 1998); lowered aspirations to pursue stereotype-relevant 
careers (Davies et al. 2002; Davies et al. 2005); and negative physical and 
psychological health consequences, including increased general anxiety 
(Ben-Zeev et al. 2005; Bosson et al. 2004), blood pressure (Blascovich et 
al. 2001), and feelings of dejection (Keller & Dauenheimer 2003). 
(Shapiro & Aronson 2013, p. 97) 
Despite this list, Shapiro and Aronson’s general discussion of the phenomenon 
consistently ignores everything but performance. As another example, they conclude that 
“[s]tereotype threat provides a compelling account of how negative stereotypes can 
                                                        
12
 For examples of Aronson and Shapiro’s avoidance of misusing the standard picture, see Aronson et al. 
1999, p. 30; Schmader 2002, p. 194; Aronson & Inzlicht 2004, p. 830; and Shapiro 2011, p. 71. 
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undermine performance” (p. 110). Nowhere do they reiterate that stereotypes can also 
undermine confidence, engagement, or health—which we were just told they can!  
 Furthermore, their focus on underperformance implies that the standard picture is 
more of a comprehensive depiction of the phenomenon than it really is. They fail to point 
out that the standard picture highlights certain aspects of the phenomenon under certain 
conditions—ones that do not always apply to everyone who experiences stereotype 
threat. Specifically, the standard picture focuses on what stereotype threat looks like in 
testing environments and how it affects individuals who are more at risk for 
underperformance—viz., individuals who are highly motivated to do well in those testing 
environments.  For that specific group of people in that sort of environment, it is perfectly 
accurate for Shapiro and Aronson to claim, “[s]tereotype threat does not typically lead to 
a decreased motivation in testing situations; indeed, it most often gives rise to a greater 
desire to do well on a given task” (Shapiro & Aronson 2013, p. 99).  However, this 
statement is not universally accurate. Stereotype threat most often gives rise to a greater 
desire to do well for those individuals who are already motivated to do well in that 
domain—usually because they strongly identity with that domain or take great value from 
belonging there. Or when Shapiro and Aronson report that “participants put forth more 
effort in stereotype threatening situations” (Shapiro & Aronson 2013, p. 99), what they 
actually mean is that participants who are the most susceptible to the underperformance 
effect in this specific domain put forth more effort when experiencing stereotype threat.  
These are crucial qualifications, because research suggests that for individuals who are 
not already highly motivated to succeed in the stereotyped domain, stereotype threat may 
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often for them lead to a decrease in motivation and aspiration to participate and succeed 
in that domain. That is how people come to disengage. Therefore, Shapiro and Aronson 
are (unintentionally, I believe) using the people who are most at risk for the 
underperformance effect as a paradigm of what it is like to be susceptible to stereotype 
threat in general.  
As I argued earlier in the paper, this framing of underperformance as the central 
or paradigmatic example of stereotype threat is unwarranted when we are looking at the 
phenomenon as a whole. The standard picture ignores those people who experience 
stereotype threat, but are the least likely to experience the underperformance effect. 
These people deserve to be part of the discussion; they are still likely to experience 
negative effects from stereotype threat. They are, for instance, the individuals who opt 
out of performing by avoiding the stereotyped domain all together, or the individuals who 
mentally check out and disengage from the tasks at hand.  As an example, the standard 
picture focuses on the student at the front of the class who is furiously scribbling on their 
test, determined to do the best they can. The standard picture ignores the student who 
drops the class after feeling uncomfortable. It also ignores the student at the back of the 
class who gives a half-hearted attempt on the test, flips it over, and is either day dreaming 
about another subject or sitting with their arms crossed, daring anyone to challenge their 
projected apathy. Those students also experience stereotype threat and its negative 
effects, but you would not know it from the standard picture.  
Not only does an overreliance on the standard picture encourage an overly narrow 
view of the phenomenon as a whole, but it also can lead to bad policy suggestions. 
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Shapiro and Aronson spend the latter part of their article discussing practical implications 
of stereotype threat research. Using the standard picture, they argue that stereotype threat 
could potentially be put to good use as a psychological state—since after all it can 
increase motivations (for some individuals.) But again, their suggestion completely 
ignores the laundry list of other negative effects that stereotype threat can cause. They 
use astrophysicist Neil deGrasse Tyson as an example of someone who may have 
benefited from aspects of stereotype threat. However, his own remarks on his education 
and academia in general provide a powerful counter-argument to their suggestion that 
stereotype threat can be used to good effect. Their attempt to show a positive side to 
stereotype threat obscures the other costs that people like deGrasse Tyson have likely 
paid.  Their silver lining conceals a deadly thunderstorm—one that they know exists. 
DeGrasse Tyson has experienced his share of implicit and explicit bias and 
adversity in his life and academic career.  He has publicly discussed what he has 
experienced while pursuing science and what he perceives to be happening more 
generally in our culture.  In his 1991 convocation address at Columbia University, upon 
receiving his PhD, deGrasse Tyson notes: 
In the perception of society my athletic talents are genetic; I am a likely 
mugger/rapist; my academic failures are expected; and my academic 
successes are attributed to others. To spend most of my life fighting these 
attitudes levies an emotional tax that is a form of intellectual emasculation. 
(Shapiro & Aronson 2013, p. 95) 
Shapiro and Aronson point out that this remark indicates that deGrasse Tyson has 
probably experienced many instances of stereotype threat in his life. However, they 
suggest that his experiences may actually have been a boon to him, and not (wholly) an 
“intellectual emasculation.”  They counter:  
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far from emasculating deGrasse Tyson, stereotype threat may have been 
an important motivator for him, a spur to prove his doubters wrong. […] 
Sometimes this motivation backfires, spoiling performance […] but 
sometimes stereotype threat can lift performance, such as when tasks are 
well-learned…. (Shapiro & Aronson 2013, p. 113) 
This commentary is meant in good faith, since the psychologists stipulate that an 
important goal of stereotype threat research is to figure out how to “help transform 
debilitating threats into energizing motivators” (Shapiro & Aronson 2013, p. 113).  They 
are not trying to invalidate deGrasse Tyson’s experiences, but rather, to provide a silver 
lining to his struggles. And their commentary is not inaccurate per se—stereotype threat 
may very well have been a motivational catalyst for deGrasse Tyson.  However, this 
commentary ignores crucial aspects of stereotype threat.  
 Shapiro and Aronson’s suggestion completely ignores the laundry list of negative 
effects on top of underperformance. They themselves had noted only pages earlier that 
stereotype threat can cause “increased general anxiety […], blood pressure […], and 
feelings of dejection” (Shapiro & Aronson 2013, p. 97). First, let’s look at stress. From 
deGrasse Tyson’s remarks, he probably experienced an increase in stress from his 
dealings with negative stereotypes.  His full remarks from which Shapiro and Aronson 
quote read:  
When combined with the dozens of times I have been stopped and 
questioned by the police for going to and from my office after hours, and 
the hundreds of times I am followed by security guards in department 
stores, and the countless times people cross the street upon seeing me 
approach them on the sidewalk, I can summarize my life's path by noting 
that in the perception of society my athletic talents are genetic; I am a 
likely mugger/rapist; my academic failures are expected; and my academic 
successes are attributed to others. (deGrasse Tyson 1991) 
If we factor in the likely stress from these situations that deGrasse Tyson describes, then 
at best, his experiences of stereotype threat have given him a trade-off: increased 
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motivation at the cost of both the potential for underperformance and a nearly definite 
increase in stress levels. In this light, it is not so clear that stereotype threat was more of a 
boon than a detriment, since large amounts of stress can be physiologically and 
psychologically debilitating.   
 Furthermore, stress is not the only other effect we need to factor in. Stereotype 
threat’s effects on performance, whether for good or ill, can also cause a depletion in 
cognitive resources, especially resources of executive control such as willpower (Inzlicht 
& Kang 2010). So, while stereotype threat may have given us a more highly motived 
deGrasse Tyson, it may also have given us a more impulsive deGrasse Tyson who has 
less willpower for other endeavors in his life.  And lastly, stereotype threat might have 
given the world a deGrasse Tyson with a shorter lifespan, since chronic stress can 
potentially decrease one’s longevity and health.   
Therefore, claiming that stereotype threat might actually be an overall boon to 
someone like deGrasse Tyson is somewhat akin to claiming that it is useful to train for a 
task while someone holds a gun to your head and threatens to pull the trigger. Indeed, that 
would probably give you a significant boost in motivation. But that motivational boost is 
nowhere close to outweighing the physiological and psychological costs such an 
experience would likely carry with it. Training under those conditions is only a good idea 
if you are concerned solely with one thing: performance. But if you also care about your 
long-term physical health and psychological well-being, threats on your life and 
stereotype threat will not likely be a net gain for you. There is likely no overall silver-
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lining to this phenomenon, especially when it co-occurs with chronic stress, micro-
aggressions, and social marginalization or oppression.  
Furthermore, while a harsh training regimen (such as chronically experiencing 
stereotype threat) might increase the motivation and performance of an already highly 
talented, motivated, and resilient individual, it could possibly destroy the performance of 
individuals who are trying to develop their talent, motivation, and resilience, but are not 
there yet. For every potential motivation boost that stereotype threat has given deGrasse 
Tyson, how many people have failed to get where he is because they underperformed one 
time too many, or burnt themselves out from chronic stress? As deGrasse Tyson himself 
remarks elsewhere: 
Now here I am, I think, one of the most visible scientists in the land. And I 
look behind me and I say, 'Where are the others who might have been 
this?' And they're not there. And I wonder: Where is the blood on the 
tracks that I happened to survive that others did not simply because of the 
forces of society that prevent it at every turn? (Code Switch 2014) 
To claim that stereotype threat has a silver lining is to ignore the larger picture. It might 
have some small silver lining for a few individuals, but stereotype threat likely has helped 
undermine the career opportunities for many more. 
It is therefore worrisome that under the standard picture, researchers are inclined 
to claim that stereotype threat can be put to good use. It might be—for people who do not 
also chronically experience the other effects of the phenomenon such as disengagement, 
stress, doubt, and higher blood pressure.  However, the people who are most likely to not 
chronically experience those other negative effects are people who do not have 
stigmatized social identities, and thus who are not the people at whom many current 
policy initiatives in education are aimed. Therefore, it would be a terrible idea if Shapiro 
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and Aronson’s notion of a ‘silver lining’ makes its way into policy. Yes, there might be a 
way to use stereotype threat’s effects on motivation to boost performance, but that is 
essentially playing with fire. Thus, the standard picture is a dangerous paradigm to use 
for making policy suggestions—doing so could negatively impact individuals’ quality, 
and even length, of life. 
 
Section 1.5: The Benefits of an Expanded Picture 
If there is a main takeaway from the expanded picture, it is that while 
underperformance is an important and interesting effect of stereotype threat, it is indeed 
only the tip of the iceberg. Stereotype threat has important effects on individuals’ 
performance, but that is not the core of the phenomenon. The phenomenon as a whole is 
really about our reactions to domains that we are negatively stereotyped in, the 
contingencies regarding our social bonds in those domains, and how we think about 
ourselves in relation to those domains. Performance is merely a sliver of this much larger 
picture. Only with this expanded picture can we fully grasp how stereotype threat affects 
not only our success in certain fields, but also our flourishing as human beings and as full 
members of our communities and social networks. 
Thus, whether researchers continue to use the standard picture or switch to an 
expanded picture has important ramifications for social psychology, philosophy, and 
policy initiatives in areas as diverse as education and healthcare.  For social psychology, 
the picture psychologists use to frame their research is also likely to affect the directions 
that research takes as a whole. This has already been shown through a decade-old article 
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that calls out stereotype threat research for being almost wholly fixated on issues of 
performance (Davies, Spencer & Steele 2005).  Since that article, there has been an 
uptick in research that goes “beyond performance.”13 Therefore, if there is an explicit, 
alternative account to the standard picture, it might catalyze a further widening and 
diversification of stereotype threat research. 
For philosophy, the standard picture is currently the dominant way that 
philosophers understand stereotype threat. As we saw, Gendler—who has done extensive 
work on epistemological issues involving psychology and cognitive science—only looks 
at underperformance when considering the potential epistemic costs of stereotype threat 
(Gendler 2011). There may be a host of epistemological questions concerning stereotype 
threat that are obscured by using this picture. Similarly, for ethics, if stereotype threat 
affects motivation and self-identification as much as it does performance, then our moral 
judgments regarding stereotype threat, individuals’ reactions to it, and our policies about 
it should take into consideration those other effects too.  
For philosophy of science, peoples’ use of the standard picture might reveal 
something interesting about scientific models and narratives in general. Scientists find it a 
boon when they hit upon a good heuristic, model, or narrative for describing a particular 
phenomenon. So if the heuristic works well as a general snapshot of the phenomenon, 
then it might become engrained among scientists and non-scientists alike as the main 
depiction of how the phenomenon works. Its engrained status makes it harder for 
                                                        
13
 Examples of work that uses this idea of going “beyond performance” include Derks, Inzlicht & Kang 
2008; Inzlicht & Kang 2010; and Thoman et al. 2013. 
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scientists to update and refine as their experimental and theoretical understandings of the 
phenomenon change. 
Such a thing could be happening with stereotype threat.  The standard picture is 
relatively easy to understand, communicating very nicely how this phenomenon can show 
up in places like the classroom, and making it fairly obvious how the phenomenon could 
be contributing to a significant problem (i.e., performance gaps). Nevertheless, the 
models and heuristic narratives used in psychology are likely to have direct impacts on 
our everyday lives. An overuse of the standard picture of stereotype threat could hinder 
not only the public’s understanding of human behavior, but also our efforts to reduce 
stereotype threat and its damaging effects—which, psychologists admit, extend beyond 
matters of performance. So if policy initiatives use only the standard picture, then they 
are likely to remain unaware that stereotype threat also can dampen academic motivation 
and identification.  If the policy goal is, say, getting more women to major in math or to 
increase high school graduation rates, motivation and identification with school may play 
as significant a role as students’ performance on tests does.  
This has specific ramifications for philosophy as a discipline and profession. We 
know now that women make up only 20-25% of full-time philosophers, and 30% of 
philosophy graduate students (Paxton, Figdor & Tiberius 2012; Hutchinson & Jenkins 
2013). Discussions in philosophy about the underrepresentation of women that involve 
stereotype threat have focused almost solely on issues of performance. The expanded 
picture pinpoints ways in which stereotype threat’s effects on motivation, aspiration, and 
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self-identity could also be exacerbating this underrepresentation. I will take this up 
further in Chapter Four. 
Lastly, an expanded picture can help us identity other contexts in which people 
may experience the negative effects of stereotype threat. One important such context is 
healthcare. Almost no one has looked at stereotype threat in medical contexts, but the 
expanded picture suggests that there could be some significant ramifications for patients 
who experience stereotype threat while undergoing diagnosis. For instance, it has already 
been documented that doctors can be implicitly biased when diagnosing and prescribing 
treatment for patients (White & Chanoff 2011). And there exist many negative 
stereotypes that can apply to patients.  
For instance, a woman could be seen as overly emotional or oversensitive; a 
Black patient could be viewed as overly aggressive or hypersexual; an overweight patient 
could be assumed to be lazy or inactive; and a patient with mental illness could be viewed 
as inherently irrational or unreliable. If these patients experience stereotype threat, it 
could affect their behavior (resulting in, e.g., increases in stress, anxiety, and impulsivity) 
and potentially how they choose to describe themselves and their symptoms. For 
instance, there is currently one study arguing that Black women feel anxiety from 
stereotype threat in healthcare settings (Abdou & Fingerhut 2014). Such responses to 
stereotype threat could in turn exacerbate or trigger the implicitly biased behavior of 
healthcare providers. They could misread their patients’ symptoms, which could lead to 
misdiagnosis. Using an expanding picture of stereotype threat to look at the 
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phenomenon’s potential existence in healthcare settings could be a way of helping reduce 
existing disparities in healthcare, as well as increasing quality of healthcare in general.  
What I hope to have shown is that the picture or paradigm of stereotype threat that 
we use to guide our understanding of the phenomenon matters greatly not just for our 
scientific and philosophical knowledge of human behavior, but also for the material 
impact this phenomenon can have on our daily lives and even our health.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
WHAT ARE STEREOTYPES AND WHY ARE THEY BAD? 
 
  
Section 2.1: Introduction 
Subsection 2.1.1: Overview 
In the previous chapter, I argued that stereotypes, via the phenomenon of 
stereotype threat, can have a range of negative effects on not only an individual’s 
performance, but also on their motivation, interests, and even on their self-identity. These 
effects provide additional support for the claim that stereotypes in general are harmful 
and present moral problems. However, work on stereotypes and stereotype threat 
suggests that stereotypes are incredibly ubiquitous, since they seem to exist for nearly 
every social group, including dominant groups that are not marginalized or stigmatized 
(Steele 2011). Furthermore, humans may be prone to using stereotypes because they can 
serve as cognitive shortcuts (Gendler 2011). This presents a dilemma: what should our 
moral stance be towards stereotypes if they are potentially dangerous and (at least) 
sometimes harmful, but also socially and cognitively entrenched in our practices? Should 
we double down on a blanket moral prohibition against all stereotypes and try to root 
them out of our thinking? Or should we focus our efforts on mitigating and preventing 
some of the specific harms they cause, which may require giving some instances of 
stereotyping a moral pass?  
On the one hand, we might consider the fact that stereotype threat can harm even 
dominant groups as evidence that all stereotypes are morally problematic. But on the 
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other hand, the potential harms of stereotype threat may be greater for socially 
subordinated groups (which I will discuss further in Chapter Three). What I have argued 
about stereotype threat thus far does not definitively push this larger discussion in one 
direction or the other.  
Not only do people often disagree about why stereotypes are immoral and the 
extent of their potential harm, but people also often disagree on what exactly counts as a 
stereotype. Some argue that stereotypes are necessarily false statements. Others argue 
that they only apply to oppressed groups. And others still argue that they necessarily 
essentialize the group they are describing. Philosophers have rightly seen this conceptual 
tangle of definitions and claims as belonging in their wheelhouse, yet recent accounts of 
stereotyping are not fully satisfying. Either they do not capture the full set of phenomena 
that people are often trying to pick out with the word “stereotype,” or they do not 
satisfactorily account for the features many people want to attribute to stereotypes.  
In this chapter, I will analyze two philosophical accounts of stereotypes, one by 
Erin Beeghley (2015) and the other by Lawrence Blum (2004). Both accounts are 
insightful, but ultimately dissatisfying for someone trying to both capture our everyday 
notions of stereotypes, and also account for the features people often attribute to them. 
Beeghley’s account attempts to find a “descriptive view” that can serve as a neutral 
description of stereotypes, but she ends up presuming a controversial premise that 
broadens the definition of stereotyping in a way that many people would not agree with. 
Lawrence Blum presents some insightful aspects of stereotypes, but his focus is so 
  
31 
narrow that it is hard to reconcile his account with how we use the concept of stereotypes 
in everyday situations. 
However, these accounts do provide good starting points for untangling the mass 
of questions and concerns that I discussed above. By using parts of Beeghley’s and 
Blum’s accounts, I will develop a dual account of stereotypes in order to explain both the 
broad way that people sometimes use the term, and the claims others make about specific 
flaws that stereotypes necessarily (or primarily) have. I will argue that the “narrow moral 
view” of stereotypes that I articulate provides some insight into the phenomenon of 
stereotype threat. On the narrow moral view, generalizations are stereotypes when they 
undermine the moral status of a social group. We might also distinguish these as 
something like “morally pernicious stereotypes.” In undermining the moral status of the 
groups they target, morally pernicious stereotypes will in practice often undermine 
individuals’ status as full human persons. They do this by contributing to 
dehumanization, or more generally what Katharine Jenkins calls “ontic injustice” 
(Jenkins 2016).  
This distinction between general stereotypes and morally pernicious ones is 
important to keep in mind when analyzing the effects and impact of phenomena like 
stereotype threat. For someone to experience stereotype threat, the threat of any negative 
judgment suffices. But a White man experiencing stereotype threat in the domain of 
athletics may not receive the full “brunt” of the phenomenon, unlike a Black woman 
experiencing stereotype threat in her science class. Researchers have indicated that they 
are aware that members of socially subordinated groups likely experience stronger effects 
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and a deeper impact from stereotype threat, but they rarely discuss these effects in detail. 
I will do so regarding effects on self-identity in Chapter Three. But to set the stage for 
that chapter, I will argue here that stereotypes generally carry more potential harm for 
socially subordinated groups.  
 
Subsection 2.1.2: Three Questions about Stereotypes 
Most of us are familiar with the concept of a stereotype. It is also fairly easy to 
pick out some examples that most of us will agree are, in fact, stereotypes. Such 
paradigmatic examples include: “women are overly emotional,” “gamers are lazy,” “Jews 
are cheap,” “gay men are fashion-savvy,” “Asians are good at math,” and 
“Midwesterners are friendly.” However, underneath this cultural consensus there is stark 
disagreement about more fundamental questions regarding stereotypes. People, both in 
everyday and academic contexts, often disagree about the answers to the following three 
questions: 
(1) What is the definition of a stereotype? 
(2) Why are stereotypes problematic? 
(3) Are all stereotypes always or inherently problematic? 
Our account of (1), what stereotypes are, will in part determine our normative accounts of 
(2) and (3). However, many arguments regarding (1) already presume answers to (2) and 
(3). For instance, Larry Blum (2004) argues that a stereotype is a specifically rigid kind 
of generalization that carries a false implication and undermines personhood. On his 
account, stereotypes by definition have specific epistemic and moral flaws.  
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Thus, untangling these three questions can be rather difficult. Because people 
have a wide range of different premises about stereotypes, it is very easy to talk past 
someone else’s account. I will argue that this happens in Erin Beeghley’s (2015) recent 
account of stereotypes, where she misconstrues some of Blum’s arguments. While 
Beeghley approaches Blum’s account as if the two of them are disagreeing about 
questions (2) and (3), she does not acknowledge that they more fundamentally disagree 
about question (1). Specifically, Blum argues for a particularly narrow definition of 
stereotypes, whereas Beeghley argues for a broader “descriptive view.” Because of this 
difference in their accounts of (1), some of Beeghley’s criticisms of Blum, as they stand, 
do not stick. And as a result of this, some of her conclusions are not warranted as is. 
 In particular, she concludes that we cannot maintain a “yes” answer to question 
(3) and claim that all stereotypes are inherently problematic.  I will argue that she has not, 
in fact, shown this; she has only shown that those who are satisfied with an account as 
broad as hers cannot maintain a “yes” answer to (3). But Blum would not be satisfied 
with such a broad account; so on his narrower account, he can still maintain that all 
stereotypes are inherently problematic.  As a result, Beeghley’s account of stereotypes 
does not make as much headway in this debate as it hopes to.   
 
Section 2.2: The Limitation of Beeghley’s “Descriptive View” of Stereotypes 
Erin Beeghley develops and defends a “descriptive view” of stereotypes, which 
she claims is “assumed in much of the psychological and philosophical literature on 
implicit bias and stereotyping, yet has not been sufficiently defended” (2015, p. 675). Her 
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descriptive view aims to describe what we take stereotypes to be without assuming any 
normative features about them, such as those which are involved in some specific 
answers to questions (2) and (3). She wants to first delineate what stereotypes are, then 
ask whether it is the case that they are all problematic, and why or why not this is the 
case.   
She acknowledges that on this approach, she will not be able to immediately 
adjudicate certain debates about the metaphysics of stereotypes, but argues that for the 
purposes of making headway on questions (2) and (3), she does not have to. One such 
metaphysical disagreement arises in psychology research on stereotypes. Beeghley 
observes that whereas some psychologists take stereotypes to be specific sorts of 
concepts about social groups, others define them as psychological entities (such as 
networks of associations) that are necessary for the formation of concepts about social 
groups (2015, p. 680). Beeghley argues that whichever of these accounts is right—
whether stereotypes are concepts or the associative networks that help form concepts—
they will create similar effects.  
That is, on both of these accounts, people may claim, for instance, that women are 
overly emotional or express surprise when their Black coworker reports that they like 
country music. The latter part of the stereotyping process will look the same in many 
situations, so we can analyze that part of the process even if we have not come to an 
answer about the earlier part of the process. As Beeghley puts it, “When we ask, ‘What’s 
wrong with stereotyping?’ we are asking primarily, ‘What’s wrong with forming 
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expectations of individuals based on group membership and structuring our interactions 
accordingly?’” (2015, p. 679).  
While this question about forming expectations may seem like simply a 
restatement of question (2), it is actually an instance of question begging that causes 
trouble for Beeghley’s project. The whole point of Beeghley’s project is to not presume 
any normative features of stereotypes while developing her descriptive view. But here 
she is claiming that if something is problematic about stereotypes, it is because there is 
something problematic about forming expectations of individuals based on group 
membership.  
This claim is not a premise shared by all who work on stereotypes. For instance, 
on Blum’s account, the problem with stereotypes is narrower: it is a problem with 
forming expectations about individuals based on group membership in a certain way—
i.e., in a way that is resistant to counter-evidence. When Beeghley analyzes Blum’s 
claims about questions (2) and (3), she concludes that they are “too strong” (Beeghley 
2015, p. 688). But she does not end up giving an argument for this conclusion; rather, she 
bakes a partial answer into her premises. She has already declared that part of the answer 
to “why are stereotypes problematic?” is that stereotyping is reducible to forming 
expectations about someone based on group membership. As a result, her account of 
stereotypes picks out such a broad set of phenomena that Blum’s claims about 
stereotypes often will not apply.  
Blum, on the other hand, picks out a much narrower set of phenomena than 
Beeghley does. So it should not be surprising that the generalizations he makes about that 
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narrower set of phenomena that he calls “stereotypes” seems false when Beeghley applies 
them to the much broader set of phenomena she is looking at. For instance, Blum claims 
that all “stereotypes” constitute a form of disrespect, insofar as they fail to treat people as 
individuals, which is an acknowledgement of their personhood (Blum 2004, p. 272-3). 
Beeghley disagrees with this claim, giving the counterexample of a panicked father in an 
emergency room looking for a doctor. Relying on the “stereotype” that doctors wear 
white coats, the father might grab the nearest person in such a coat, expecting them to be 
a doctor. 
 Here is a stereotype that forms an expectation based on group membership, but 
that does not seem to be epistemically or morally problematic. Blum would actually agree 
with Beeghley’s point here. As he acknowledges, “treating or seeing others as individuals 
is not always a required or appropriate standard of conduct” (2004, p. 272). But Blum 
would not accept this example as a counterexample to his claims about stereotypes 
because he would deny that this case is an instance of stereotyping. On Blum’s account, a 
stereotype is not the formation of any expectation about an individual based on group 
membership. It is the formation of a rigid expectation (that is false or misleading) about 
an individual based on essentialized group membership. What he picks out as 
“stereotypes” are those generalizations that are resistant to counter-evidence and that (at 
the very least) imply something misleading about the group being stereotyped (Blum 
2004, p. 256-260). Because there is nothing misleading about the generalization that 
doctors wear white coats, and the father in Beeghley’s example does not show any 
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resistance to counter-evidence regarding this generalization, the father is not stereotyping 
doctors, on Blum’s account. 
This disagreement about whether the father in Beeghley’s example is in fact 
stereotyping demonstrates that Beeghley’s account of stereotypes is broader than Blum’s. 
Blum might argue that Beeghley’s descriptive view identifies necessary but not sufficient 
conditions for something’s being a stereotype. Can Beeghley defend the descriptive view 
from this objection? She tries to, but fails to make her case because she assumes the 
principle that she ultimately needs to justify. That is, she assumes that forming 
expectations about individuals based on group membership is the core of what 
stereotypes are, as I show below.  
Beeghley addresses the sort of objection I have made on Blum’s behalf by 
acknowledging that some people may want the concept of a stereotype to be more thickly 
normative than it is on her descriptive view. So she is aware that some might argue that 
her broad delineation of stereotypes “misses something essential” (i.e., sufficient) about 
stereotypes (Beeghley 2015, p. 684). She argues that we should not assume that 
stereotypes are a thickly normative concept—but again, this is actually question-begging. 
If we all had the same set of phenomena in mind, picked out by a non-normative 
definition, then yes, we should not assume that set of phenomena could be described by a 
thickly normative concept. We need to show it.  
But the disagreement she is having with some people is a disagreement about 
which set of phenomena we should pick out in the first place. It turns out that the version 
of question (1) she needs to answer is not, “what exactly are stereotypes?” but rather, 
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“what set of phenomena deserve the name ‘stereotypes’?” On Blum’s account, only 
generalizations that are false or misleading deserve to be called “stereotypes.” Beeghley 
counters that people sometimes use a broader notion when picking out stereotypes, such 
as when someone calls something a stereotype, but qualifies that it is true (Beeghley 
2015, p. 685). However, since people need to qualify this feature of a stereotype’s being 
true, this points to a paradigmatic notion of stereotypes as being false. This point is not 
definitive either way, so Beeghley needs to argue against the specific reasons behind a 
narrower definition of stereotypes. 
She discusses two different kinds of claims about stereotypes, which could serve 
as justifications for a narrower definition of stereotypes.  Therefore, if she can argue 
against these claims, she will have a case against a narrower definition of stereotypes. 
She refers to these claims as the “epistemic hypothesis,” which is that all stereotypes 
have some epistemic flaw, and the “moral hypothesis,” which is that all stereotypes have 
some moral flaw.  So again, if she can make a case against the epistemic and moral 
hypotheses—that there is some unifying flaw in all stereotypes—this could also act as an 
argument for her broader delineation of what stereotypes are.  
Examples of the moral hypothesis include Blum’s claim that all stereotypes fail to 
treat people as individuals, and in doing so, undermine personhood. As I mentioned 
above though, Beeghley’s critiques of Blum’s moral hypothesis are question-begging. 
She has already decided on an account of stereotypes by which Blum’s claims are too 
strong. She does not offer an explicit justification for why we should use her broader 
account in the first place. 
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This problem for her account becomes clearer when she discusses the epistemic 
hypothesis. Examples of the epistemic hypothesis include the claims that all stereotypes 
are false, unjustified, or unreliable. Beeghley argues that the epistemic hypothesis faces a 
general problem: “If, as the descriptive view suggests, stereotyping involves categorizing 
individuals as members of kinds and forming expectations about them on that basis, 
stereotyping could not always be epistemically wrong” (2015, p. 687). She is right that if 
stereotyping is reducible to forming expectations in this way, then not every instance of 
that will be problematic.  
But again, what I am pushing her on is the claim that stereotypes are reducible to 
simply the formation of expectations based on group membership. She has not raised an 
objection to the epistemic hypothesis that does not already assume her own account. And 
as she continues to spell out this objection, she also is making the case for why her 
descriptive view may be too broad:  
[I]f we claim that it is never rational to stereotype, we will have to endorse 
this thought in other domains as well. We will have to say, for example, 
that it is never rational to form expectations about anything based on the 
fact that it belongs to a certain population or kind. It is very hard to believe 
that we could accept such an implication when it comes to forming 
expectations about objects like chairs or nonhuman animals or physical 
events like lightning storms. So why would the thought be justified when 
it comes to people? (Beeghley 2015, p. 687) 
Why indeed would we think that simply forming an expectation about a person based on 
a category they belong to is inherently problematic?  It seems rather straightforward that 
this thought would not be justified when it comes to people. Beeghley’s doctor example 
is one such instance where such an expectation seems relatively rational and 
epistemically justified.  
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However, we can flip this question. If our everyday uses of the term “stereotype” 
imply that there is something epistemically flawed about stereotyping, why should we 
think this term applies to all expectations and generalizations that are based on group 
membership? Doesn’t it seem plausible that perhaps we are instead picking out some 
specific subgroup of expectations that are actually problematic? Beeghley does not 
address this point, and so she does not offer an explicit justification for why our account 
of stereotypes should pick out such a broad set of phenomena as, basically, all 
expectations about individuals based on group membership.  
 Her implied reasoning for a broad delineation of stereotypes is perhaps that this is 
the set of phenomena that psychologists are talking about. So if we want to understand 
stereotypes as schemas or associative networks, we need an account that picks out those 
phenomena. But Beeghley herself points out that stereotypes are not meant to be 
synonymous with schemas or associative networks in general. She notes that according to 
Virginia Valien, “The term schema is broader and more neutral than the term stereotype” 
(Beeghley 2015, p. 685).  So actually, even here we see a reason to aim for a narrower 
account of stereotypes. Beeghley’s account is left without a justification for one of its 
central propositions: namely, that a stereotype is simply or primarily an expectation about 
an individual based on group membership.  
 
Section 2.3: A Dual Account of Stereotypes 
Beeghley’s descriptive view is not without merit. It is a helpful starting point for 
investigating how broad or narrow our delineation of stereotypes should be. At the end of 
the day, the answer to this issue will depend on what we want the definition of 
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stereotypes to pick out. For instance, do we want to pick out a set of cognitive 
phenomena that a specific group of scientists are studying, which may or may not map on 
to how we traditionally use the term? Or do we want to pick out a set of phenomena that 
are often or always problematic, in order to point out and address that problem?  
Because there are multiple projects that the term “stereotype” can be used for, my 
aim in this chapter is to articulate a dual account of stereotypes that is useful for both 
descriptive and normative projects. What this means is that I will develop two accounts, a 
broader and a narrower one. I do not take these accounts to be exhaustive of all the 
plausible accounts of stereotypes, but they cover a good range thereof and are useful for 
adjudicating the sort of disputes that Beeghley’s account intends to. Furthermore, the 
narrower account may shed some light on why stereotypes, even ones that we do not 
necessarily believe, can be threatening to our self-worth. 
 
Subsection 2.3.1: The Broad Epistemic View 
The “broad epistemic view” of stereotypes that I develop here attempts to not 
only capture the set of phenomena that we often refer to as “stereotypes” in everyday 
contexts, but also attempts to broaden the notion a bit to include all phenomena that have 
the same significant epistemic features that “stereotypes” paradigmatically have. I will 
not be approaching this view as Beeghley approaches hers, which is by delineating a 
descriptive account of stereotypes, then figuring out the normative features of that 
account. Instead, I will hone in on the paradigmatic epistemic problem that stereotypes 
are purported to have, then figure out what set of phenomena that problem delineates. I 
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argue that it picks out a set of phenomena that is somewhat broader than our everyday use 
of the term, but that is narrower than Beeghley’s descriptive account. And this broad, 
epistemic account that I develop is useful, insofar as it helps explain why we focus on 
stereotypes as a problematic sort of generalizations.
14
  
A common, everyday notion of stereotypes is that they are false generalizations 
about people: e.g., “women are irrational,” “gamers are lazy,” “Jews are cheap,” “Blacks 
are good dancers,” “Asians are good at math,” “Muslims are terrorists,” etc. Some people 
treat almost any generalization about a social group as a problematic stereotype, but 
philosophers have pointed out that not all generalizations about social groups are false. 
For instance, if we report the results of scientific research, such as “women score higher 
on measures of empathy” and “Black American students get lower grades than White 
American students,” these seem to be neither problematic generalizations, nor 
stereotypes. But if I said, “women are more empathetic,” that does fit the paradigmatic 
notion of a stereotype. Interestingly, “Black students do worse in school” seems at least 
to me to be on the fence regarding whether or not it fits the paradigmatic notion of a 
stereotype. Saying “Blacks are poor students,” however, definitely does.  
From these examples, we might claim that once we move from generalized 
observations (“women score higher on measures of empathy”) to generalized claims 
about social group features (“women are more empathetic”), then we have entered 
stereotype territory. So paradigmatic stereotypes are generalizations about group features 
                                                        
14
 The broadest possible account of a “stereotype” might claim that it is simply synonymous with a 
generalization or cognitive shortcut based on categories. But if that is the case, the term “stereotype” would 
be superfluous, it would not pick out any unifying epistemic problem, and it certainly would not come close 
to picking out the set of phenomena we usually associate with the term. 
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specifically. This fits with Beeghley’s descriptive view, insofar as stereotypes concern 
“forming expectations of individuals based on group membership” (Beeghley 2015, p. 
679). The “based on” is important: stereotypes are not just generalizations about groups, 
but more specifically, generalizations that are solely or primarily based on group 
membership, and thus end up describing features of group membership.  
This is why Beeghley’s example of a father stereotyping people in white coats 
does not fit the paradigmatic notion of a stereotype. The father is not generalizing based 
primarily on membership in a social group. That is, expecting someone who is wearing a 
white lab coat in a hospital to be a doctor does not fit the common use of the term 
“stereotype.” Compare that example, for instance, to a case where someone expects that a 
gamer will be an overweight person who does not lead an active lifestyle. In the doctor 
example, the father is using specific evidence—his location, the person’s clothes—to 
form his expectation. But in the gamer example, one is using nothing but the category 
“gamer” to form one’s expectations.  
Furthermore, there are some generalizations based solely on group membership 
that still do not paradigmatically seem like stereotypes. For example, if I form the 
expectation that my friend Carly will vote against a certain proposition which would 
expand some government program on the basis that Carly is a Tea Partier, this does not 
seem to be a case of stereotyping. It is not inaccurate, disrespectful, or presumptuous. Tea 
Partiers are, practically by definition, people who support smaller government. So 
perhaps stereotyping is forming an expectation based primarily on group membership 
that does not stem from necessary features of that group. Since the Tea Party is founded 
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on principles of smaller government, opposition to expanding government programs is a 
core part of being a Tea Partier. In contrast, if I expected my friend Carly to be closed-
minded because she is a Tea Partier, this would be a stereotype, because it is an 
expectation based primarily on group membership that does not stem from necessary 
features of belonging to that group.  
However, not all expectations based on non-core features of group membership 
are epistemically faulty expectations. Building off of Beeghley’s list (2015, p. 687), the 
sorts of epistemic charges brought against stereotypes range from the following: they are 
false or inaccurate, they are unjustified even if some happen to be accurate, and they are 
generally unreliable even if some are somewhat justified. I argue that the latter charge is 
closest to what is really at issue with stereotypes (epistemically). Specifically, stereotypes 
tell or imply a bad causal story—that is, they support misunderstandings of the causes of 
group features, even if they end up being somewhat reliable or accurate ways to predict 
behavior. This explains why some of us argue that stereotypes are unreliable even when 
others point out that they are true in some sense.  
Let’s go through some examples to see how this plays out, especially when we 
extend the notion “stereotype” to generalizations about non-living things. For instance, 
forming expectations about what certain molecules are going to do based on those 
molecules’ membership as a certain kind of molecule (e.g., H2O) rarely creates the 
problem of a bad causal story. Let’s consider the generalization:  
Water freezes at 32 degrees Fahrenheit.  
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It is not false to make generalized claims about how water molecules behave, nor is it 
epistemically unjustified or an unreliable way to predict the behavior of water molecules. 
And we are not misunderstanding the causal mechanisms of the behavior of water when 
we attribute many of its features to its identity as an H2O molecule. This last point 
explains why we may accept the above generic statement as true, even if water does not 
in fact freeze at the same temperature in all cases. When it freezes at temperatures other 
than 32 degrees Fahrenheit, it is because the causal story includes something besides its 
being H2O, such as the additional presence of salt. 
What about generalizations regarding non-human animals? Let’s consider two 
potential stereotypes about animals, one that is not normally considered a stereotype and 
one that has been labeled a stereotype: 
Dogs are domesticated. 
Pit bulls are dangerous.  
For the first statement about dogs, we can tell a similar story to the one I gave for water: 
this generalization seems accurate, justified, reliable, and does not give or imply a 
misleading causal story. What about the second statement though? Some have claimed 
that it is not an accurate claim about pit bulls, especially compared to other dog breeds. 
But even if it were accurate that pit bulls are involved in more injuries to people and 
other animals when compared to other dog breeds, some might argue that this claim is 
still not a justified or reliable generalization. They could argue that many pit bulls are 
owned by abusive owners, and abuse makes a dog dangerous more so than its breed. Or 
they might argue that only some pit bulls (the ones that are abused or used in dogfighting) 
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are dangerous, and so this generalization is unreliable, because it only applies to a subset 
of pit bulls. At the end of the day, these criticisms culminate in the same point—namely, 
that the generalization gives or implies a bad causal story.  Specifically, the claim “pit 
bulls are dangerous” implies that the dangerousness of dogs can be assessed by the very 
breed, as opposed to the conditions that individual dogs have lived under or their owners’ 
handling of them.  
If this is right—that the epistemic failing of a bad implied causal story is the 
primary problem with stereotypes—then many of us have been operating with too narrow 
a definition of stereotypes. On this account, the claim that “fatty foods are unhealthy” 
could be a stereotype, if we can show that it supports or implies an inaccurate or 
misleading causal story about why food that is fatty tends to cause health problems. For 
instance, I could argue that foods are only “unhealthy” in a certain quantity, so this claim 
wrongly attributes unhealthiness to the type of food eaten, as opposed to the amount of 
food eaten, or the variety of different foods eaten. To make this sort of claim not be a 
stereotype, we could say, “large proportions of fatty foods are unhealthy.” 
I take this account to be in-line with Blum’s analysis of why stereotypes are 
epistemically problematic, although he focuses on how they are ultimately inaccurate. 
Blum defines stereotypes as being in part false or misleading generalizations, though he 
actually acknowledges the various ways that a stereotype might be technically accurate. 
He argues that stereotypes are all necessarily false because they imply that “if Xs are Y 
[…] this is something distinctive about Xs” (Blum 2004, p. 256). This notion of 
“distinctiveness,” however, is another way of saying that stereotypes “essentialize” group 
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membership. And wrongly essentialized group features are what lead to a bad causal 
story. Blum also argues that stereotypes resist revision based on evidence (2004, p. 272). 
Another way to say this is that stereotypes are treated as explanations instead of 
observations. Thus, a claim like “women are more nurturing” is a stereotype when it tries 
to explain, or is taken to be explaining, something about women as such. This is perhaps 
another reason why the line between pernicious stereotype and harmless generalization 
can be blurred. People may hear a generalization as an explanation, even if it was only 
meant to be an observation. For instance, if a sociologist says, “Black men are more 
likely to be convicted of a crime,” that is not a stereotype if it is used and perceived only 
as an observation. It becomes a stereotype when one takes it as explaining some 
distinctive or inherent feature of Black men.  
This may be part of what happened with Daniel Moynihan’s report “The Negro 
Family: The Case for National Action,” which Ta-Nehisi Coates has recently written on. 
In his report, Moynihan argues that “the federal government was underestimating the 
damage done to black families by ‘three centuries of sometimes unimaginable 
mistreatment’ as well as a ‘racist virus in the American blood stream,’ which would 
continue to plague blacks in the future” (Coates 2015). Monyihan concludes, “The Negro 
family, battered and harassed by discrimination, injustice, and uprooting, is in the deepest 
trouble” (as cited in Coates 2015). I argue that insofar as Monyihan meant this statement 
to be an observation, and not an explanation that stems from racial identity, he is not 
stereotyping Black families. He is making observations based on evidence other than 
mere group membership. That evidence is the things he mentions: prevalence of 
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discrimination, injustice, etc. (This is not to imply that there was nothing problematic 
with Monyihan’s report. Coates argues that his report was misogynistic, among other 
things.) 
However, Coates argues that many people took away a different message from 
Monyihan’s report. Specifically, the press did not treat President Johnson’s speech about 
Monyihan’s report  “as a claim of white responsibility, but rather as a condemnation of 
‘the failure of Negro family life,’ as the journalist Mary McGrory put it” (Coates 2015). 
People began (or continued) to attribute the “breakdown” of the Black American family 
to Blackness—to children born outside of wedlock, female-led households, etc. Now we 
are well within the territory of stereotyping when we not only observe a correlation 
(however accurate it is or not) between, say, female-led household and race, but attribute 
or imply that this correlation is caused by, or is essential to, race.  
What I have described above I call the “broad epistemic view of stereotypes.” On 
this account, to engage in stereotyping is to employ a generic view
15
 of a group in a way 
that supports or implies a bad causal story about that group—usually by wrongly 
essentializing certain features of that group. This account is useful because it can help us 
explain when a generalization crosses the line from non-stereotype to stereotype, and 
why some statements that are not meant to be stereotypes may still end up becoming 
them when spoken out loud, or being treated as them by some people and not others.  
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 I define stereotypes here in terms of “views” to take up Beeghley’s point that stereotypes do not 
necessarily need to be spoken or written generalizations. For instance, if someone of race X expresses 
interest in activity Y, and upon hearing of this your reaction is one of surprise, it might be that your 
reaction is caused by a cognitive stereotype that you hold—even if you never explicitly think or say, “Xs 
don’t Y”. 
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Some might think this account is ultimately too broad, since it would allow views 
about non-human animals and even inanimate objects to count as stereotypes. And it 
might be the case that, psychologically, we do not think about and categorize non-living 
things the same way we categorize living things. So perhaps the broad epistemic view 
only picks out metaphorical stereotypes. Even if that is the case, it is useful to identify the 
larger set of generalizations that have the same epistemic flaws as stereotypes do. It 
allows us to ask the following question: is there anything else problematic about all or 
most stereotypes, in addition to this epistemic flaw of insinuating a bad causal story? In 
fact there is.   
 
Subsection 2.3.2: The Narrow Moral View 
Someone might argue that we need a narrow account of stereotypes that picks out 
a specific moral harm on top of the more general epistemic harm that some or all 
stereotypes bring about. They might argue that a common notion of a stereotype is that of 
a generalization that fails to treat people as individuals, and this moral failing is what 
actually delineates stereotypes from other sorts of generalizations. Beeghley argues that 
we cannot accept this definition at face value, because there have actually been multiple 
charges brought against stereotypes. They have been accused of “failing to apply fair 
procedures […], humiliating expressions of social superiority, […and leading to] 
negative effects of allowing stereotypes to structure our interactions with others” 
(Beeghley 2015, p. 688). This is why Beeghley argues that we may need to simply be 
pluralists about the moral wrongs of stereotypes. I think Beeghley jumps to pluralism too 
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quickly here, without giving the “fails to treat people as individuals” line of thought 
enough of a chance.  
For instance, in Blum’s account we find an interesting argument regarding the 
moral wrongs of stereotypes, one that tries to account for our concern about individuality, 
while actually going beyond it. Specifically, Blum argues that failing to treat people as 
individuals is immoral when doing so undermines their personhood. So on his account, 
stereotypes are immoral when they fail to treat people as full persons. I argue that 
personhood in this context is a kind of moral status. So more generally, stereotypes are 
those generalizations that wrongfully undermine the moral status of the stereotyped 
groups.   
This definition can unify the examples of moral wrongs that Beeghley mentions: 
unfairness, humiliation, and the other negative effects that stereotypes cause. I call this 
the narrow moral status view of stereotypes.  What is nice about this account is that it 
gives us concrete criteria to determine whether generalizations about non-humans count 
as stereotypes, such as the pit bull example. It also explains why people might disagree 
about whether “pit bulls are dangerous” counts as a stereotype. That is, it depends on 
whether you think that generalization wrongfully undermines the moral status of pit bulls, 
or whether you think pit bulls have any moral status to begin with, or if you think the 
generalization is wrongfully undermining the moral status of this breed of dog.  
In addition, we can now explain that generalizations about food will never be a 
stereotype, unless food gains a moral status. For those who view “moral status” as 
anything with a moral trait— good/bad, healthy/unhealthy, etc.—then there can be 
  
51 
stereotypes about food. But for those with a narrower conception of “moral status,” 
whereby it means some status in a moral community that can only be granted to agents or 
living beings, then there cannot be stereotypes about food. By explaining stereotypes in 
terms of their effects on moral status, we can better understand and explain why we so 
often disagree about what counts as one. I am currently ambivalent on how broad or 
narrow our conception of moral community should be. For instance, if it is the case that 
stereotypes about human groups function differently than stereotypes about groups of 
non-living things, that might be a good reason to restrict the notion of a moral community 
to things that we think about in a certain way. But it may be the case that really only a 
lack of moral imagination stops us from viewing non-human animals as part of our moral 
communities in the same way that other humans are. In that case, it may be only 
speciesism that stops us from viewing stereotypes about pit bulls as stereotypes.  
Furthermore, we might want to qualify this view as one where a stereotype 
plausibly or likely undermines a group’s moral status in a wrongful way. Whether the 
view “White men are dangerous” is as much of a stereotype as “Muslims are dangerous” 
hinges on whether both generalizations are taken as undermining the moral status of these 
groups to an equal degree. This can explain (in part) why some people harp on instances 
of stereotypes that they view as instances of “reverse racism.” The narrow moral view 
can push back on this. Technically, yes, generalizations about a dominant group could, 
under certain conditions, undermine its moral status. However, those conditions are very 
unlikely to come about, which is why many people get annoyed with these sorts of 
accusations. They are possible harms, but not very likely ones, whereas stereotypes about 
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oppressed groups create very likely or actual harms via the undermining of their social 
status.   
Similarly, we need to stipulate that stereotypes wrongfully undermine group 
status. Again, for instance, some people employ generalizations about dominant groups to 
mock their dominant status and dismantle their privilege. As examples, I am thinking of 
stand-up comics’ routines that talk about men or White people in a generalized way. 
They might say things such as, “White people are crazy” or “men are stupid.” Now, there 
is a way that bad comedy could turn these statements into stereotypes (on the broad 
epistemic view): as generalizations that imply a bas causal story. That is, someone could 
have a joke where they say, “men are stupid” and imply that this stupidity is attributed to 
the category of maleness—which is often taken to be a biological category.  
But one could also use a view such as “men are stupid” to poke at the sort of 
privilege that men often benefit from and are oblivious to. For instance, one could point 
out the ways that men often try to explain things to women that they actually have good 
reason to suspect know much more about the topic than they do. This is a paradigmatic 
description of “mansplaining.” And if someone points out that men are stupid because 
they often do not recognize expertise in women, and they imply that this is due to their 
status as members of a dominant social group, not an essential feature of the group itself, 
it would not be an instance of stereotyping, because it would not wrongfully lower that 
group’s moral status. It rightfully calls out male privilege and seeks to dismantle it.  
Thus, we can give a fairly unified account of stereotypes while acknowledging 
that social context will determine which stereotypes are actually wrongful, and to what 
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degree. If we want to reserve the word “stereotype” for those instances that are in fact or 
are very likely to be harmful, we can refer to the broader set of generalizations (such as 
those about dominant groups) as “potential stereotypes.” This acknowledges that these 
generalizations have the potential to play the same role in undermining moral status as 
“active” stereotypes, under the right conditions. Another benefit of this account is that we 
can explain what is a problem with a claim such as, “yes I used a stereotype, but it’s 
true!” True statements can still be used to undermine personhood or moral status, so 
pointing out that a stereotype is true is not an excuse if that stereotype still is disrespectful 
or callous. 
Thus, on the narrow moral view of stereotypes, stereotypes are generalizations or 
expectations about individuals, based primarily on their group status, that plausibly risk 
wrongfully undermining those individuals’ moral status by implying an essentialized 
causal story about the behavior or features of that group. Some might think that what I 
describe here is more properly a subset of stereotypes—a set that is particularly harmful 
or dangerous. That might be right, and if that is the case, we could label these “morally 
pernicious stereotypes.” As I will discuss in the next section, morally pernicious 
stereotypes can be extra threatening to individuals’ self-worth, even if those individuals 
do not initially believe the stereotype to be accurate.  
 
Section 2.4: Dehumanization, Ontic Injustice, and Stereotype Threat 
How does a mere stereotype become capable of undermining a group’s moral 
status? Some might argue that stereotypes, or anything that focuses on group 
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membership, fail to respect people as individuals, and that undermines their moral 
status—usually as persons. However, as pointed out by Beeghley and Blum, one does not 
always need to be acknowledged as an individual in order to be respected as a person, as 
illustrated in my discussion of Beeghley’s doctor case.   
So we might turn to another of Blum’s claims—namely, that stereotypes 
encourage a kind of “moral distancing” from the stereotyped group. Many negative 
stereotypes imply that the stereotyped group is inferior to other groups. Blum points out 
that this is one sort of moral distancing, because viewing someone as inferior is one way 
of viewing them as “other.” But it is not the only way that stereotypes may lead to moral 
distancing. Even positive stereotypes can create moral distancing, since the stereotype 
still “intensifies a sense of difference and separateness between the stereotyper and the 
stereotyped” (Blum 2004, p. 276).16 Because they are emphasizing differences, people 
who use stereotypes “fail to experience a sense of commonality, of mutual 
identification—for example, of a shared civic fate, or of common humanity” (Blum 2004, 
p. 276). Another way to put this is that stereotypes lead to moral distancing by making it 
easier for us to conceive of the stereotyped group as not really belonging in our own 
moral community. And if our moral community is made up of individuals with the moral 
status of being persons, then people outside that moral community may have their status 
as persons undermined by this distancing. To flesh this out, I will draw from two recent 
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 It is an interesting question to ask what is going on when someone endorses a stereotype about their own 
group, in a way that includes themselves. It may be the case that they are distancing themselves and their 
group from everyone else, but if they do so with a self-deprecating stereotype, are they undermining their 
own personhood? In some cases, that does not seem to be the intent.  
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philosophical projects: David Livingstone Smith’s discussion of dehumanization and 
Katharine Jenkins’s discussion of Ontic Injustice.  
 
Subsection 2.4.1: Dehumanization 
David Livingstone Smith offers one of the few philosophical accounts of 
dehumanization. He analyzes one extreme form of moral distancing, whereby some 
groups of humans are viewed as having a non-human essence, in order to make violence 
against them easier. They are compared to animals and disease to emphasize this essence. 
Insofar as many of us consider our humanity to be the anchor of our moral personhood, 
we can undermine that personhood by denying one’s humanity. Livingstone Smith also 
notes that sometimes members of dehumanized groups have their individuality denied by 
being compared to swarms or hives of creatures that are all fungible (Livingstone Smith 
2011). He argues, “dehumanization is the belief that some beings only appear human, but 
beneath the surface, where it really counts, they aren’t human at all” (2011, p. 4-5). 
 This is a dehumanization that explains why the Nazis referred to Jews as 
“subhuman,” why preceding the Rwandan genocide Hutus on the radio talked about Tutsi 
“cockroaches” (BBC News), and more recently, Muammar Gaddafi encouraged his 
supporters to attack the “cockroaches” who were not another ethnicity, but protestors 
against his rule (Peace Pledge Union). Similarly, Livingstone Smith claims that this sort 
of dehumanization is “fundamentally different” from the sort faced by women under 
patriarchy, where they are objectified. Livingstone Smith explains that for his project, he 
wants to understand the kind of dehumanization “associated with war, genocide, 
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[slavery,] and other forms of mass violence” (2011, p. 5). He also acknowledges that his 
project does not tackle the dehumanization experienced by “sexual minorities, 
immigrants, mentally and physically handicapped people, and various specific ethnic 
groups (for example, the Roma, the Italians, the Irish)” (2011, p. 6). At the end of the 
day, Livingstone Smith is discussing a kind of racial dehumanization that justifies 
violence and explicit disregard of a group’s life or liberty.  
However, not all moral distancing may lead to the sort of dehumanization that 
Livingstone Smith discusses, so his project may actually be describing an extreme form 
of dehumanization, as opposed to describing the threshold of dehumanization. For 
instance, Livingstone Smith argues that there is a difference between being treated as an 
inferior human being and a non-human animal. This is the difference between denigrating 
someone and denying their humanity (2011, p. 28). While I agree that not all instances of 
denigrating are also instances of dehumanization, some instances of denigration may be, 
even if they do not become instances where others claim that one’s humanity is an 
illusion. Stereotypes may involve a more general and subtle process of dehumanization, 
because they involve a more general and subtle process of moral distancing.  
Again, I will not argue that all forms of denigration count as dehumanizing. For 
instance, criticizing someone for their actions, (e.g., “what you said was racist”) 
expresses moral disapproval, but does not necessarily dehumanize them. People make 
this point when they talk about “calling in” people to do better rather than just “calling 
them out” to shame them. Calling in can still be a form of criticism and denigration, but 
you are calling a person to be accountable as a peer and member of the moral community.  
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Shame, on the other hand, is a controversial topic in regards to whether it is 
dehumanizing. Often people feel dehumanized when they feel ashamed. However, for 
people who you truly and wholly do not consider part of your moral community, I do not 
think we would bother to shame them unless we are making them an example to others to 
deter behavior, or we just want to make ourselves feel better. Incorporating shame into 
this account of dehumanization is beyond the scope of this project. But I will say this: 
there are some ways that shaming someone may be a form of temporarily revoking their 
“full” membership in the moral community, but it importantly is not revoking their whole 
membership, which is what instances of dehumanization seek to do or seek to justify. 
Shaming may be an act of probation, whereas dehumanization is an act of expulsion. 
When shaming becomes permanent ostracization, then it becomes a form of expulsion.
17
  
The psychologist Herbert Kelman has an account of dehumanization that takes 
seriously the role of membership in a community. Specifically, he argues that when we 
perceive others as human, this means that we grant them both “identity and community”: 
 To accord a person identity is to perceive him as an individual, 
independent and distinguishable from others, capable of making choices, 
and entitled to live his own life according to his own goals. To accord a 
person community is to perceive him—along with oneself—as part of an 
interconnected network of individuals, who care for each other, who 
recognize each other’s individuality, and who respect each other’s rights. 
(Livingstone Smith 2011, p. 86-7).   
Using Kelman’s account, I argue that to treat someone as a human person is to consider 
them as both (a) autonomous and (b) part of our moral community. Livingstone Smith 
focuses his account of dehumanization on the cases where we deny (a), that people are in 
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 Thus, prison sentences are, in theory, probation from the moral community in that prisoners lose their 
freedom for a time. However, laws that strip convicted felons of their rights in perpetuity are forms of 
exclusion from the moral community, as are life sentences. In this way, the prison system is dehumanizing. 
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fact autonomous and therefore non-fungible individuals with rationally directed goals. 
Our usual model for non-autonomous beings is non-human animals, so this is why the 
examples Livingstone Smith focuses on are ones where people are often referred to as 
animals, or having animal-like natures.
18
 Also, if we deny (a) to a creature, it is very easy 
to also on that basis deny it (b).
19
 Many of us do not take ourselves to have obligations to 
creatures that are not rational or autonomous. Also, we often do not feel bad about killing 
creatures that are not individuals, but rather are fungible copies of some organism—
especially if that organism is dangerous to us, the way that predators, pests, or diseases 
are dangerous. In this way, there is an important connection between (a) autonomy and 
(b) membership in our moral communities.  
The ultimate goal of dehumanization in all its forms may be to deny (b)—i.e., to 
claim that some beings are not part of our moral community. We thus owe them neither a 
share of our resources, nor any moral respect or obligation. On this framework, 
Livingstone Smith discusses an extreme form of dehumanization, whereby people are 
posited as being so far outside one’s moral community that committing mass violence 
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 There is also more than one way to dehumanize a person by undermining (a).  For instance, instead of 
using non-human animals as our model, we could use inanimate objects as our model, which is what may 
happen in many cases when women are dehumanized. They are also treated as fungible, non-autonomous 
creatures that are trophies to be displayed, prizes to be won, or sex toys to give humans pleasure. In this day 
and age, we could even use the robot as this model of inanimate object. Siri stands as the perfect model of a 
woman: someone whose only job is to provide help. (It at least bears explaining why it is that so many AI 
programs are given female personas in our androcentric world.) 
19
 We may be able to dehumanize someone by going after (b) directly without challenging (a). One way to 
do this is to construct someone as a monster or demon. They are often still granted autonomy and agency, 
but as constructed as being outside the moral community of humans. In fact, this is what we mean by the 
term “moral monster”: a person who has committed such extreme moral transgressions that they cannot be 
reincorporated into our (moral) communities.  On this model, monsters and demons are intelligent, rational, 
and can have their own set of goals (often the destruction of humanity or the pursuit of evil). But they still 
do not count as part of our moral community. This is the kind of dehumanization we often project onto 
individuals, rather than whole groups of people: individual sociopaths, violent criminals, leaders of 
countries we are at war with, etc. 
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against them seems permissible and justified. But morally pernicious stereotypes can be 
dehumanizing in some sense even if they do not fit the specific account that Livingstone 
Smith discusses.  
For instance, morally pernicious stereotypes may still deny the autonomy of 
individuals by purporting to know something about a person simply by knowing what 
sort of category of human they are. This is a small way in which we treat people as 
fungible: For any human of type X, you will (be likely to) find trait Y. If fungibility 
greases the wheels of dehumanization, then stereotypes do too. This may help explain 
why so many of us bristle when others evoke stereotypes about the groups we belong to. 
It is not that we are being sensitive about not being treated as unique individuals. Rather, 
we are picking up on how stereotypes can become small cracks in our publicly regarded 
personhood.  
 
Subsection 2.4.2: Ontic Injustice 
What exactly do these “cracks” consist of? Katharine Jenkins provides a possible 
answer with her account of one way that we undermine the moral status of certain social 
groups. She argues that when we wrongfully strip people of certain powers simply in 
virtue of their belonging to certain groups, this becomes an “ontic injustice.” Certain 
social identities come to have inferior moral status “baked in” to them. This inferior 
moral status is maintained by various mechanisms, one of them being cultural stereotypes 
about these groups.  
Ontic injustice is, roughly, the injustice of being made into a member of a social 
kind that is wrongfully deprived of deontic powers (Jenkins 2016, p. 126). A deontic 
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power is something you are, by convention, entitled to do. For example, being appointed 
as a “judge” grants you, by convention, the power to hear certain cases and pass 
judgment on them (Jenkins 2016, p. 22). Having a certain status can also remove deontic 
powers, such as gaining the status of being a “felon” in the U.S. Deontic powers can be 
contrasted with physical powers. Whereas physical powers are those things that you can 
physically do, deontic powers are those things that you are conventionally entitled to do. 
Deontic powers are also contrasted with moral powers—what you are morally entitled to 
do (Jenkins 2016, p. 23). For instance, some law might strip you of certain deontic 
powers, such as using a public bathroom that you would feel comfortable using. But we 
might maintain that you still have the moral power to pee in public in comfort. That is, 
you are morally entitled to use a public bathroom you feel comfortable using even if 
certain states pass a law (such as North Carolina’s “bathroom bill” HB2) that strips you 
of the deontic power to do so. 
 An ontic injustice occurs when someone is given the status of a social category 
that wrongfully deprives them of deontic powers. In contrast, someone being given the 
status of a “convicted criminal” might in some cases include the rightful deprivation of 
deontic powers—such as the freedom to go where one pleases. Or, if someone is 
negligent in their workplace and they are demoted to a lower-status position, which 
deprives them of the deontic power to oversee certain equipment, that could be a rightful 
deprivation of powers. And perhaps as a result, that company decides that no one without 
a specific training accreditation can operate certain equipment. So now whole groups of 
people will be stripped of the deontic power to operate that equipment.  
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 An ontic injustice occurs when a group of people are wrongfully deprived of 
deontic powers simply by virtue of belonging to a certain social group. A paradigm case 
is being designated a slave, insofar as it is always wrong to deprive people of certain 
freedoms and powers of autonomy. Jenkins argues that being designated a woman or a 
Black person is similarly an ontic injustice. A brief overview of her argument is as 
follows: race and gender are social kinds, each of which is, at heart, a certain kind of role 
or position within an institution. That institution is specifically a social hierarchy. And 
the positions of women and people of color in that hierarchy are ones of inferior status to 
other positions, such as men and White people. She cites arguments by Charles Mills and 
Katherine MacKinnon (among others) to this end, summarizing: 
Mills argues that racial categories are socially constructed via a Racial Contract 
agreed between Europeans that imposes subperson status on non-Europeans. This 
contract creates racial categories, rendering non-Europeans non-White (in various 
ways), and, correspondingly, rendering Europeans White. (Jenkins 2016, p. 47)  
And for gender: 
Women, according to MacKinnon, are systematically treated in ways that fall 
short of the standards we set for morally appropriate treatment of human beings, 
and these shortfalls are not recognized as violations of human rights. As a 
consequence, women as a group come to count socially as less than fully human. 
(Jenkins 2016, p. 49) 
Thus, to be categorized as a woman or person of color is to be accorded a status that 
strips one of certain moral entitlements that one should in fact have. 
If Jenkins’s account of ontic injustice is right, then some stereotypes undermine 
personhood independently of their specific content, and not because they create an in-
group/out-group moral distancing. Instead, stereotypes do so by emphasizing a group 
status that already undermines the personhood of group members. For instance, if 
members of a group such as women already experience ontic injustice as women, then 
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anything that contributes to women wrongfully having less power by convention 
contributes to ontic injustice and the undermining of their moral status. Jenkins argues 
that in this way, ontic injustice is: 
[A] failure to respond appropriately to properties of the individual that 
merit a certain moral response—for example, their being a person. This is 
to say that the wrong of ontic injustice consists of morally relevant 
features of the individual being denied or contradicted[.] […] [T]he 
deontic powers allocated to a victim of ontic injustice license others to act 
towards the victim in ways that violate moral entitlements that the victim 
has in virtue of the sort of being that they are. (Jenkins 2016, p. 131) 
Therefore, if using negative stereotypes about women contributes to the justification and 
normalization of this loss of deontic power, then negative stereotypes contribute to ontic 
injustice. Importantly, this can happen even if the person using the stereotype does not 
personally engage in moral distancing. Insofar as stereotypes reify women as a distinct 
social group, they are contributing to the wrongfully undermined moral status of women.  
 
Subsection 2.4.3: The “Threat” in Stereotype Threat 
The existence of ontic injustice perhaps shows us a way in which the onus is on us 
to make sure our generalizations are unproblematic, because many of them, simply by 
continuing to reify certain social groups, can also be contributing to injustice. Jenkins 
argues, “The victim of ontic injustice is socially defined as having a lesser moral standing 
than they in fact do” (2016, p. 131). This raises an interesting possibility. Perhaps 
labeling people according to gender is itself the prime evil, whereas then making claims 
such as “women are bad at math” is simply tacking on a false or lazy generalization that, 
at worst, re-entrenches the wrong already being done to people in being construed as 
women. That is, perhaps stereotypes are primarily wrong because they continue to 
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essentialize certain groups whose members have their full membership in our moral 
communities regularly undermined.  
While this would explain why stereotypes are wrong when they are about 
members of oppressed groups, it creates two mysteries. (1) Why do we then single out 
stereotypes as being especially problematic if any essentialized reference to a social 
group contributes to ontic injustice? (2) What do we then say about stereotypes about 
dominant groups—are they not really stereotypes, or are they less problematic ones? If I 
want to maintain the narrow moral view of stereotypes that I developed, I need to say 
more about what it means to “plausibly risk wrongfully undermining” the moral status of 
a group.  
Stereotypes might be especially problematic because they can wrongfully 
undermine the moral status of a group in multiple ways, whereas simply using an 
essentialized social category does not do so. Stereotypes can undermine the moral status 
of a group by (a) claiming or implying that that group is inferior, and thus less deserving 
of equal moral status, as well as (b) implying an essentialized causal story that reifies the 
social group—which potentially can undermine moral status, by for instance contributing 
to ontic injustice. Thus, while negative stereotypes about stigmatized groups can 
undermine the moral status of those groups via their content, all stereotypes carry the risk 
of undermining moral status via their implications about group essences.  
Thinking about the effects of stereotype threat can help us sort through the 
various harms of stereotypes more generally. Stereotype threat can lead to negative 
effects for everyone who experiences it, even members of dominant groups. But members 
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of stigmatized and oppressed groups face additional and greater harms. For instance, let’s 
think about how dominant groups are affected by stereotype threat. Even dominant 
groups such as White men can experience the threat of devaluation in certain contexts, 
such as athletic competitions and discussions about race. This suggests that perhaps we 
are right to count the generalizations about these groups as stereotypes. They too can 
potentially undermine the social value and moral status of these groups, as seen by the 
fear and worry members of these groups have about such things happening. Stereotypes 
perhaps make groups more vulnerable to processes that can undermine their moral status 
by further essentializing such groups. And even members of dominant groups who 
experience a lot of privilege may be sensitive to this, that all that stands between them 
and their deontic powers in society is convention. And those deontic powers can be 
eroded with a few culturally engrained generalizations.   
As an example, let’s consider the stereotype that White men are worse athletes 
than Black men. This is a negative judgment that can trigger stereotype threat in the same 
way that more accepted stereotypes can, such as the stereotype that Black students are not 
as intellectually talented as White students. Is it true that holding, using, or considering 
the belief that White people are worse athletes than Black people encourages us, or 
makes us more likely, to morally distance ourselves from White people, or to fail to see 
White people as individuals? Under current social conditions, I think the answer is, “no, 
not in any significant sense.” Thus, even though members of dominant groups can 
experience stereotype threat and its underperformance effect, the phenomenon gains an 
  
65 
additional level of threat when it is experienced by a member of a marginalized group, for 
whom the wheels of dehumanization are already greased. 
 It is perhaps the difference between adding drops of water to a bucket that is 
already overflowing (thus, those drops are adding to the spill on the floor besides the 
bucket), and adding drops of water to a nearly empty bucket. It would seem odd to say 
that in both cases, adding drops of water to the bucket is equally adding to the likelihood 
of there being water on the floor.  This is also the same problem with complaints about 
“reverse racism.” They are correct that prejudice and differential treatment has the same 
potential to add to dehumanized treatment, but they are wrong to think that the “bucket” 
of racism against themselves is about to overflow every time they see a few drops being 
added. I have little sympathy for these cautions regarding “reverse racism,” because 
people seem more concerned about their nearly empty buckets receiving some water than 
they are about other people’s buckets that are currently overflowing with the racism 
directed towards them. This is a willful ignorance regarding the scale of the problem and 
the likelihood of people receiving detrimental treatment. 
For those groups that are already marginalized and subordinated, stereotypes may 
be potent mechanisms by which their marginalization, stigmatization, and oppression are 
maintained. Stereotypes can contribute to these things via their degrading content, their 
essentializing narratives, and their triggering of stereotype threat that can come with 
heftier costs for these groups. Claude Steele observes that for American Black students, it 
can feel like their very humanity is on the line when they take a test (Steele 1992). So, 
although stereotype threat’s ability to influence our performance has far-reaching 
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consequences of its own, our lives extend far beyond the reach of the tests that we take. 
Though all stereotypes might carry certain kinds of moral risk with them, some 
stereotypes are riskier than others—when, that is, they contribute to already existing 
habits of dehumanization and ontic injustice. Stereotype threat is especially threatening 
when it involves morally pernicious stereotypes that target a group that already 
experiences ontic injustice. 
In the following chapter, I will flesh out the impact these sorts of stereotypes can 
have on these sorts of groups by focusing on how stereotype threat can affect self-
identity. 
  
  
67 
CHAPTER THREE 
STEREOTYPE THREAT, SELF-IDENTITY, AND EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE 
 Section 3.1: Introduction 
I established in Chapter One that stereotype threat’s effects include more than just 
those on performance. Stereotype threat also affects our self-identity, aspirations, and 
motivation. The “threat” in stereotype threat is primarily a threat to our self-worth, not 
our performance. I explained in Chapter Two how this threat might work, by contributing 
to processes of ontic injustice and dehumanization. In this chapter, I will flesh out how 
these threats to self-worth can affect individuals’ self-identity and epistemic agency. 
Specifically, I will argue one’s self-identity can essentially be coerced by stereotype 
threat, which undermines one’s epistemic agency and is a form of epistemic injustice. 
What this means is that stereotype threat has a much broader impact on our lives than the 
Standard Picture suggests.  
Currently, much of the research on stereotype threat focuses on education and 
academic contexts. Under the Standard Picture, this research focuses on how the 
phenomenon impacts achievement and success in academic contexts. This makes some 
sense, given that the original problem research on stereotype threat was trying to tackle is 
the problem of achievement gaps in school.
20
 However, there is very little research on 
stereotype threat “independent of how it might affect performance” (Carr & Steele 2009, 
p. 853). This means not only that stereotype threat’s underperformance effect gets the 
lion’s share of the attention (as discussed in Chapter One), but that when researchers do 
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turn their attention to these other effects, it is usually still for the purposes of 
understanding issues relating to performance (e.g., Leitner, Jones & Hehman 2013 and 
Fogliati & Bussey 2013). Even when stereotype threat research investigates other effects, 
it still often uses the Standard Picture to consider the impact of those effects. Under this 
picture, stereotype threat's most significant impact on our lives is that we might not 
achieve what we otherwise could. However, its impact on our lives goes much deeper. 
We might also know less about ourselves than we otherwise would, and in doing so, we 
might become different people than we otherwise could. 
As explained in Chapter One, stereotype threat can also affect our stress levels, 
motivations, interests, and self-identity, so its impact on our lives extends far beyond how 
well we perform on tests. It can also impact our long-term health, our satisfaction in a 
stereotyped domain, and our sense of self. While achievement may correlate with some 
things such as status and distributions of resources within a domain, it will not 
necessarily correlate with health, satisfaction, or sense of self. In this chapter, I will turn 
my attention to the latter, fleshing out how our sense of self and epistemic agency can be 
impacted by chronic experiences of stereotype threat. In the next chapter, I will use the 
debate over the ideal proportion of women in philosophy to point out how stereotype 
threat may also impact our satisfaction with and interest in a stereotyped domain.
21
  
One reason I focus on self-identity in this dissertation is to help flesh out the less 
easily quantifiable and measurable impacts of stereotype threat. In the literature in social 
psychology, there is relatively little discussion of the “subjective” components of 
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stereotype threat—i.e., its phenomenology and less easily measurable features. Work by 
Walton and Cohen (2007) is an exception; they discuss at length the potential broader 
impact of stereotype threat on individuals’ sense of self and sense of belonging in 
stereotyped domains. They also focus on how stereotype threat impacts the lives of 
subordinated groups, so their call to investigate the subjective components of stereotype 
threat is also a call to investigate the subjective components of inequality (Walton & 
Cohen 2007, p. 94). Ann Cudd makes a similar point in her philosophical account of 
oppression. She describes oppression as a harm perpetrated on groups by way of both 
material and psychological forces (Cudd 2006, p. 26). Therefore, to understand the full 
scope of stereotype threat’s impact, especially regarding its relationship to oppressive 
social hierarchies, we cannot only focus on its material effects—though these are 
obviously important too. Since oppression has subjective and symbolic components, it 
affects more than just the distribution of material things; it also impacts the meaning and 
qualitative experience of those things.  
To help flesh out how stereotype threat impacts meaning and qualitative 
experience, I will discuss how the phenomenon influences individuals’ self-identity. This 
influence can, in turn, affect what individuals want to do, what they think they can do, 
and what sort of person they think they are. I will argue that, by doing this, stereotype 
threat negatively affects self-knowledge in a way that can hinder or limit individuals’ 
epistemic agency. While everyone may be vulnerable to this influence on their self-
identity, members of socially subordinated groups may be especially vulnerable to, or 
especially harmed by, this erosion of self-knowledge. In the following sections, I will 
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argue that stereotype threat counts as a kind of “implicit cultural coercion” because it has 
coercive effects on self-identity (Section 3.2), that these coercive effects hinder epistemic 
agency and are a form of epistemic injustice (Section 3.3), and that this sort of epistemic 
injustice has important implications for fostering equality in education (Section 3.4).  
 
Section 3.2: Stereotype Threat’s Effects on Self-Identity 
Subsection 3.2.1: Stereotype Threat as a Cause of Dis-Identification  
Stereotype threat can affect our self-identity in various ways. The two primary 
ways it can affect it are by influencing an individual’s ability to identity with a 
stereotyped domain and their identity with a stereotyped social identity. In this chapter, I 
am going to focus on the former, one’s identity with a stereotyped domain. I will do this 
for two reasons. One, it may be easier to trace out the negative consequences of dis-
identifying with a certain domain, and two, there is more work on the latter sort of dis-
identification. It is an already studied phenomenon that people will sometimes “bi-
furcate” their identity (Steele, Spencer & Aronson 2002, p. 415). That is, they will set 
aside parts of their self-identity with a stereotyped social group in order to more fully 
pursue an identity with a domain that is counter-stereotypic for that group to be involved 
in. For example,  
To stay identified with math, women might "bifurcate" their identity as 
women by reducing identification with those aspects of being a woman 
they perceived as being negatively stereotyped in the math domain, while 
remaining identified with aspects of being a woman they perceived as 
unproblematic in math. (Steele, Spencer & Aronson 2002, p. 415)
22
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Though this sort of bifurcation or dis-identification with a stereotyped group (as 
described in Steele & Aronson 1995) likely has long-term impacts on individuals, it is 
beyond the scope of this chapter to investigate them. Instead, I will investigate how 
stereotype threat causes dis-identification with a stereotyped domain specifically. 
 As a response to chronically experiencing stereotype threat, some individuals may 
stop identifying with the stereotyped domain, as a way to defuse the threat to their self-
worth (Steele, Spencer & Aronson 2002, p. 410-11).
23
 For instance, if a woman regularly 
experiences stereotype threat when playing video games, one way to diffuse this threat is 
to completely detach the domain of gaming from her self-identity. If she is not a gamer, 
and video games are not a part of her sense of self, then it becomes much less threatening 
to be stereotyped as being worse at them then men are, or as not appreciating “hardcore” 
games. In this way, she escapes some of the negative effects of stereotype threat by 
having video games become less important to her, and less of an important part of her 
life.  
While dis-identification may be more common with individuals who are not 
already strongly identified with the stereotyped domain, it may develop in individuals 
that are strongly identified with the domain too. For instance, Schmader (2010) argues 
that women who are math majors will, under stereotype threat, become less certain about 
their future in math—which might mean that their self-identity with math is weakening. 
In one study, math majors tried to quickly identify whether they could envision 
themselves in various math-related careers, such as accounting, statistics, or science. The 
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control groups of men and women had similar results: both groups reported that “they 
imagine themselves in about half of the math careers they saw” (Schmader 2010, p. 15). 
But for the experimental groups, subjected to stereotype threat conditions, a different 
pattern emerged.  
[…] for women, those who were initially fastest to imagine themselves in 
a math-related career actually became the slowest to make these same 
judgments when under stereotype threat. When their math ability was 
about to be put to the test, these math-identified women felt uncertain 
about who they were and what they could do. (Schmader 2010, p. 15) 
What is interesting about this study is that it suggests that individuals under stereotype 
threat might be scared away from domains that they are already interested in, and that 
they already identity with somewhat strongly (i.e., strongly enough to major in it).  
No matter how an individual reacts to stereotype threat, they will face a pressure 
on their self-identity—especially if stereotype threat is a chronic occurrence.  If they react 
to stereotype threat by disengaging from or avoiding the stereotyped domain, they may 
start to dis-identify with that domain to some degree. And if they try to remain identified 
with that domain, and instead attempt to disprove the stereotype (risking the 
underperformance effect), they will be incentivized to dis-identify with the stereotyped 
group. For instance, Steele and Aronson (1995) found that Black students in this 
situation—who were at risk of underperforming from trying to disprove a stereotype—
were more likely to distance themselves from an African-American identity. In both 
cases (disengaging/domain avoiding and trying to disprove the stereotype), individuals 
face a pressure to alter their identity in some way, due to a threat to their self-worth or 
social status.  
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As I mentioned, I am going to focus on the former case, where individuals end up 
dis-identifying with the stereotyped domain. An interesting question is, how does this 
process of dis-identification happen? How can a stereotype convince someone to abandon 
a domain they are already interested in? It is well known that people can sometimes 
internalize a cultural stereotype, but as pointed out in Chapter One, that is not what is 
primarily going on in stereotype threat. It is not that, when reminded of a stereotype that 
threatens their self-worth, individuals suddenly think, “you know what, I think the 
stereotype is right, and I have no business being in math. I must get me to a nunnery (or 
an English department)!” The study discussed by Schmader gives us a clue as to what is 
going on instead. In that study, women seemed to become “less certain” about their future 
in, and identity with, math. Stereotypes sometimes give us pause to consider our identity 
with a stereotyped domain. Why do they give us pause; why can they make us less 
certain of our identity with a stereotyped domain? I argue, because they function as 
implicit accusations. 
 
Subsection 3.2.2: Stereotype Threat as an Implicit Accusation 
In Chapter One, I identified three major reactions to stereotype threat: trying to 
disconfirm the stereotype and prove yourself the exception, disengaging the specific task 
at hand from your self-worth, and avoiding the stereotyped domain. I argue that we can 
frame these “acute reactions” to stereotype threat (Steele, Spencer & Aronson 2002, p. 
407) as strategies for dealing with stereotype threat as what I will call an “implicit 
cultural accusation.” That is, stereotype threat can function as an implied accusation that 
  
74 
is suffuse throughout a culture—or as stereotype threat researchers like to describe as  “in 
the air.” Thinking about stereotype threat under this accusation framework that I develop 
here will help us understand how it ultimately can impact our self-identity. 
 Under the accusation framework, the three common reactions to stereotype threat 
can be reframed as three common strategies for responding to an accusation. One strategy 
is to try to prove the accusation wrong (trying to disconfirm the stereotype). Another 
strategy is to detach your self-worth from what you are being accused of 
(disengagement). That is, in response to an accusation, someone might adopt the attitude, 
“Okay, so what if I’m guilty of this particular thing? I don’t care; I’m still a good 
person.” This response is to weaken the connection of the particular accusation with what 
that accusation is supposed to imply—some more general feature about you. And that is 
exactly what disengagement is. It is a “weakening of the connection between how one 
views oneself and one's skills in a domain,” which is a more general claim about oneself, 
and “how one performs in the domain,” which is the particular accusation (Steele, 
Spencer, and Aronson 2002, p. 409). 
 Lastly, a third strategy in the face of an accusation is to, essentially, get out of 
Dodge and avoid being investigated. If an accusation tends to crop up in a certain 
domain, people who adopt this strategy will simply avoid that domain, in order to avoid 
dealing with the accusation. This avoidance can be physical, social, or conceptual. 
Physical avoidance would be avoiding physical spaces where stereotype threat tends to 
crop up, such as certain areas on campus linked to the stereotyped domain, or areas where 
your social group is often a numerical minority. Speaking from my own experience, I 
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have been willing to take a longer commute to work, or a longer route around campus, in 
order to avoid areas that may cause stress or anxiety. More related to stereotype threat, I 
also used to avoid my college’s common area when my friends played first person 
shooter (FPS) games. I loved videogames, but probably suffered some stereotype threat 
regarding not being good at FPS games, which are considered to be the best or most 
hardcore kind of games by some. The few times I did play with male friends, I was so 
upset by my poor performance that I started avoiding social settings where I might be 
asked to play. As Steele et al. put it, “People seem to sense when they come under the 
possibility of being negatively stereotyped and, other things being equal, respond by 
avoiding the premises” (2002, p. 408). 
Social or conceptual avoidance is avoiding thinking about or associating oneself 
with the stereotyped domain. For instance,  
the Davies et al. (2001) study found that women who incidentally watched 
TV commercials with negatively stereotyped women in them, compared to 
women who watched neutral commercials, reported less interest in 
quantitatively based college majors and subsequent careers. (Steele, 
Spencer & Aronson 2002, p. 408) 
This strategy may eventually develop into dis-identifying with a domain, but in its early 
stages, it seems to be something different. It is avoiding the decision of whether to 
identify or not with the domain, by ignoring it or dampening one’s interest in exploring it. 
In the accusation framework, this response is to avoid saying what you think about the 
accusation, by preventing it from coming up in the first place. And you can do this by 
avoiding the domains where that accusation is likely to be implicitly raised, due to a well-
known cultural stereotype about that domain. 
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 What do we get from thinking about stereotype threat as a sort of implicit 
accusation? For one, it helps us makes sense of and predict other sorts of responses to 
stereotype threat. For instance, if stereotype threat functions as an accusation, then we 
might expect to find other acute responses to stereotype threat that mirror the sorts of 
responses people have to accusations. As it turns out, another response to stereotype 
threat that some people adopt is to emphasize self-handicapping factors. That is, they find 
another reason for their potentially poor performance. Steele and Aronson (1995) found 
that “Blacks who expected to take a diagnostic test reported that they had slept less the 
night before and had a harder time concentrating than Blacks who expected to take a 
nondiagnostic test” (Steele, Spencer, and Aronson 2002, p. 408). Under the accusation 
framework, this response is equivalent to the claims, “Wait! It’s not what it looks like!” 
Individuals who adopt this response are finding reasons why it might seem like they are 
confirming the stereotype, but in actuality, their performance is being influenced by 
something else besides their group identity. 
 Furthermore, this accusation framework illuminates the potential role that self-
doubt plays in stereotype threat. It need not be the case that, under stereotype threat, 
someone suddenly believes that the stereotype is true. Rather, the stereotype may act as 
an accusation, that is, as a cultural suspicion, which can be enough to give an individual 
pause—to give them reason to doubt. 
 
  
77 
Subsection 3.2.3: Stereotype Threat as Suspicions and Hypotheses 
An accusation is, essentially, a hypothesis—one that is to be adjudicated by 
whatever the social context dictates: a court, some governing body, or the members of the 
relevant community. We have reason to think that under stereotype threat, the stereotypes 
function as hypotheses too. It is still somewhat of an open question what exactly 
individuals worry about when they worry due to stereotype threat. They are definitely 
worrying about the stereotype and their own self-worth. But what exact form does this 
worry take? Do they worry that the stereotype is definitely true and they have been a fool 
to try to buck it? That does not seem to be case.  
 Instead, the worry could be that the stereotype is possibly true, or that possibly 
others will take it to be true. That is, individuals might succumb to the stereotype as a 
suspicion—as an accusation that needs to be addressed. This is different from 
internalizing the stereotype as a belief. If individuals internalized a stereotype as a belief, 
then responding to stereotype threat may actually be simpler and less fraught. If they 
believed the stereotype was true, that say, women are naturally not inclined to be good at 
math, then they could simply determine whether they themselves are an exception to this 
general rule, and if it seemed like they were not, they would likely pack up and pursue 
their self-esteem elsewhere. 
 But if stereotype threat functions as an accusation, and the stereotype is processed 
as a suspicion, then dealing with this phenomenon becomes a lot more fraught, because it 
becomes a matter of risk. If you suspect that you might not be naturally talented in a 
domain, but you are somewhat interested in that domain, is it worth the risk to stay and 
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find out? Furthermore, a suspicion can be a lot harder to put to rest than a straightforward 
belief can be. For instance, even if there is not enough evidence to justify a certain claim 
being definitely true, only a small amount of evidence is needed to keep that claim alive 
(logically and psychologically) as a possibility.  
Some social psychologists are already investigating how stereotypes may function 
as suspicions or hypotheses, and what that entails. Walton and Cohen (2007) argue that a 
negative pressure on one’s self-worth can be “especially pernicious” (Walton & Cohen 
2007, p. 83) when it takes the form of a hypothesis, rather than a belief or definite 
perception.  This is because hypotheses can be as attention-directing as beliefs, as well as 
more resilient—as I described above. A hypothesis, like a belief, will make evidence 
consistent with it stand out. For instance, Walton and Cohen found that students who 
were worried about whether or not they belonged in college were more likely to notice 
and pick out events that were consistent with and potentially explained that hypothesis, 
such as having few friends. Furthermore, because people often are not comfortable with 
ambiguity, with not knowing where they stand, they will be motivated to seek out 
evidence that can confirm or deny their suspicions (Walton & Cohen 2007, p. 83).  
A person experiencing stereotype threat may treat the stereotype as a suspicion 
and implicit accusation. They will be motivated to seek out or think about evidence that 
could potentially confirm or deny this suspicion. And the sort of evidence that is enough 
to maintain this suspicion as a live possibility is quite low, especially compared with the 
degree of evidence one would need to believe that the stereotype is true. Furthermore, 
there may be a way in which stereotypes serve as cultural hypotheses, and specifically 
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default hypotheses. That is, they may be treated as the hypothesis more likely than not to 
be true. Or at least, the burden of proof is considered to be on those who are arguing 
against the stereotype.  
Current research on stereotype threat is compatible with this notion that 
stereotypes function as default hypotheses. Individuals experiencing stereotype threat 
seem to be worried about failing to disprove a hypothesis. For instance, research subjects 
who experience the underperformance effect seem to be “vigilant to signs they are 
failing” (Schmader 2010, p. 16).24 They are vigilant for errors they make and feelings of 
anxiety, possibly as a proxy for potential confirmation of this default hypothesis. 
Similarly, Steele frames stereotype threat as a worry about possible hypotheses. The 
worry may be that another person “could judge me in terms of those bad stereotypes” 
(Steele & Gates 2009, p. 252-3). If stereotypes function as hypotheses in this way, then 
the risk of harm to one’s self-worth becomes very hard to defuse. As long as the 
stereotype remains a live suspicion, harm to one’s self-worth remains a live possibility. 
As I have explained thus far, this sort of suspicion can influence people to alter their self-
identity, in order to avoid the risk of having their self-worth undermined. Some 
individuals will alter their self-identity rather than risk the harmful consequences of being 
indicted under a cultural accusation. This makes stereotype threat a coercive influence on 
self-identity.  
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Subsection 3.2.4: Stereotype Threat as Coercion 
Coercion in an everyday sense is the use of a threat to force someone to act a 
certain way. For instance, you can stick a gun to someone’s head and tell them to do 
something. This functions as forcing them to do that thing by threatening to kill them if 
they do not comply. Similarly, blackmailing someone is using the threat of revealing 
certain information to force them to give you money. Even though the coerced 
individuals are physically free to do otherwise, the threats (in these cases, death and a 
ruined reputation) are severe enough that the individual does not consider themselves to 
have any other viable option.  
 Our paradigm of coercion is what I will refer to as explicit interpersonal coercion. 
It is coercion between individual people, and the person doing the coercion knows that 
they are engaging in coercion and means to be doing so. Implicit interpersonal coercion 
is where the threat is ambiguously implied, perhaps because the person using the threat is 
not fully aware that they are doing so. For instance, imagine that your friend tells you a 
story about his cousin’s wedding. He explains that his cousin’s best friend bought his 
cousin a cheap gift, so his cousin snubbed this former best friend and stopped hanging out 
with him. Your friend tells this story in a way that leads you to believe your friend thinks 
his cousin was justified in snubbing their ex-best friend. You realize that your friend’s 
wedding is shortly around the corner. You wonder if your friend is trying to indicate that 
he will likewise snub anyone who does not get him a sufficiently substantial gift. While 
this does not fit the paradigm of explicit interpersonal coercion, its effects are the same as 
they would be if your friend had used explicit coercion on you. You feel as if you must 
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buy your friend an expensive wedding gift, or else they might possibly snub you, which 
would be painful to go through.  
The individual being implicitly coerced here feels as if they may have no other 
viable options (should they value their friendship with this person.) Similarly, the person 
being blackmailed feels as if they have no other viable options (should they value their 
reputation or current status in their community). 
 Another key feature of coercion is that the agent who is doing the coercing has the 
power to bring about what they are threatening. This is why merely describing to 
someone the likely outcome of their actions does not by itself count as coercion. For 
example, let’s say someone is standing next to a button that, if pressed, will lead to 
someone’s death because it is hooked up to certain machinery that will kill the person. 
You tell the person standing next to this button, “If you press that button, someone will 
die.” This is not an instance of coercion, even if you are intending to influence their 
behavior by telling them about the outcome their behavior will have. It is not coercion 
because you do not have the power to bring about or avoid this outcome; you are merely 
describing the outcome that something else will bring about, that you are powerless to 
intervene into. Contrast that with this case that does count as coercion. You present 
someone with a button and say, “if you do not press this button, someone will die, 
because I will kill them.” Now you are coercing that person into pushing the button—
insofar as that person values the life of other people. In this example, you are the agent 
who will bring about the consequences being described.  
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 Under stereotype threat, stereotypes are potential threats to our self-worth. They 
represent what I call implicit cultural coercion.  In being implicit coercion, the threat is 
ambiguously implied. This is different from forms of explicit coercion where the threat is 
implied, but unambiguously so. For example, the man in The Godfather movie who 
wakes up to find his prize horse’s head under his bedsheets is receiving an implied threat, 
but it is a fairly unambiguous one.
25
 Similarly, if a Black golfer wants to apply to a 
country club, and the person they are talking to says something to the effect of, people 
like them would not be happy at that country club, that can be taken as an implied threat. 
It can be taken as a threat if that person is implying, people like you will not be happy 
here, because I will make sure that you are not. The person is implying that they will 
bring about this negative outcome, should the other individual act a certain way. 
Similarly, negative stereotypes imply that, if a person pursues a stereotyped domain, they 
may not be respected there. And it is the very culture that is implying this that will make 
sure the person is not respected there. Thus, this is a form of cultural coercion, where the 
agent doing the coercing is not an individual person, but instead the sense of the culture 
at large.  
Perhaps more precisely, the agent is taken to be a collective, such as a community 
or a culture. For instance, when someone who is not a white man walks into an academic 
department, and sees pictures of only white men on the walls, they may have the sense 
that the community in that department may treat them a certain way. That is, the people 
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 In fact, The Godfather gives us a nice definition of coercion: making someone an offer they essentially 
cannot refuse. 
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who choose to hang these pictures on the wall, who choose to value only white men in 
this way, may also collectively choose to value newcomers in a certain way or not. 
One might still be unconvinced that a culture is coercing people when those 
people are primed to think about negative stereotypes. Are people under stereotype threat, 
who choose to dis-identify with a stereotyped domain, being forced to choose as such? 
Even if individuals are faced with a set of negative consequences, they might still have 
multiple viable options. I think this case actually gives us a reason to question whether 
someone needs to feel like they have no other viable options for something to count as 
coercion. Marilyn Frye gives us another way to think about coercion, that instead focuses 
on whose interests are being served. She argues that the paradigm of coercion is the 
“detachment of the victim’s will and intelligence from the victim’s own interests and 
their attachment to the interests of the exploiter” (Frye 1983, p. 60). In the case of 
stereotypes, the “exploiter” would be the culture which fosters and maintains the 
stereotype as a default hypothesis. In this way, the culture is potentially detaching the 
victim’s will from their own interests and instead promoting the interests of the culture at 
large, which is to endorse whatever stereotypes help maintain the current social 
hierarchies in place.  
When we theorize about interpersonal coercion, we claim that coercion happens 
when someone forces you to act against your interests. On that account, “if people don’t 
mind what you want them to do, you can’t really be making them do it” (Frye 1983, p. 
60). That is, it cannot count as coercion if the person is still acting on their own interests 
and desires. But if some forms of coercion that can get us to alter our very desires, then 
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there may be a whole class of coercion that is hidden to us, which Frye implies there is in 
a patriarchal society. The coercion from stereotype threat may fall under this sort of 
coercion, since it can influence people to alter their self-identity, motivations, and 
interests. (I will follow up on this, especially regarding interests, in Chapter Four.) 
As a result of the implicit cultural coercion from stereotype threat, certain 
identities may feel as though they are, essentially, off-limits. This does not mean that one 
is absolutely barred from these identities. Some people may persevere and decide that 
they will be, say, a mathematician or a scientist, even if they are often made to feel like 
that identity does not fit. For instance, Diann Jordan interviewed a number of Black 
women mathematicians and scientists who have had long and successful careers, despite 
their sometimes early and frequent run-ins with remarks such as, “you don’t look like a 
scientist” (Jordan 2006, p. 22) or that these fields would require too much “brainpower” 
for them (p. 84) or questions about their sincerity in wanting to pursue these interests, 
asking them “Why are you applying? Don’t you get enough attention at home?” (p. 87) 
However, these women often had support from elsewhere: family, teachers, an inspiring 
role model, etc.   
For instance, that was the case with Mae Carol Jemison, the first African-
American woman in space. She tells the story of how, "In kindergarten, my teacher asked 
me what I wanted to be when I grew up, and I told her a scientist," Jemison says. "She 
said, 'Don't you mean a nurse?'” (Haynes 1992, p. 120). Jemison herself was not fazed by 
this interaction, in part because her mother had helped instill in her a curiosity about 
science from a young age. So Jemison remarks, “Now, there's nothing wrong with being 
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a nurse, but that's not what I wanted to be" (Haynes 1992, p. 120). Her resilience in 
holding on to her future identity as a scientist is likely the result of, at least in part, having 
the resources and encouragement to cultivate that identity.  
But if someone had no such support, no indication from anywhere that this 
identity could fit them, would they still pursue this domain in the face of constant 
stereotyping? Steele, Spencer, and Aronson note that regularly trying to demonstrate 
counter-stereotypic behavior is “a Sisyphean effort”: “Trying to win and rewin one's 
exemption from the stereotype in each new setting where it applies is never-ending and 
thus becomes a pressure against complete identification with the domain” (Steele, 
Spencer & Aronson 2002, p. 409). Without some respite from this Sisyphean task in the 
form of respite from the stereotype being a possible default hypothesis, many people will 
find that pursuing a stereotyped domain is simply not worth the effort. This is likely what 
is happening with countless girls of color who have nascent interests in the sciences. But 
they will likely not respond the way Jemison did if their nascent curiosity is met with a 
teacher suggesting a career in nursing instead. For certain social groups, this sort of 
experience is very common, so the chances of people being nudged away from these 
counter-stereotypic domains is higher than it is from non-stereotyped domains. In this 
way, stereotypes exert a coercive pressure on individuals’ self-identity, both present and 
future.  
In the next section, I will argue that people who experience chronic stereotype 
threat are less “free” to explore certain avenues of self-knowledge. They are not as free to 
explore whether they might be a math person, or a science person, or a philosopher. By 
  
86 
making these avenues of self-knowledge more risky, stereotype threat hinders not only 
specific self-knowledge, but our epistemic agency more broadly. We may become less 
comfortable exploring new avenues at all, or feel less entitled to do so. Individuals are 
being hindered by an unfair pressure or constraint on their potential self-knowledge, 
which is a constraint on their ability to grow and flourish as epistemic agents. 
 
Section 3.3: Epistemic Agency and Epistemic Injustice 
Epistemic injustice, a concept coined by Miranda Fricker, is “a wrong done to 
someone specifically in their capacity as a knower” (Fricker 2007, p. 1). The two forms 
of epistemic injustice that Fricker discusses in her work are wrongs done in terms of the 
credibility assigned to a speaker giving testimony, and the interpretive resources available 
for a knower to make sense of their experiences. These are, respectively, “testimonial 
injustice” and “hermeneutical injustice.” They count as epistemic injustice because they 
not only disrupt the formation and communication of knowledge, but they also hinder the 
wronged individual’s epistemic agency in an unfair manner.  
For instance, testimonial injustice may be experienced by a woman who is trying 
to tell others that she was sexually assaulted, but is not believed by them, because they 
are holding her testimony to an unfair standard. As a result, they are giving her testimony 
less credibility than it deserves. Not only does this hinder the communication of 
knowledge in this instance, but it also silences the woman in a significant way. She may 
think twice the next time she wants to testify about something sexist she experienced or 
witnessed. This hinders her ability to communicate knowledge more generally, and to 
  
87 
engage in and pursue epistemic projects. That is, it hinders her epistemic agency, 
especially in relation to others whose testimony is unfairly given more default credibility 
than hers is. 
Similarly, hermeneutical injustice may be experienced by an individual who is not 
able to render a significant experience of theirs fully intelligible because the 
hermeneutical resources available to them (vocabulary, ways of others hearing their 
speech style, etc.) are not sufficient for the task. For instance, before “post-partum 
depression” was a well-known concept, many women were not able to make sense of, or 
render intelligible to themselves or others, their experiences with depression and neurosis 
shortly after giving birth. Many were told they were simply being weak, crazy, lazy, 
and/or selfish. Some women remained convinced that there was something medically 
wrong with them, but many others struggled to understand what they were experiencing. 
They did not have an intelligible counter-narrative to offer to those who claimed they 
were simply letting their feminine vices get the better of them.  
Besides these two forms, anything else that unfairly wrongs someone in their 
capacity as a knower—what I interpret to mean anything that undermines one’s epistemic 
agency—counts as epistemic injustice. I have argued above that stereotype threat can 
coerce us away from certain identities, which stunts our self-knowledge of who we are 
and who we could possibly become. In stunting our self-knowledge, it is undermining our 
epistemic agency, and thus qualifies as epistemic injustice. Not only does stereotype 
threat potentially lead to both testimonial and hermeneutical injustice, but it also may 
constitute another form of epistemic injustice.  
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Stereotype threat may lead to a kind of testimonial injustice against oneself if it 
unfairly causes individuals to doubt their own knowledge (which can be thought of as 
self-testimony.) That is, someone chronically experiencing stereotype threat may come to 
doubt themselves in a way that unfairly lowers the credibility of their testimony to 
themselves. This sort of self-doubt can start out small and specific—such as a doubt 
regarding a specific test, or even just a specific answer on a that test. But some doubts 
can linger. For instance, Tamar Gendler discusses the examples of someone taking a test 
under stereotype threat and doubting whether 11 x 11 is 121, or whether sunt is the third 
person plural of esse (Gendler 2011, p. 50). If an individual suddenly blanks on a simple 
multiplication answer, and does not know why they are doing so, they may think this is a 
reason to doubt other mathematical knowledge they have, or their ability to do math more 
generally. If you cannot correctly remember what 11 x 11 is, how certain will you feel 
about your answer to a more complicated math question? Likewise, if someone has been 
studying Latin for a while, but suddenly on a test cannot recall whether sunt is the third 
person plural of esse, this may lead them to doubt whether their translation of Cicero is 
really hitting the mark. 
This is a common feature of doubts, beliefs, and thoughts: they spill over. They 
entail and lead to other beliefs, doubts, and thoughts. A similar concept of spillover is 
already a part of stereotype threat research. “Spillover” in that context refers to stereotype 
threat’s ability to affect additional domains other than the one specifically targeted by a 
stereotype. For instance, a negative stereotype about a group’s ability in math can affect 
that group’s behavior in not just math, but also in other domains. It can cause risky 
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decision making, and increases in aggression levels, indulgence and loss of self-control in 
domains that are completely unrelated to math (Beilock, Rydell, & McConnell 2007; 
Inzlicht & Kang 2010; Carr & Steele 2009). I designate these as instances of “cognitive 
spillover,” because the primary mechanism causing the spillover is a cognitive one—in 
this case the ones that govern executive resources, willpower, and self-control. What I 
discuss in terms of doubt, however, is another kind of spillover: what I call “epistemic 
spillover.” Instead of a cognitive mechanism being the primary culprit, our networks of 
belief and knowledge are. So, if a doubt influences our beliefs about, not just the specific 
domain it pertains to, but also other domains as well, then it causes epistemic spillover. 
For example, if someone doubts their ability to succeed in math, that doubt may in turn 
affect how certain they are about succeeding in college more generally, or succeeding in 
a related domain such as computer science.  
But doubts go even further—they can spill over in a way that they affect not just 
another specific thought, but also our sense of ourselves. To use an example that has 
received much philosophical attention, consider a doubt such as whether or not you have 
two hands. In most cases, if we were to sincerely doubt this, that doubt would have 
serious ramifications for our epistemic life in general. For if we are in sincere doubt of 
what the makeup of our limbs are, we probably would also start doubting other, more 
fundamental propositions about ourselves, such as whether we are capable of reliable 
perception.  
Wittgenstein makes this very point in On Certainty: “If a blind man were to ask 
me ‘Have you got two hands?’ I should not make sure by looking. If I were to have any 
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doubt of it, then I don't know why I should trust my eyes.” (1951, #125). A doubt about 
our hands implies a doubt about our eyes, and really our brain too.  A doubt regarding a 
body part that has little direct influence over our status as an epistemic agent (e.g., our 
hand) can still lead to us having doubts about more fundamental aspects of ourselves 
(e.g., our cognition). Similarly, if you find yourself doubting what 11 x 11 is during your 
math exam, then why should you trust any of your other answers regarding calculus, 
trigonometry, or statistics? Perhaps you can write it off as an anomalous mistake, if this 
doubt does not seem be an indication of anything in particular. But if you are aware of a 
stereotype—an implicit accusation or hypothesis—that suggests you are fundamentally 
not good at math, this mistake about simple multiplication might be a sign of something 
larger. So this sort of self-doubt stemming from stereotype threat is plausible, and would 
likely lead to a form of testimonial injustice. 
Individuals experiencing stereotype threat could also experience hermeneutical 
injustice if they become aware of the anxiety that is stereotype threat, or any of its effects, 
but do not fully understand (or cannot fully articulate) why this is happening. In fact, it is 
this situation that is most likely to lead to the self-doubt and testimonial injustice that I 
just described. They might also think that they are overreacting or stressing out for no 
good reason. This also counts as hermeneutical injustice insofar as the individuals are not 
able to make sense of a significant experience because of insufficient hermeneutical 
resources—which are insufficient because of the unfair marginalization of their social 
group. Fricker explains, “the powerful tend to have appropriate understandings of their 
experiences ready to draw on […] whereas the powerless are more likely to find 
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themselves having some social experiences through a glass darkly” (Fricker 2007, p. 
148). So when we have this sort of imbalance in our communal hermeneutical resources, 
it will likely lead to hermeneutical injustices.  
However, there is also another form of epistemic injustice in play here, that 
neither testimonial nor hermeneutical injustice captures sufficiently. Individuals are 
experiencing an unfair obstacle to their (potential) self-knowledge, which is a constraint 
on their ability to grow and flourish as an epistemic agent. If someone is not as free as 
others to explore their possible identity as, for instance, a math person or someone in the 
sciences, this is a wrong done to them specifically in their capacity as a knower. It is 
specifically harming their epistemic agency. But the wrong done to them is not (just) an 
unfair distribution of credibility, nor an unfairly maintained gap in their hermeneutical 
resources. It is (also) a direct stunting of their epistemic agency. They are not given the 
same amount of social freedom to learn and grow, because they are under a coercive 
pressure from cultural stereotypes. These stereotypes make exploration in certain 
domains unfairly more risky for them.  
Claude Steele actually described this sort of injustice stemming from stereotype 
threat before he even coined the concept of stereotype threat. When he was studying 
performance gaps between Black and White students in U.S. schools, he noticed that for 
Black students, some mistakes were much more risky for them. And thus, investing 
themselves in certain domains was much more risky, because of phenomena such as 
stereotype threat. He writes:  
Like anyone, blacks risk devaluation for a particular incompetence, such 
as a failed test or a flubbed pronunciation. But they further risk that such 
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performances will confirm the broader, racial inferiority they are 
suspected of. Thus, from the first grade through graduate school, blacks 
have the extra fear that in the eyes of those around them their full 
humanity could fall with a poor answer or a mistaken stroke of the pen. 
(Steele 1992) 
In this passage, the notion of a “broader, racial inferiority they are suspected of” is 
another way of saying, “a cultural stereotype.” So what Steele is describing here is 
stereotype threat: the students have extra fear and anxiety stemming from the possibility 
of their behavior confirming a stereotype that is, essentially, a culture-wide suspicion 
about them.  
 What is the likely impact of this extra fear and anxiety, that makes intellectual 
endeavors riskier for some students than for others? I argue, it is that their epistemic 
agency is hindered. Sally Haslanger argues that this can occur for subordinated groups in 
educational contexts, though she does not have stereotype threat in mind as a specific 
cause. In her work on racism in education, Haslanger argues that one form oppression 
takes is when “one is unjustly limited to a narrow range of conversations that do not 
enable one to form a self that is fully integrated into public space” (Haslanger 2014, p. 
122). This is exactly what stereotype threat does when it affects our interests and self-
confidence: it pushes us into a narrow range of possible roles, as defined by stereotypes 
about our social groups, and pushes us away from counter-stereotypic roles. Haslanger 
even points out that stereotypes can contribute to this sort of oppression, insofar as they 
deny individuals conversations that are trustful and reliable.  
For instance, when speaking with people who uphold negative stereotypes, “the 
conversations one enters into provide one with limited or distorted resources for forming 
a self.” She gives the example of someone responding to the “intellectual aspirations 
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expressed by a Black girl by treating such desire as ridiculous, thus quashing the dream” 
(2014, p. 122). In this example, a person is limiting this conversation by having their 
attitudes shaped by stereotypes. But with stereotype threat, another person as the vehicle 
for the stereotype is not needed. Building off the example above, a Black girl may merely 
enter a science classroom where there are few other girls or students of color present. She 
proceeds to experience stereotype threat, which puts a coercive pressure on her self-
identity and motivation to pursue her interests in science. Here, too, she is presented with 
limited resources for self-formation. But this time, the “conversation” that is presenting 
these limited resources is not an actual, explicit one. It is an implied conversation that she 
picks up on via cues in her environment, such as the race and gender of her teacher, her 
classmates, the portraits on the wall, and the people she reads and studies in class.  
Specifically, she is reminded or made aware of an implied accusation about her 
social group when, for instance, she sees picture after picture of white men who are 
lauded as great scientists; when her peers and mentors struggle to make sense of her 
counter-stereotypic interests; or when she realizes she got a basic question wrong on her 
homework. Stereotype threat limits her resources for self-formation by directing her 
attention towards this implied accusation, which requires a “Sisyphean effort” to contend 
with every single time engages in an activity that she is stereotyped as being bad at or 
uninterested in. Requiring this sort of Sisyphean effort to resist the coercive pressure of 
stereotypes is an unfair burden on the epistemic agency of subordinated groups. It 
requires significantly more cognitive energy for them to explore certain identities, due to 
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unfair power relations in their society. The unfair power relations are that the negative 
stereotypes attached to them contribute to ontic injustice and dehumanization. 
We can contrast this with a White male student who experiences some effects of 
stereotype threat when engaging in athletics. There does exist a cultural stereotype that 
white men are worse natural athletes than Black men are, and this does lead to the 
underperformance effect in white male athletes (Stone, Chalabaev & Harrison 2011). But 
for the white male athlete, this stereotype only threatens his identity and value within this 
limited domain. It is much less likely for his worries and doubts, and for other people’s 
potential devaluation of him, to spill over into other domains. One main reason is that his 
Whiteness and his maleness protects him (insofar as he properly conforms to the reigning 
standards of Whiteness and maleness.) This means his entire humanity will not be on the 
table when he contends with stereotype threat in this instance. There is no deeper cultural 
suspicion that he must ward off, unlike the Black student who struggles when taking an 
academic test, or the woman who struggles to belong in a field that is heavy on logic and 
math. Stereotype threat may be a near-universal phenomenon for humans, but the impact 
it is capable of having is not. Not all stereotypes are created equal; some have been 
crafted to pierce deeper than others. This is a crucial point for tackling issues of justice 
and equality, especially in the domain of education. 
 
Section 3.4: Stereotype Threat’s Impact on Epistemic Agency in Education 
As a result of the expanded picture of stereotype threat, and the fact that 
stereotype threat can take various forms of epistemic injustice, we need to broaden our 
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understanding of stereotype threat’s ramifications for issues in education. While 
documenting the way that stereotype threat can impact “achievement” in education 
remains important, this is not the only impact the phenomenon can have. There are other 
outcomes that matter besides quantifiable achievement, such as individuals’ sense of self, 
sense of belonging, and long-term health. For instance, I argued in Chapter One that 
focusing on only boosting performance can obscure potential costs to individuals’ health 
via their stress levels. Furthermore, if our goal is not just to have students score highly on 
tests, but also to have equal access to important social roles, paying attention to 
stereotype threat’s effects on self-identity is crucial. For instance, if one is pressured to 
dis-identify with a domain before they have the chance to fully explore it, this may limit 
their access to that domain as much as quantifiable achievement within the domain can. 
This issue of looking beyond short-term performance has an analog in debates of 
how to increase literacy rates and appreciation of reading in students across America. 
Initiatives such as No Child Left Behind focused on getting all students up to par skill-
wise, fostering mastery so that children have the tools to fully appreciate books and 
literature. Initiatives like Reading Rainbow, on the other hand, come at the problem from 
the other direction. They seek to foster in children a love of reading and an identity as 
readers, so that children will be more motivated to improve their reading skills (Goldstein 
2014). That is, if we foster in children an interest in a domain, that can give them the 
motivation to improve their skills in that domain. As part of fostering such interest, we 
need to have their success and continued identity with that domain be a live and open 
possibility for them. If we do that, they will find a way to get the skills they need. 
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Therefore, the impact stereotype threat can have on self-identity is not secondary to its 
impact on performance.  
 Furthermore, education does more than simply teach us how to perform well in 
certain academic or technical domains. It functions as an important place where we foster 
our epistemic agency and gain a sense of the sorts of social and epistemic roles we may 
adopt in our lives. Haslanger argues, “schools are contexts in which we develop self-
understandings and identities that situate us as members of society” (2014, p. 109). And 
Fricker cautions that epistemic injustice can, by stunting self-understanding and 
epistemic agency, negatively “influence the construction of the individual subject.” I 
have shown in this chapter that it can indeed “[cramp] the very development of the self” 
(Fricker 2007, p. 163). It is crucial that we pursue justice and equality in education 
because education communities are an important place where we can foster a more robust 
and flexible self-identity.  
If some groups are experiencing more hindrances to their self-understanding and 
epistemic agency, that is likely as much of an obstacle to equal access in education as 
hindrances to their performance are. Equal access does not just mean equal access to high 
achievement, but also equal access to all the possibilities that education is supposed to 
grant: access to careers, vocations, and self-directed inquiry. It does not matter how well 
you perform in math if you cannot see yourself as a mathematician, or an engineer, or a 
math teacher. Even if we were able to eliminate all the performance gaps in education, 
there still could be significant inequality in the form of different students having different 
degrees of self-understanding. If one student could perform highly and see such 
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achievement as opening 50 doors for themselves, but another student only has the tools 
and encouragement to see five of those doors as viable, we are still missing the mark on 
equality. I will take up this line of thought in the next chapter on women in philosophy. 
  
  
98 
CHAPTER FOUR 
WHY ASKING “WHAT WOMEN WANT” IS THE WRONG QUESTION 
 Section 4.1: Introduction and Overview 
There has been a recent push to increase the representation of marginalized 
groups in various academic fields. In philosophy, our focus has been largely on women.
26
 
It has now been well-established that women are underrepresented in philosophy. The 
chart below shows that while women earn 50-60% of all B.A., M.A., and Ph.D. degrees, 
and 55-65% of degrees in the humanities, they only account for 25-30% of degrees 
earned in philosophy.
27 
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 Worryingly, the underrepresentation of racially marginalized groups, such as Black, Latino, and 
indigenous philosophers, may be even more severe than that of women. For instance, only 5% of APA 
members who reported their race (which was a little over a third of total members) identified as Latino 
(APA 2014). Currently, 17% of the U.S. population is Latino (Census Bureau 2015). Similarly, Botts et al. 
(2014) calculated that there are 141 affiliated Black philosophers, which means that only 1.5% of U.S. 
philosophers are Black (Botts et al. 2014, p. 237).  To compare, 13% of the U.S. population is Black 
(Census Bureau 2015). However, for various reasons, the field has been slower to respond to this issue than 
to that of gender. 
27
 For “all” degrees conferred, I used data from NCES (2013a):. For “philosophy” degrees, I used data from 
NCES (2013b). Paxton, Figdor, and Tiberius (2012) estimate the number of female graduate students in 
philosophy to be somewhat higher, at around 30%. Miriam Solomon and John Clare (2009, p. 4) similarly 
put the percentage of women getting Ph.D.s in philosophy at 28%. To calculate “humanities” degrees, I 
tallied up Philosophy and Religious Studies, Liberal Arts and Humanities, Foreign Languages, English, and 
Area Studies from NCES (2013b). I also used data from “Interdisciplinary Studies” to decide whether to 
round up or down—since it is not clear what percentage of these degrees count as humanities.  
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Figure 1. Percentage of degrees conferred to women in the U.S., 2012. 
Regarding faculty numbers, Kate Norlock puts the percentage of female faculty in 
philosophy at 20.6% as of 2009. Furthermore, women’s representation seems somewhat 
worse in higher-status positions. Norlock notes that while women constitute 26% of all 
part-time philosophy instructors, they only account for only 16.6% of full-time 
instructors (Norlock 2011).
28
 Women’s representation may be getting better though. 
Current undergraduate enrollments suggest that women are majoring in philosophy at the 
higher rate of 35% (Paxton, Figdor, & Tiberius 2012). While these more recent numbers 
may be heartening, we still have a ways to go if we want the percentage of women in 
philosophy to approach 50%.
29
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 These numbers in the U.S. are consistent with the numbers from other Anglophone countries, where the 
underrepresentation of women is an international problem: women seem to make up 20-30% of philosophy 
faculty in many English-speaking countries. Women in Australia make up 28% of continuing positions in 
philosophy. Women in Canada make up 21% of full professors (Hutchinson & Jenkins 2013). Also in many 
countries, the U.S. included, the degree of underrepresentation seems even worse for other social groups, 
such as Black philosophers and disabled philosophers. 
29
 See Crasnow 2009b for a discussion of how women’s participation in philosophy and other fields has 
changed over time. 
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However, is this the number we should want? Many of us take it as a given, 
believing it to be a good default aim or rule of thumb for gender parity.
30
 Few people I 
think would argue that the numbers in academia should absolutely match the overall 
population demographics, down to the percentage. However, 35% still seems too low, 
and bringing that number closer to 50% is a worthwhile goal in the name of gender 
equality. Some are not so sure that this goal is worthwhile. Some people worry that it is 
not, because this goal is either (a) futile (e.g., if it goes against an immutable nature) or 
(b) harmful (e.g., if it is not in line with people’s actual preferences). For instance, David 
Papineau (2015a) has recently cautioned that women might, as a group, be less interested 
in philosophy than men are, and this may not necessarily stem from a pernicious source. 
If that is the case, then there may come a point at which demanding greater proportions of 
women in philosophy may go against what women themselves genuinely want. In this 
chapter, I argue that Papineau’s caution ignores the reasons why such a potential 
difference in interest would likely stem from a pernicious source—reasons such as 
stereotype threat. Thus, Papineau’s argument demonstrates the importance of better 
awareness of the negative effects of stereotype threat, especially those beyond 
performance. 
Furthermore, Papineau’s argument is a bit interesting in that it somewhat 
explicitly demands that the onus be on those who want greater proportions of women in 
philosophy. I will argue that the opposite is the case, that even if on the whole women 
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 Note, many concrete goals set in philosophy have been markedly lower than 50%. For instance, one 
recent push has been for philosophers to have their syllabi include 20% women. And the Gendered 
Conference Campaign, started by the Feminist Philosophers blog, seeks to call out the pattern of 
conferences where 0% of the presenters are women.  
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currently express less interest in philosophy than men do, that is not a good enough 
reason on its own to deviate from a goal of gender parity. The onus is on those who think 
this difference in interest is innate and/or benign. 
As has been pointed out in online discussions about women in philosophy, “Even 
if women as a group are disinclined to do something because it doesn’t appeal to them, 
[that] doesn’t mean that the reason it doesn’t appeal to them isn’t rooted in unfair social 
conditions” (Leibowitz 2015). Along these lines, I argue that if there is such a gendered 
difference in interest, it is more plausibly due to pernicious stereotypes and gender 
schemas (Saul 2009) than any benign biological tendency or cultural trend. As things 
stand in our societies, if we simply ask what women want, we are likely to be asking 
what women want when they are under pressure from sexist norms and stereotypes, 
which does not give us a good benchmark for what women’s participation could be if we 
reject these sexist norms and stereotypes. 
In making this argument, I want to stress several features of this debate. First, 
when we talk about the potential harms that low numbers of women in a profession can 
cause, we want to think both about harms to the profession, and harms to individual or 
groups of women. For instance, David Hull discusses the importance of respecting the 
demographic diversity of scientists, but insofar as doing so helps science. For instance, he 
notes that J. D. Watson did not succumb to prejudicial temptation to discount the 
scientific work of women, because he was “happy to use Rosalind Franklin’s X-ray-
diffraction pictures. It never occurred to him not to, even though she was a woman” (Hull 
1988a, p. 389). Hull mentions the benefits to science that came of Watson’s attitude, but 
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fails to note the costs that Franklin herself endured. That is, it also did not occur to 
Watson to treat Franklin and her contribution to the discovery of the double helix of 
DNA in a way befitting a fellow scientist (O’Carroll 2013). 
Also, we should keep a good part of our attention on what our theories about 
causes imply regarding potential remedies. I argue that if some groups of people have 
their potential interest in philosophy affected by stereotypes, then we should seek to 
diminish this influence by (a) undermining the stereotype and (b) counteracting its 
influence with deliberate encouragement. If stereotypes and schemas are having this sort 
of influence, and it seems like they are, then we should not be content to accept only 
those who are already interested in philosophy. If we take seriously philosophy’s task of 
investigating the entire spectrum of human existence, then it should be a pretty highly 
prioritized goal of ours to have people from across the spectrum of human existence 
contribute to philosophy. 
And lastly, we can accomplish (a) and (b) without disregarding or disrespecting 
what specific individuals want, as long as we do not assume that current expressed 
interests are manifestations of fixed traits. The opening worries of this chapter often 
imply that they are though. They implicitly invoke a kind of fixed picture regarding 
human interests and desires, which is not warranted. In fact, we should recognize how 
much others play a role in shaping our own interests. Most people do not wake up one 
day and decide they are interested in philosophy. They find a book, or take a class, or 
have a friend or professor that is their gateway to the profession. Human desire is not that 
mysterious at the end of the day. People usually like things for reasons. And even in rare 
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occasions where we cannot discern a reason, those desires still have causes (like 
everything else in the universe). In the following sections, I will analyze four potential 
contributing factors for the low numbers of women in philosophy, including the 
hypothesis that women are, as a group, less interested in philosophy. 
 
Section 4.2: Four Arguments for the Cause of Low Numbers of Women in 
Philosophy 
 To determine the ideal goal for women’s participation in philosophy, we need to 
answer two questions: 
(Question #1) Can the rate of women’s participation in philosophy be changed? 
(Question #2) What are the consequences of increasing women’s participation in  
philosophy? 
These two questions are not usually articulated however. Instead, we often focus on a 
third question, which will help us answer the first two:  
(Question #3) What is the cause of women’s lower participation in philosophy? 
Whether women’s participation in philosophy can be changed is largely dependent of 
what the exact causes of their low participation are. If it is due to some innate, immutable 
trait that many women share, then the project of increasing women’s participation may be 
futile. And if it is due to some natural tendency, even if not an immutable one, then 
perhaps we should not try to change it, because it could lead to us going against our 
natures or cause us long-term dissatisfaction. This may be why the hypotheses for the low 
numbers of women in philosophy are often clumped together as either biological 
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explanations or cultural ones. Some people suspect that, if women’s lack of participation 
is largely due to a biological feature, then these features probably either cannot be 
overridden, or should not be. Whereas if the cause is cultural, it is much more likely to be 
contingent—that is, more likely to be either changeable or worth trying to change. 
Thus we should keep in mind that our ultimate goal is to answer Questions #1 and 
#2, because it may be the case that even if the cause of women’s low numbers is cultural, 
it may still not be (easily) changeable or worth changing. Similarly, a biological cause 
might be easily changeable, and worth changing. In this section, I will analyze four 
hypotheses in response to Question #3, noting what they imply for Questions #1 and #2.  
The hypotheses are as follows: that the low numbers of women in philosophy (and other 
fields) are due in large part to:  
(1) differences in innate talent  
(2) double standards stemming from overt discrimination or implicit bias  
(3) differences in innate interest 
(4) effects on interest and identity from stereotype threat 
These hypotheses are not mutually exclusive, which is why they are claims regarding 
what affects, in large part, the participation of women. I will first review the challenges 
that hypothesis (1) faces as to its plausibility, especially in light of hypothesis (2) being a 
more plausible explanation of the same facts. However, not everyone is satisfied that (2) 
is the whole story, so some people have also proposed (3). But again, (3) has its 
plausibility undermined by (2), and furthermore, it has its potentiality as a benign cause 
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of women’s low participation undermined by (4). I will conclude that the most plausible 
answer is a combination of (2) and (4). 
 
Subsection 4.2.1: Hypothesis (1): The Argument from Innate Talent 
In 2005, Larry Summers infamously emphasized the possibility of “intrinsic 
aptitude” being a factor in explaining the dearth of women in some STEM fields 
(Summers 2005). He suggested that if something like “IQ,” “mathematical ability,” or 
“scientific ability” has different standard deviations from the mean when it comes to 
gender, then, when we are looking at groups of people who are taken from the extreme 
end of the spectrum (such as “physicists at a top twenty-five research university,” 
according to him), we should not be surprised to find significant gender imbalance there. 
That is, if men are slightly smarter than women, along something like a bell curve, then 
whereas the smartest 50% of all humans will include, say, 49% women, the smartest 5% 
of people may include a much lower percentage, perhaps 10-25%. Summers’s remarks 
describe one possible explanation of how our biology might cause the numbers of women 
in STEM fields to be what they are: much lower than 50% in many cases (Healy 2011). 
And this explanation could fairly easily map on to conditions in philosophy. If this indeed 
explains the underrepresentation of women in STEM and philosophy, then it may not be 
a good idea to try to have women make up 50% of participants in these fields. We would 
likely not be recruiting the ‘best of the best’ if we did.  
However, Summer’s picture of quantifiable human intelligence and the 
meritocracy of academia faces several challenges to its plausibility. For one, it is not 
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obvious that when Harvard is hiring they are in fact drawing from the very top of the 
distribution in human ability or intelligence. There could be factors of prestige bias that 
make more mediocre candidates look smarter than they are, and smarter candidates from 
lesser-ranked schools look worse than they are. Furthermore, the people at the very top of 
the natural human intelligence spectrum (if there is such a thing), may be the sorts of 
people who do not function well in formal, academic or workplace settings. If you truly 
are a genius, you might not flourish all that well in systems surrounded by social 
formalities, bureaucracy, and demands for remedial competency. After all, the success of 
geniuses like Einstein and Nash were not necessarily guaranteed. They could have rather 
easily remained social outcasts indefinitely.  
Moreover, it is not obvious that something like “genius” or “scientific ability” is a 
single thing that can be so easily quantified. People who are excellent theorists can be 
mediocre experimentalists, and vice versa. Furthermore, being successful in STEM fields 
may require a whole host of social skills (getting grants, navigating departmental politics, 
working nicely with co-authors, etc.) So it is not clear that even if we could reliably 
measure something like mathematical talent or logical aptitude, that it would tell us who 
the best scientists are—or should be.  
Thus, this hypothesis relies on some controversial assumptions: that the relevant 
talent is a singular, measureable thing, that current hiring practices are indeed selecting 
for this talent, and that this talent is the best indicator of who will most benefit the field. 
There is especially significant pressure on the middle premise regarding hiring practices, 
when we take into account the role that implicit bias may play in hiring decisions (Moss-
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Racusin et al. 2012). It seems unlikely that hiring is tracking solely innate talent and not 
also (or more so) our biases regarding who we expect to be talented.
31
 
These challenges to this hypothesis’s plausibility is one reason why many people 
were so offended by Summers’s remarks. For some, it was not because he dared to 
suggest a biological explanation at all, but rather because he treated what they regarded 
as a highly implausible, shaky explanation as if it were just as plausible as other, better 
supported explanations. So even when Summers qualified that he would like to be proven 
wrong about the innate talent hypothesis, people took umbrage that he still considered it 
plausible enough to suggest that more attention and investigation be devoted to it. So 
even if Summers is sincere when he says that he believes, “working toward gender equity 
is vitally important,” this statement about his intentions skirts the issue of whether he is 
achieving his own goal of helping to foster “careful, honest and rigorous research” on 
gender issues.  
The criticism of Summers is that his remarks dishonestly obscure what many 
scientists currently think about the already-disproven innate talent hypothesis. Instead, he 
treats the innate talent hypothesis as an open question and a hypothesis that has not 
received enough attention for anyone to come to a conclusion about its plausibility. But 
many of the experts in the field do not agree; they think there is enough evidence 
showing that the innate talent hypothesis does not bear out. Thus, the criticism of 
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 Though there is a recent study that purports to show that women actually receive positive bias in hiring 
decisions (Williams & Ceci 2014), this study has been criticized for not actually showing what it purports 
to show, and failing to factor in known moderators of implicit bias. Roughly, the study purports to show 
that women actually experience bias in their favor, when really it shows that women with stellar C.V.s face 
such bias. This is something already predicted by implicit bias research: that stellar women may seem extra 
stellar (because they so exceed expectations), but average women will seem less accomplished than average 
men.  
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Summers’s remarks is that he ignores this fact; he does not acknowledge that treating this 
hypothesis as a live possibility is in fact controversial. By obscuring the context of his 
remarks in this way, by obscuring the fact that what he was saying was more 
controversial than he made it seem, he was not fostering good scientific research and 
public education.  
 
Subsection 4.2.2: Hypothesis (2): The Argument from Double Standards and Implicit 
Bias 
The second hypothesis is that sexist norms may be driving women out of 
philosophy, regardless of what their initial talent in philosophy is. One such norm is that 
regarding aggressiveness. In short, philosophers are expected to be aggressive, but 
women are not. So female philosophers face a double bind. Kate Manne argues, “women 
have less social permission to engage in the kind of aggressive intellectual combat which 
remains (for better or, probably, worse) standard in our discipline. Women are implicitly 
expected to manage social dynamics, not to try to win arguments or show others to be 
mistaken” (Manne 2015a). This observation is also echoed in fields outside of 
philosophy, such as the business world. Claudia Kotchka, a former vice president of 
design, observes, “people tend to be a lot more forgiving of men who are assholes than 
women who behave that way” (McIlvaine 2010). Similarly, B.J. Gallagher, a 
management consultant, argues that people in business view the same behavior from men 
and women differently: "A male boss doesn't suffer fools gladly; a female boss is a bitch" 
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(McIlvaine 2010). If this is right, then it is unlikely that female bosses will be assessed 
fairly when it comes to determining who has positive leadership skills. 
A similar double standard arises when women attempt to negotiate for a job. This 
example is similar because while some people hypothesize that women do not like 
negotiating, recent studies suggest that actually, interest may not matter because women 
are more heavily sanctioned for negotiating. For instance, a recent study of graduating 
MBA students found that 59% of men negotiated their job offers while only 17% of 
women did (Small et al. 2007). Off the bat, this might look like evidence for differences 
in interests. However, this discrepancy may instead reflect the knowledge (used loosely) 
candidates have regarding the likelihood of negotiations going well or poorly for 
themselves. According to the Harvard Business Review, “In repeated studies, the social 
cost of negotiating for higher pay has been found to be greater for women than it is for 
men” (Bowles 2014). Specifically, the less nice a woman seemed while negotiating, the 
more she was penalized by evaluators—especially male ones. Men, however, were not so 
penalized. Thus, while women have been accused of not negotiating enough, or well 
enough, it seems that they are not assessed by the same standards as men often are. 
Philosophers should be especially worried about a third type of study, one which 
looks at how people respond to someone presenting information and making various 
claims. One such study showed that men demanded, “a higher degree of likeability from 
female than from male targets to be persuaded by them.” Women demanded likeability 
from both men and women (Bowles, Babcock & Lai 2005; Carli, LaFleur & Loeber 
1995). This should worry us because philosophy is a field where one’s talent and 
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contribution to the field is often measured in terms of how persuasive our peers take our 
arguments to be. And given the current gender balance in philosophy, our peers are still 
mostly men. This suggests that women in philosophy are forced to walk a tightrope of 
signaling both that they are serious, hard-hitting philosophers and that they are nice and 
likeable ones whose views are worth considering. 
Lastly, recent research has suggested that beliefs about whether fields require 
innate “brilliance” or “genius” may also be a factor in pushing women out of certain 
fields. Leslie, Cimpian, Meyer, and Freeland (2015) argue that a major factor in whether 
a given academic field has an underrepresentation of women may hinge on the degree to 
which that field is believed to require “raw intellectual talent,” such as brilliance or 
genius (2015). The chart below is the result of their study, showing a correlation between 
the underrepresentation of women in a field and the degree to which practitioners believe 
their own field requires brilliance. 
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 Figure 2. Percentage of women in ratio to field-specific ability beliefs, 2011. 
Leslie et al. argue that such beliefs about brilliance may be an indirect cause of 
underrepresentation: 
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[W]omen are often stereotyped as lacking the same sort of innate intelligence as 
men, and thus women will be discouraged from participating in fields to the 
extent that these fields are perceived as requiring this type of intelligence. (2015, 
p. 9-10)  
If this is right, then we can expect women to experience some of the highest amounts of 
discouragement in philosophy, since it is the discipline furthest up the scale of reportedly 
requiring something like brilliance. 
The point in presenting all this research is to demonstrate that it is rather plausible 
that various forms of implicit bias and sexist norms are creating double standards and 
motivation for discrimination against women in various fields, including philosophy. 
Furthermore, while people may believe that academics hire fewer women because 
women tend to be less capable or “brilliant,” it seems that what may really be driving 
hiring decisions is our expectations of who is capable or brilliant. For those of us who are 
convinced that hypothesis (1) is implausible and hypothesis (2) is very plausible, this 
seems like enough to indicate that women’s low numbers in philosophy are not due to 
any benign or harmless process. However, not everyone is convinced that this is so. 
 
Subsection 4.2.3: Hypothesis (3): The Argument from Interest 
Difference in innate ability is not the only way in which biology or benign factors 
could influence the relevant demographics. Steven Pinker points out that, “gender 
disparities can arise in the absence of discrimination as long as men and women differ, on 
average, in their mixture of talents, temperaments, and interests” (Pinker 2005). So 
perhaps we should be looking at differences in human desire instead of ability. As 
Rebecca Jordan-Young describes this argument which she critically engages, perhaps 
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“women and men want different things out of life and are temperamentally suited both 
for different work and for a different balance between career and family” (Jordan-Young 
2011, p. 5).  
 In the context of philosophy more specifically, David Papineau has recently 
argued that discrimination and the kind of bias that Leslie et al.’s work demonstrates may 
not be the whole picture. Papineau points out that if the low numbers of women in 
philosophy were merely “the result of simple discrimination against women,” then it 
would clearly be a pernicious influence on the profession and we should intervene. But 
he emphasizes that “it should not be taken for granted that any other causes for the 
imbalance would be similarly unacceptable” (Papnieau 2015a). Specifically, he argues 
that what seems to be evidence of implicit bias could be instead evidence of such 
different interest.
32
 Specifically, he argues that gender-based differences in desires and 
interests could be an alternative explanation for Leslie et al.’s results.  He ventures: 
Placing a premium on brilliance creates a pressure to work in a style that 
requires it. This may turn women away from the brilliance-prizing 
disciplines, not because they can’t play the game, but because they won’t. 
Most young people come into philosophy and economics because they 
want to address important issues, not to make the next move in a technical 
exercise. When they discover that they need to dance on the head of a pin 
to get a job, women and men are likely to react differently. Where many 
men will relish the competitive challenge and enjoy the game for its own 
sake, many women will see it as the intellectual equivalent of putting balls 
in pockets with pointed sticks, and conclude that they could be doing 
something better with their lives. (2015a) 
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 Papineau is not the first person to consider this hypothesis. In 2009, Sharon Crasnow acknowledged this 
viewpoint when she stated, “I take it for granted that there is a problem; it is not a good thing that women 
are under-represented in philosophy. Some might argue that this is not really a problem, however. Perhaps 
not as many women as men want to study philosophy and under-representation of women is a simple issue 
of self selection” (Crasnow 2009a, p. 8). 
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Papineau’s hypothesis here is that, for some reason, women (more so than men) are not 
interested in impractical pursuits or arbitrary competitions. While this hypothesis about 
women’s interests keeps alive the possibility of a biological factor at play, both Pinker 
and Papineau acknowledge that the driving force behind women’s interests might not be 
all biology. Pinker points out that the differences in temperament and interests between 
the genders could be the result of “biology, socialization, or an interaction of the two” 
(Pinker 2005. Similarly, Papineau reflects on the fact that, “Mores are changing, within 
philosophy as well as without, and it is hard to predict what men and women will come to 
want. Fifty years ago, who would have thought that women doctors would come to 
outnumber their male counterparts?” (Papineau 2015a). So if Pinker and Papineau both 
acknowledge that socialization could drive differences in human interests, why do they 
present this hypothesis in alignment with biological explanations of ability? 
They may do so because, as mentioned above, the entire “biology vs. culture” 
debate regarding sex differences is ultimately of secondary concern. The question of what 
causes the numbers to be the way they are (Question #3) may be interesting in its own 
right, but a pressing social matter is what the cause of underrepresentation implies about 
the possibility of intervention (Questions #1 and #2). Papineau emphasizes that if we 
want to answer Questions #1 and #2, we need to address #3: “How far philosophy’s 
gender imbalance is bad depends on its causes” (Papineau 2015a). But the emphasis 
works the other way around, too. Figuring out what causes the low numbers of women in 
philosophy only tells us what we should do about women in philosophy insofar as it 
sheds light on whether the numbers can be changed and should be changed.  
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Insofar as Questions #1 and #2 are our ultimate goal, then we need to dig further 
than merely investigating whether the cause is biological or not. Innate, biological 
features are not the only things that make change unlikely or unappealing. Benign 
cultural trends could also be responsible. (By “benign,” I am following Papineau’s usage, 
which I take to mean having no serious, harmful effects.) So if women, as a group, have 
come to dislike philosophy for even cultural reasons, it is not obvious that we should try 
to intervene.  It really depends on what that reason is, and it could potentially be a benign 
one. This is why Papineau argues that once we have eliminated the “bad reasons” why 
women are turned away from philosophy (i.e., bias and discrimination), there still may be 
fewer women in philosophy due to lack of interest. In that case, he sees “no further 
reason not to let the gender numbers fall where they may” (Papineau 2015a). For if 
women simply are not interested in philosophy (for whatever benign reason), that may 
not require our intervention—and in fact, it might even demand a lack of intervention. 
So, we need to examine this hypothesis regarding possible innate differences in 
interest, keeping in mind that the goal is not to show whether the cause of women’s lack 
of participation in various fields is biological or not. Rather, what is stake is whether we 
are justified in trying to intervene into these patterns of participation. Unfortunately, 
Papineau is of limited help in going further. Although he is eager to point out the 
possibility of hypothesis (3), he does not complete this argument by explaining exactly 
what sort of causes of differences in interest would be benign or not. 
 In fact, he even later backtracks on this point, when Kate Manne and others 
criticize him for arguing that there likely is such a benign cause of women being 
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uninterested in philosophy. He responds, “Kate Manne (July 24) took me to be urging 
that the underrepresentation might have a ‘benign explanation’. The explanations that I 
took seriously were (a) implicit bias against women, (b) that women are put off by the 
aggressive style of philosophical debate and (c) that they are put off by scholastic 
silliness designed to display “brilliance”. I wouldn’t have thought that any of these 
explanations were ‘benign’.” (2015b). I am not sure why Papineau insists here that all the 
explanations he is “taking seriously” are ones he does not suspect are benign, when he 
spends a good portion of the review emphasizing that we should not assume that “that 
any other causes for the imbalance would be similarly unacceptable [i.e. not benign].”  
Similarly, he reiterates, “Something peculiar to philosophy must be keeping the 
numbers of women down. We need to find out what this is, if we want to know whether it 
is a bad thing” (Papineau 2015a). So he clearly is urging us to consider the possibility 
that the underrepresentation of women could, at the end of the day, not (fully) be a “bad 
thing.” And when he starts to consider how women may be interested in different things 
than men are, he argues that for some hobbies, if the “mind-numbing rigours of practice” 
of the game are enough to “dissuade most women” from taking up the hobby, “Would 
this be bad? It is hard to see why” (Papineau 2015a). So here is Papineau taking seriously 
a potential cause for the low numbers of women in philosophy and emphasizing that it is 
potentially a completely benign influence. Of course, he acknowledges that what decides 
whether an influence is benign or not is not merely a matter of whether voluntary choice 
is involved. He writes, “Even if we assume that women are voluntarily selecting 
themselves out of philosophy [...] it does not yet follow that philosophy’s gender 
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imbalance is benign” (Papineau 2015a). But throughout his review, he cautions that we 
should not assume that the gender imbalance is pernicious, as opposed to it potentially 
being benign.  
So, let’s spell out the argument that Papineau seems to be gesturing at. There are 
at least three potential reasons one might think of for not meddling with philosophy’s 
demographics: (a) it is pointless, because we cannot change them; (b) it is too risky, 
because we might end up making matters worse, and (c) it is too risky, because even if 
we fix the problems we set out to fix, we might create other, bigger problems. Thus, it 
turns out that the hypothesis (3), the hypothesis from innate differences in interest, is used 
to justify three separate arguments: (3a) that increasing women’s participation in 
philosophy is not possible due to immutable interests, (3b) it is too risky because we 
could end up harming women, by either driving them away from philosophy or pushing 
uninterested people into the profession, or (3c) it is too risky because we could end up 
doing harm to philosophy as a profession. For instance, David Hull has argued that the 
social organization of science may encourage men and certain masculine traits, but 
cautions that attempting to alter this social organization could risk “the destruction of the 
system one wants to change” (Hull 1988a). Thus, he emphasizes that regarding such 
sociological changes to science (specifically in terms of reducing aggressive 
competitiveness in science), he is “not sure that the results would be worth effort” or that, 
such efforts could “bring science to a halt,” or perhaps to a more “leisurely pace” (Hull 
1988b).  So it is actually a bit of an old worry that feminist meddling in demographics 
could end up harming the profession they want to intervene into.  
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Interestingly, while evidence is often presented for (3a) regarding the possible 
biological nature of a difference in interest between genders, the immutability of the 
difference is not often explicitly argued for. Although few academics will argue that our 
biological tendencies are strong enough that they will fix our behavior in a way that is 
completely unalterable, there is still a powerful, cultural association between biology and 
the idea of an immutable nature that will show through, no matter how much “culture” 
you pile on top of it.  
 Ultimately, hypothesis (3a) is highly implausible. It is sometimes presented in a 
way that tries to shift the onus of the debate back onto those who want to try to increase 
women’s participation in a given field, asking for evidence that this is even possible. 
There are historical anecdotes which demonstrate that vast changes in participation 
within a field can occur within several decades. For instance, below is a chart detailing 
the gender breakdown of medical school graduates from the 1960s until the 2010s (Perry 
2009). 
  
119 
 
Figure 3. Medical school graduates, 1961-2009. 
After seeing a profession change from 95% to 50% men in 50 years, the onus should be 
on the person arguing that the numbers cannot or will not substantially change.   
 Similarly, many people might suspect that women do not have as much of an 
interest in computer science as men do, but the low participation rate of women in 
computer science is actually a recent trend. Grace Hopper, a computer scientist, wrote in 
1967 that women were well-suited for programming: “It’s just like planning dinner. You 
have to plan ahead and schedule everything so it’s ready when you need it. Programming 
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requires patience and the ability to handle detail. Women are “naturals” at computer 
programming” (Wade 2015). But in the 1990s, students in computer science classes were 
expected to have experience with personal computers (PCs), which were marketed as 
“toys for boys” (Planet Money 2014). The results are shown in the chart below, detailing 
the proportion of women in computer science, as compared to other fields where their 
participation steadily increased. 
 
Figure 4. Percentages of women majors by field. 
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What might look to us now in 2015 as the result of differences in interest (i.e., women’s 
lack of interest in computer programming and science) is actually the result of contingent 
historical and cultural factors. As a result of these known cases, the onus should be on the 
person who wants to argue that some sort of fixed or immutable interest is a factor in 
women’s participation in philosophy. Furthermore, we should be cautious about some of 
our intuitions on the matter, given that our notions about which people seem to be 
innately interested in what often stem from stereotypes that are so flexible that you could 
practically make any argument for any outcome. For instance, “Aren’t women also 
supposed to be endless talkers, complainers, nit-pickers and more detail-oriented than 
men? Sounds like a perfect background for philosophy to me.” Thus, our ideas about 
women’s interest in philosophy may be a manifestation of hindsight bias. That is, we 
claim that what we suspect about sex differences would result in just this being the case, 
even though, if the opposite were true, we could make the very same “just so” stories 
(Yudkowsky 2007). 
 However, these points do not diminish the plausibility of hypothesis (3b), that 
there could be benign—or even beneficial—differences in interest that are influencing 
women’s participation in various fields. This argument is at the heart of Papineau’s 
caution that we ought to let the gender numbers fall where they may. He suggests that 
perhaps some things, like philosophy or snooker have gotten “stupider” over the years, in 
the sense that, they are activities with little practical import, and women—for whatever 
reason—have better things to do with their time, and thus have little interest for 
impractical activities. I am not sure how Papineau would try to explain the popularity of 
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the women’s fashion industry on this account, but he is correct that it is “possible” that 
there are benign causes to groups of people not being interested in certain professions.  
Notably, Papineau’s argument is not just that there is possibly no pressing need to reach 
gender parity in philosophy, but the caution that in pushing for that goal, we may do more 
harm than good. In this way, the argument that the causes for women’s low participation 
may be benign often morphs into the claim that these causes are somehow beneficial, or 
at least, that tampering with them would bring the risk of doing greater damage. 
 
Subsection 4.2.4: Hypotheses (3b and 3c): The Arguments from Inductive Risk 
An argument from inductive risk states that with inductive hypotheses comes the 
risk of error, which can have practical consequences. So when choosing which hypothesis 
we should choose as the default, or more likely until we have more evidence, we should 
take these practical risks into consideration. For instance, if we do not know whether a 
useful chemical is toxic, we need to weigh the risks to safety in using it against the risks 
to lost productivity in not using it. Likewise, if we are not sure exactly why there are so 
few women in philosophy, then we need to weigh the risks of pushing for more women in 
philosophy against the risks of supporting the current demographic split.  
What are the practical risks we face in pushing for a 50/50 gender split? The first 
potential consequence could be cashed out as one of two arguments: on one reading, it is 
not worth focusing so much on rooting out discrimination if even a few people are falsely 
accused of sexism. This does not seem like a good argument. On another reading, it is not 
worth focusing so much on rooting out discrimination if a significant number of people 
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will be falsely accused of sexism. This is a reasonable caution, but we need evidence that 
this is a plausible worry. It quickly loses its plausibility, though, when we remember that 
a lot of discrimination in philosophy is probably the result of implicit sexism—which is 
probably profuse throughout the population. Therefore, if we all are likely implicitly 
sexist to some degree in some way or another, then the possibility of people being falsely 
charged with (implicit) sexism is extremely low. Furthermore, one also needs to provide 
evidence that the harm caused to people’s reputations from being falsely, or unfairly, 
labeled sexist is likely to be greater than the harm caused by letting potential bias and 
discrimination go unchecked. Note, one does not need to do this to show that being 
falsely accused is a generally bad thing, or that someone should not do it. They need to 
show this in order to argue that pushing to get more women in the field is not worth the 
risk. 
The next several consequences, that quotas could make people doubt women’s 
abilities, and that quotas for service work could overburden women, are already often 
acknowledged by the people pushing for more participation by women. In fact, as far as I 
know, it is the people pushing for greater gender equality in academia who first 
emphasized these worries. So again, someone needs to present evidence that either these 
risks cannot be avoided if we push for more women in a given field, or that they risk 
greater harm than the harm trying to be prevented in the first place. But it seems to be 
that they can somewhat easily be avoided by taking a more sophisticated approach to 
increasing women’s participation in the field besides mandating quotas.  
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The last potential consequence, however, is one that is not normally discussed by 
those who want to increase women’s participation. This is the worry that encouraging 
more women into certain fields runs the risk of pressuring people into lines of work they 
do not like. For example, Jordan-Young reports this warning from a sociologist: “If you 
insist on using parity as your measure of social justice, it means you will have to keep 
many men and women out of the work they like best and push them into work they don’t 
like” (as cited in Jordan-Young 2011, p. 5).  
While this might be a valid worry in some contexts, it does not seem to be so for 
philosophy in particular, given our small numbers. In 2009 there were an estimated 
23,000 full- and part-time philosophers in the U.S. (Norlock 2011). The U.S. has 309 
million people as of the 2010 census, 51% of which are women. Since 209 million people 
are ages 18 and over, that leaves us with 106.5 million women old enough to be potential 
philosophers. We would only need 1 in every 4,600 women to be interested in philosophy 
in order to staff the entire profession in the U.S. with only women. At a university of 
roughly 9,000 students, that means you only need about two female majors to go on to do 
graduate work in philosophy. This is a hack job statistics-wise, but it gets at the point that 
for such a populous country and a relatively small profession, this worry about dragging 
people into it who do not want to be here seems somewhat farfetched. 
 It seems even more implausible when we consider the current state of the 
philosophy market. We receive hundreds of times more applications for graduate 
programs and philosophy jobs than we can fill, so we know that there are currently many, 
many more people who are interested in philosophy than we can currently accommodate. 
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As one department chair confided to me, in regards to the number of applications they 
received for a job search, “we were presented with an embarrassment of riches.” Thus, at 
least for philosophy, it seems highly unlikely that in order to increase the number of 
women in the field, we will be forced to drag in people who want nothing to do with us. 
 One might have the worry, however, that even if there are women who are 
interested in philosophy, we might need to lower our standards to let them in, instead of 
admitting more qualified men. Though again, the “embarrassment of riches” observation 
in the job market suggests that this may not be the case—especially if philosophy is the 
type of endeavor where searching for the “best of the best” offers diminishing returns at a 
certain point. That is, there may just be lots of extremely qualified people who are willing 
to do philosophy, to the point that we could focus on changing the demographics of the 
field without (significantly) sacrificing quality. And again, the worry that we are lowering 
our standards presupposes that we are already doing a good job upholding those 
standards—a premise which research on implicit bias has challenged, as I discussed 
earlier. To reiterate, work on implicit bias suggests that we in philosophy might be extra 
harsh when judging women, so even if we consciously “go easier” on them in order to 
hire or accept more women, it is plausible that this could be making us fairer, not more 
biased—because we could be using our deliberative favoring to cancel out our implicit 
biases. 
Lastly, Papineau has a separate worry, which is that by focusing primarily on 
getting more women into the field, we might change the field in regrettable ways. He 
argues that if we try to make philosophy more appealing and welcoming to women, we 
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might be tempted to do so by putting more emphasis on topics that women tend to like. 
But what if those are not the topics that “deserve sustained philosophical attention”? 
(Papineau 2015a). We could alter the character of philosophy in order to cater to a 
specific group, which, even if it does not somehow lower the overall quality of 
philosophical scholarship, it might still be simply unfair to those not interested in those 
topics. Papineau suggests the following solution: “The alternative would be first to decide 
which topics are really worth studying, and then to see who wants to study them” 
(2015a). However, there is a troubling feature of this proposed solution. Who gets to 
decide which topics are worth studying?  
Papineau’s solution would have us trade out one arbitrary group for another. 
Instead of women getting to dictate philosophy’s curriculum, people who already are 
interested in currently-endorsed-philosophy get to decide what should count as 
philosophy. Papineau claims that this would not necessarily “preserve the intellectual 
status quo” (2015a), but it is hard to see how that would not happen on some level. If 
there is possibly something deserving of philosophical attention that is not currently 
studied in philosophy, why would we think the people interested in the stuff we are 
studying would recognize the merit of this unstudied topic? Would it not be more likely 
that those who are already interested in the ignored topic (and thus perhaps not currently 
in philosophy) are better suited to argue for its merits? Papineau acknowledges that it is 
hard for even current philosophers to agree on what deserves philosophical attention. So 
why should non-philosophers not help us figure this out? Why do we think we are better 
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judges of what philosophy is if the very question on the table is whose interests should 
count as philosophical in the first place? 
It might sound like I am now arguing that we should in fact ask women what they 
want. But that is the wrong framing. We should not ask women what they want because 
women have biologically different interests. We should ask them what they want insofar 
as we should ask marginalized groups, philosophical outsiders, and non-philosophers 
what they want. We should be open to the possibility that what counts as philosophy has 
been (somewhat unintentionally?) shaped by biased interests and sexist stereotypes that 
push out those who would help constitute a more representative array of human interests 
and insights. We should be open to the possibility that our interests are in part shaped by 
the norms and stereotypes of our culture. 
 
Subsection 4.2.5: Hypothesis (4): The Argument from Stereotype Threat 
Thus, the argument that if women are less interested in philosophy than men, we 
should not aim for 50/50 representation, is flawed. Not only does it too quickly dismiss 
the potential role of bias, and gesture towards arguments from inductive risk without 
marshalling enough evidence that these risks in pushing for more women are greater than 
those for supporting the status quo, but the argument also fails to consider how disinterest 
in a topic can stem from sexist norms. This is, as I will argue below, the final nail in the 
coffin for the argument from differences in interest suggesting a benign or beneficial 
cause for women’s low numbers in philosophy. If women are in fact more disinclined 
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than men to pursue philosophy, it is very plausibly due (in good measure) to unfair social 
conditions.  
As we already saw, Kate Manne articulates one way this is likely happening, via 
women being penalized for not adhering to gendered norms of conduct. She furthermore 
criticizes Papineau for ignoring or being ignorant of this likelihood, and thus inflating the 
plausibility of there being a leftover gap in women’s interests that we need to explain, 
once we have truly accounted for all the ways in which bias and other “bad reasons” can 
push women out of philosophy. Whereas Papineau suggests that perhaps many women 
simply do not want to play the game of philosophy, Manne counters that, “many women 
clearly want to play the game – or would, were we not subject to hostile and punitive 
reactions in doing so. As a result, being a woman in philosophy is often stressful and 
unpleasant […]” (Manne 2015a). Similarly, she rejects Papineau’s hypothesis that 
philosophy’s “gladiatorial element…seems to put more women off than it does men” 
(Manne 2015b). She counters that it is not that women are put off by the norms of 
philosophy, but rather that, “men are put off by women who do what we do”—when we 
actually act in accordance with the aggressive norms of philosophy (Manne 2015b). In 
one way, Manne is demonstrating how Papineau is potentially making the same sort of 
mistake that Summers made. Both men are claiming that they are not discounting the 
possibility of discrimination playing a role, but they do not carefully attend to the vast 
amounts and various kinds of evidence pointing to discrimination; instead, they 
emphasize the possibility that there still could be some core biological fact determining a 
part of the phenomenon to be explained.  
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In addition to Manne’s observations about the misogynistic enforcement of 
gender norms, stereotypes can also pressure people to leave a field or to never pursue it in 
the first place—and do not necessarily need the same kind of aggressive enforcement by 
others.
33
 Even if a woman receives no overtly hostile bias in philosophy, she still may 
have her interests shaped by chronic experience of stereotype threat, insofar as it puts a 
coercive pressure on her self-identity, as I laid out in Chapter Three. And philosophers 
have recently argued that stereotype threat is likely operating in philosophy, due to 
stereotypes regarding gender and logical or analytical ability (Haslanger 2008; Beebee & 
Saul 2011; Schouten 2015).
34
  
Furthermore, if an individual experiences the related phenomena of belonging 
uncertainty and imposter syndrome, she may be pressured to raise her standards for 
evidence that she belongs in philosophy or can likely succeed here. Thus, if she is primed 
to notice any potential evidence that she does not belong, and is extra critical of potential 
evidence that she does belong, then even in a department where she experiences little 
direct bias, she still might feel unwelcomed, undervalued, and uncertain. Constantly 
experiencing that sort of uncertainty can disincline someone from remaining in the field. 
That is, even if she does not experience actual penalties and costs, there might be too 
many potential costs, and not enough evidence of potential gains. And this can likely 
squash any nascent desire women have in philosophy. 
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 In her recent work on misogyny, Manne proposes that it plays the role of enforcing gender norms and 
sexist social arrangements when individuals or groups appear to get out of line. 
34
 It is also likely operating for other social groups as well: people of color, disabled persons, older junior 
scholars, queer or trans persons, economically disadvantaged persons, etc. 
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Recent research on stereotype threat shows one of its effects causes women to 
become less interested in certain fields. Women under stereotype threat are slower to 
report the stereotyped domain as part of their future sense of self. In one study, 
researchers had men and women try to quickly identify whether they could envision 
themselves in math-related careers, such as accounting, statistics, or science. They report 
that women became less confident in these judgments when they realized that an 
upcoming math test would be graded by a male graduate student, as I explained in detail 
in Chapter Three. The men did not become less confident in this circumstance, nor did 
the women who were asked about careers but were not put in the threatening position of 
having their ability graded by a male graduate student in math. These math-identified 
women, when subjected to stereotype threat, suddenly “felt uncertain about who they 
were and what they could do” (Schmader 2010, p. 15). It seems plausible that if 
stereotype threat can cause individuals to second guess whether they identify with a 
stereotyped domain, it can decrease their overall interest in that domain too. This is a 
significant finding because it suggests that stereotypes can affect our interests even if no 
one in the stereotyped domain is explicitly supporting them, or even acting on implicit 
biases in support of them. All you need to trigger stereotype threat is a well-known 
cultural stereotype and any kind of micro-signal that the stereotype might apply in your 
current situation. Having low numbers of the stereotyped group present is enough to do 
the trick.  
Furthermore, even if an individual is trying to remain identified with a 
stereotyped domain, this can come at a significant cost to other aspects of their identity:  
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Pronin, Steele, and Ross (2001) reasoned that during a person's struggle to 
remain domain-identified, stereotype threat might affect the nature of 
one's identification with the negatively stereotyped group. Looking at this 
question in relation to women trying to remain math-identified, they 
developed a specific hypothesis: To stay identified with math, women 
might "bifurcate" their identity as women by reducing identification with 
those aspects of being a woman they perceived as being negatively 
stereotyped in the math domain, while remaining identified with aspects of 
being a woman they perceived as unproblematic in math. (Steele, Spencer 
& Aronson 2002, p. 414-5) 
If we are going to assess whether we should intervene in the demographics of philosophy 
based on considerations inductive risk, one of many factors we should acknowledge is 
that allowing stereotypes to flourish in the field carries with it the risk of forcing 
members of certain groups to bifurcate their identity, in order to feel like they fully 
belong in philosophy.  
 Similarly, these stereotypes can pressure individuals to emphasize the counter-
stereotypic aspects of their identity: 
Recently von Hippel, Hawkins, and Schooler (2001) [found that] Blacks 
who were better students were more schematic for intelligence than 
Whites who were better students. In explanation, von Hippel et al. argued 
that attention drawn to a person's counterstereotypic traits pressures the 
person to think more about the area, which eventually elaborates their self-
concept in the area. In support of this theory, they later found that White 
students who were good athletes--and thus succeeding in a 
counterstereotypic domain--had more developed self-schemas for athletics 
than Blacks who were good athletes. Here then may be another identity 
adaptation to stereotype threat in a domain—among those who persist in 
the domain, a more elaborate self-concept about the area in which the 
stereotype applies. (Steele, Spencer & Aronson 2002, p. 415-6) 
What this means is women who successfully identity with philosophy cannot simply be a 
woman who happens to like philosophy. There is a pressure for them to consider 
philosophy as part of their core identity, whether they would want that to be the case in 
the event that this stereotype did not exist. Therefore, those who are worried about 
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pressuring women into philosophy should actually be more worried about the low 
numbers of women in philosophy—not about increasing those numbers. For the low 
numbers of women in philosophy enables stereotype threat to be triggered more easily, 
which can pressure women into emphasizing their identity with philosophy.  
 What we need to keep in mind overall is that social incentives and norms, via 
stereotypes, can drive our behavior and interests. People are more likely to enjoy the 
things they are praised for, though it may not be the case that, were they not so highly 
praised for them, so many of them would seem to naturally enjoy it. We should thus be 
careful of observations like the following: “Women, bless them, care about people, and 
they care that their work have some relationship, even if tenuous, to the concerns and 
interactions of human beings in the world” (Healy 2003).  It could be some women just 
naturally care more about interpersonal relationships than they do about individual 
achievement. But it could be that many women come to care about interpersonal 
relationships because they are widely praised when they do so, and perhaps more 
importantly, censured when they do not.  
When women dare not to care about other people, they are called ruthless, 
heartless bitches. They are censured as bad women—as failing to be what they should be. 
That kind of assault on one’s social worth and self-identity should not be taken lightly, 
and I don’t think it is by the people who experience it. I suspect that women go into fields 
where they are more likely to be praised, appreciated, valued, and not made to feel like 
they are transgressing important moral boundaries. This means they are also coerced into 
avoiding fields where success in that very field may come at the cost of moral censure, 
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social de-valuation, or the bifurcating of their self-identity. And again, to reiterate, 
people’s actual social censure is likely significant, but it need not be a necessary 
condition. It may be that all people need is the suspicion that others might censure them. 
And cultural stereotypes provide evidence that others in the culture might endorse such 
censure. As social psychologists studying stereotype threat put it, “The mere threat of 
discrimination and devaluation implied by the perceived relevance of a negative group 
stereotype—like the threat of a snake loose in the house—can have effects of its own” 
(Steele, Spencer & Aronson 2002, p. 389). 
What this threat entails is that members of marginalized groups may raise their 
standards for evidence that they belong in philosophy, in order to compensate for the 
anxiety due to stereotype threat. Stereotype threat primes these individuals to notice any 
potential evidence that they do not belong. And if imposter syndrome is in play, that 
could push individuals to discount potential evidence that they do belong. So, even in a 
philosophy department where people experience little direct bias, they might still feel 
unwelcomed, undervalued, or uncertain about their future there. Constantly experiencing 
that sort of uncertainty can disincline someone from remaining in the field. There might 
seem to be too many potential costs, and not enough evidence of potential gains. And this 
can likely squash any nascent desire these individuals may have in philosophy. If we 
simply ask “what women want”—we gloss over this whole process, failing to investigate 
an important reason why women may end up expressing less interest in philosophy than 
men do. Certainly, if we are going to investigate whether there are biological differences 
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in interests, we need to rule out other factors that we could be mistaking for innate 
difference. 
This highlights the problem with most of the biological explanations put forward 
for complex social phenomena: they face competition from equally plausible social 
explanations, but they never supply evidence that they are more plausible than these 
competing hypotheses. And while many people suspect that both culture and biology 
have roles to play, the fact is, how could we even begin to tell what is due to biology 
when we have largely ignored what is potentially stemming from culture? Any biological 
explanation that has not shown the shortcomings in competing social explanations ends 
up being the less plausible of the two. There’s little reason to think that our “biological 
nature” will show through this supposed thin veneer of culture—at least, when it comes 
to numbers of women in philosophy. Even with violence, this may not be the case, for 
people have recently suggested that men may be more prone to violence because one of 
the sources of their self-esteem, their masculinity, is actually a fragile thing—leading 
many men to violently lash out, or to attempt to reclaim it through displays of physical 
dominance. So it seems possible that a whole lot of what we attribute to the natural world 
(and thus take to be immutable or beneficially natural) is actually a result of culture—
implying that it is much more contingent, mutable, and potentially pernicious than we 
have acknowledged. Therefore, we currently do not have a good enough reason to simply 
“let the gender numbers fall where they may” (Papineau 2015a) regarding women in 
philosophy. We have good reasons to think that increasing the number of women in 
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philosophy is both possible and beneficial, because we have good reasons to think that 
the current causes of their low numbers are pernicious and harmful. 
 
Section 4.3: Implications for the Philosophy Profession 
Subsection 4.3.1: Implications for Our Goals 
For the past decade philosophy has been trying to figure out just why the numbers 
of women in our profession are so low, especially compared to other fields in the 
humanities. As mentioned in Section 4.1, women earn degrees in philosophy at a much 
lower percentage (25-30%) than they do in general (50-60%) and within the humanities 
(55-65%). Even some STEM fields—which also have struggled to attract and retain 
women—have higher proportions of women than philosophy does; as of 2009, 
mathematics, astronomy, chemistry, and economics all have had larger proportions of 
women earning Ph.D.s than philosophy. (See chart below). 
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Figure 5. Percentages of Ph.D.s awarded to women, selected disciplines, 2009. 
For the past few years, Lousie Antony’s “perfect storm” model has been a popular 
explanation of why philosophy is such an outlier: there are several different causes of 
women’s low numbers, and some of these causes have interaction effects that magnify 
one another (Antony 2012). Again, while some people emphasize that some causes could 
be biological while others are cultural, I want to direct our attention towards what the 
causes imply about possible interventions, and whether they are called for. Current lack 
of interest in philosophy may be one cause of women’s low numbers, but even if it is, we 
need to know more before we can know whether such differences in interest are alterable 
and worth altering. Pinker and Papineau emphasize that they may not be, but I have 
shown that due to what we know about stereotype threat, our interests in general seem 
quite malleable, especially when our self-identity is at stake. So, if gendered stereotypes 
are contributing to the posited lack of interest women exhibit in philosophy, there is a 
good chance this is, at least in part, a result of stereotype threat, which would suggest that 
difference in interest are both able to be changed, and worth changing.
35
   
As a result, the percentage of women who are currently interested in philosophy is 
not a good benchmark for the ideal percentage of women in philosophy, for two reasons. 
First, instead of giving us an independent benchmark to aim for, it is likely to just be 
mirroring back the current state of the profession (which is not one that most of us 
approve of). That is, current degrees of interest only tell us what individuals are interested 
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 For independent reasons why stereotype threat is likely affecting philosophy, see Saul (2009, p. 43). 
Roughly, she argues that the conditions needed for stereotype threat are present in our field, the sorts of 
stereotypes needed for stereotype threat plausibly exist in our field, and many of the effects of stereotype 
threat look to already be present in our field.   
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in given our current social climate (and the stereotypes, norms, and schemas prevalent in 
that climate). As I discussed in Chapter Three, many women may not have been given the 
conceptual space within their self-concept to explore any nascent or potential interest in 
philosophy, to the degree that men have. So current interests only make for a good goal if 
you think the background social climate is currently acceptable (in regards to gender and 
race). But that is a premise that few people in philosophy hold! So this question ends up 
presuming something that is on the table in this very debate: that once we take away overt 
discrimination, the social climate of philosophy is healthy and acceptable enough that it is 
not putting any pernicious influence on people’s interest in philosophy, their ability to 
enjoy philosophy, or their self-identity. Only under those conditions would it make sense 
to use what women currently want as a benchmark for the degree of participation from 
this group that we should seek out.  
To emphasize, I am not suggesting that we have no reason to take seriously or 
respect what women actually want to do with their lives. I am not suggesting that we 
paternalistically tell them, “That’s just the gender stereotypes talking, dear.” Rather, I am 
arguing that asking what women, as a group, are currently interested in now is not a good 
way to figure out what women could potentially be interested in, now or in the future.
36
 
Furthermore, I think it may be mistaken to think about there being a static totality 
of women’s interests. Social climate can probably have huge impacts on our interests. 
Just imagine how your lifelong hobbies and interests may have been different if, for 
instance, you had or did not have a role model at a crucial point in your life. Or, if every 
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 Thanks to Victor Kestenbaum for a helpful discussion about the dynamic nature of interests, and whether 
interests are supposed to reflect some core part of ourselves. 
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time you tried to engage in that hobby, people would comment how weird and rare it was 
for someone like you to being doing so. Or, if whenever you tried to participate in your 
hobby, people kept insisting that you could not be that good at it, or they would demand 
that you first demonstrate competence before they would treat you as one of their own 
(and they would not make this demand of everyone—only you.) Or, imagine that the 
more engrossed you became in your hobby, the more people suggested to you that it must 
be in conflict with some other part of your identity, and so surely, that other part must be 
something you are not that attached to. 
There are thousands of configurations our social climates can take, and each of 
them could potentially have different influences on which groups are encouraged or 
discouraged from certain activities and ways of being. So there are thousands of potential 
configurations of certain social groups having, on the whole, certain interest or not. So, 
even if there is some biological or fixed, innate differences in interests between humans, 
it is a whole other step to prove that this innate tendency is not completely trumpable by 
social climate. We certainly know that any sort of natural ability could be trumped by all 
sorts of environmental factors: nutrition and other health factors, socioeconomic factors, 
etc. So once again, if you observe that two groups seems to have different levels of 
interest in some activity, you need to do a lot of work before you can conclude that the 
difference in interest stems wholly or primarily from the “natural” tendencies of those 
two groups, and not from social or cultural factors that are putting different sorts of 
pressures on those groups. Thus, instead of asking “what women want,” we should ask 
what stressed, besieged, unwelcomed people want. (The possible answers: less hostility, 
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aggression, uncertainty.)  We should focus on the circumstances, not the (often 
presumed) static group markers. 
The second reason that asking “what women want” is a bad question is because, 
even if there were no pernicious social influences at work, it presumes that desire and 
interest are largely static. Or, it presumes that philosophy has no reason to help people 
discover whether they might be interested in philosophy. On Papineau’s picture, that is 
left up to individuals to figure out on their own—which is weird given that philosophy 
does not currently have that large of a pop culture footprint, or a primary education one.  
So how are people supposed to figure out if they are interested in philosophy, if we in 
philosophy are deciding to take a hands off approach? Do they need to just stumble on it 
themselves? Are we presuming that some sort of irresistible, “natural” interest in 
philosophy will shine through even if a person is never explicitly encouraged to pursue 
the field? 
 At least for myself, many things I am interested in have come to be interesting 
because someone else introduced them to me, and supported me in trying them out. These 
are all things that I have become interested in, because someone else encouraged me to 
try them, and that at an earlier point I thought I would never be interested in: playing 
soccer and basketball, military history, baking, person vs. person competitions in 
multiplayer video games, feminism and gender issues, psychology, therapy, engineering 
and infrastructure, political fantasy such as Game of Thrones, and Star Wars. And in 
many of these cases, I first had to struggle though awkward incompetence. But the result 
was that I discovered that these things were much more enjoyable than I had originally 
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thought. So even though some people may be right that, "Reinventing the [science] 
curriculum will not make me more interested in learning how my dishwasher works” 
(Pinker 2005), that does not mean that nothing will make them interested in mechanical 
or electrical engineering. 
To reiterate from Chapter Three, our collective social imagination is fairly limited 
in lots of ways. Some people cannot even imagine themselves wearing clothes of a 
certain color (e.g., pink) because of what their bodies look like. Whether or not we 
“want” to wear those clothes or are interested in them often never even enters our 
calculations. So the clothes we “want to wear” are not taken from the range of all 
possible clothes. They are taken from a fairly narrow range of clothes that society deems 
appropriate for our gender, age, body type, race, and class. Sometimes people break those 
norms—and there’s normally a cost when they do.  
 The point is, our desires often change when our understanding of what is possible 
(or probable) changes. So, given the way human interest seems to work in many cases 
(i.e., you can build it over time, and other people’s encouragement may be a large factor), 
why not consider the possibility that interest in philosophy could work this way too? 
Instead of throwing up our hands when we see the numbers that many women do not 
want to pursue philosophy, we can work to make philosophy a more attractive possibility 
and viable probability for those groups that have been (and still are) materially and 
conceptually discouraged from philosophy. And to do that in a way that does not 
reinforce potentially pernicious gender stereotypes, using a default goal of 50% 
participation from women would help. Obviously there may be exceptions when we are 
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dealing with small numbers, or trying to balance women’s participation with the 
participation of other marginalized groups. But using 50% as a target goal is much less 
likely to cause any sort of harm, as opposed to simply letting the gender numbers fall 
where they may.  
 
Subsection 4.3.2: How Research on Stereotype Threat Can Help Us Achieve Our Goals 
So, how can we better encourage women to explore their existing, potential, or 
nascent interest in philosophy? We can focus on increasing interest, and decreasing 
factors that decrease interest (i.e., seek to undermine the stereotypes in a long-term 
manner). Research on stereotype threat offers some advice about how to work towards 
both these goals. And some of the most promising lines of intervention are those also 
suggested by my expanded account of stereotype threat: focusing on role models, 
identity, and belonging—not just performance, “achievement,” and quantified “success.”  
 For starters, we can invest in practices that we suspect may reduce the 
effectiveness of pernicious stereotypes: we can invest in promoting socially diverse role 
models, encourage all our students to have flexible identities and to view their talents as 
something they can grow, and tamp down on microaggressions in ways that are as simple 
as reminding everyone about the importance of eye contact, or taking a second look at the 
posters you put up in the hallways to see if it reflects the sort of demographic diversity 
you want for your philosophical community. Margaret Walker argues, “The presence of 
concerns, texts, and images that acknowledge women within undergraduate classrooms, 
graduate training, and professional media allow women students to feel that a discipline, 
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literally, comprehends them, that it is a space that they are free to enter and expected to 
enter” (Walker 2005, p. 156). Moreover, these practices are great places to start because 
they can potentially help all students, not just those belonging to marginalized groups.  
 Some people may roll their eyes at the thought of promoting social diversity in 
these ways, because it seems hollow or inauthentic. And there is a point where hounding 
the one female student of color for a photo op every semester can do more harm than 
good. However, there is not prima facie anything wrong with being more deliberative in 
the aspirational features of our departments. Again, the choice is not between sending no 
micro-signals or sending some. We already send these signals in the small things that we 
do: our body posture, the pictures on our wall, our conference line-ups, etc. I am 
advocating that we be more conscious of the signals we are sending, and that we be more 
deliberative about them. Also, we should not be content to accept into philosophy only 
those who are lucky enough to already be interested in it when we find them. If we take 
seriously philosophy’s task of investigating the entire spectrum of human existence, then 
it should be a pretty highly prioritized goal of ours to have people from across the 
spectrum of human existence contribute to philosophy. This means we can make the 
effort to give more encouragement to students whom we suspect may be receiving less 
encouragement overall.  
Again, this does not mean we should hound people who are clearly not interested 
in philosophy. But we can make the effort to extend explicit encouragement to students 
who may need more explicit encouragement before they feel comfortable with 
philosophy, or before it really shows up on their radar as a viable interest, major, or 
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career path. To reiterate, if there is a student from a marginalized group who seems to 
have little interest in philosophy, I might try to ask them why if I get the chance, but if it 
is the case that they are taking the class for a requirement, they are very happy with their 
current major, and they are just not interested in pursuing it further, I do not hound them 
about doing so. I do not try to convince or convert them. But that is compatible with me 
selling philosophy to my class in general, and to people who have not yet made a 
decision about their courses, majors, or potential career fields. 
And I may still push a student whose reasons for not enjoying philosophy seem to 
be tied up with stereotypes. That is, if someone says they do not like philosophy because 
they are just “not that kind of thinker,” I take that as an opportunity to ask them what 
kind of thinker they take themselves to be, and I try to describe the range of philosophy 
projects from formal epistemology to continental aesthetics, from contemporary 
philosophy of science and metaphysics to the history of ethical thought, from pragmatism 
to logical positivism to feminist and post-colonial philosophy. (I might not do that all in 
one sitting!)  
I also keep in mind that sometimes we are not aware of (all) the reasons why 
something does not appeal to us. Eileen Pollack observes that in the business world:  
Often the women who leave the field say, ‘I don't want to work this hard, 
I'd rather stay home with my kids,’ when in fact, life's been made so much 
more difficult and unpleasant for them than the men in the same field that 
it's not clear that they even know why they're leaving” (Dooe 2015). 
Pollack points out that if people do not realize that there are negative micro-signals, and 
implicit bias, and hard-to-detect forms of discrimination being sent their way, then people 
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might mistake their negative feelings in the face of these obstacles to negative feelings 
about the field itself. 
This does not necessarily mean that, under these circumstances, people’s desires 
and current interests are inauthentic or coerced—at least, not any more so than all of us 
are subject to inauthentic or culturally coerced desires. No one’s desires are purely “their 
own,” springing from some unadulterated fount of individual will. Every one of us has 
our desires influenced by our friends and peers, our family, our role models, and our 
social imagination. Most people wake up one day and decide they are interested in 
philosophy. They find a book, or take a class, or have a friend or professor that is their 
gateway to the profession. In many cases, interest requires cultivation.  
This applies to the possibility of differences in ability too. Economists Michael 
Cox and Richard Alm argue that, regarding whether differences in mathematical ability 
matter for the STEM fields, “The national debate on the issue […] has so far missed the 
central point: scientists are made, not born” (D.M. 2009). Thus, the Swarthmore College 
Bulletin concludes, “from grade school through grad school and beyond, our society is 
failing to make as many women scientists as it could—perhaps because we are too 
mesmerized by the idea that scientists have to be born” (D.M. 2009).  Therefore, instead 
of sitting on our hands due to the possibility that there could be innate or unchangeable 
differences in interest, we should act on the plausible reasons we have to think that these 
things are potentially shapeable. 
Furthermore, the profession should be more deliberate in advocating the merits of 
our field because as things stand, I think a lot of us are very unsure about what 
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philosophy’s worth is, and how we can articulate it. But if you believe that the universe 
does not run on magic, then human desire is not magical, and thus we tend to like things 
for reasons. All of us currently in philosophy like it for a reason. We should get better at 
articulating those reasons. That is, after all, one of the things we are supposed to be 
especially good at.  
But we should also be open to the profession having value and worth that is not 
yet realized, let alone articulated. When we remember that the self is not stagnant, and 
thus is capable of transformation, then it seems odd to have philosophy, the study of 
human knowledge, existence, and meaning, reflect only the questions that people are 
currently interested in—and to offer encouragement only to people who already 
interested in those questions. Instead, we should also offer people the opportunity to 
transform themselves into someone who values what our discipline is, and what it could 
be. And similarly, we should be open to the possibility that the philosophy profession 
may over time transform itself as it, in turn, is shaped by the values of its practitioners 
and others in the world.  
Part of this means ceding our desire for absolute control over philosophy. It is not 
up to only us—those of us currently in the field—to determine what is worth studying. 
And we have reasons to not just welcome in people who want to do philosophy, but also 
to make the case for why we think someone might find it valuable to do. As one blog 
commenter notes, we need to seriously consider, “whether we acknowledge that the 
inclusion of women, people of color, people from lower-class backgrounds, etc. will 
actually lead to substantive changes within the discipline” (workplaysleep [pseud] 2009). 
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And that means acknowledging that “What is philosophy” really is an open question—as 
open as many other questions that we ponder over in philosophy are. I suspect that many 
philosophers will not like the idea of allowing non-philosophers to help decide what is 
worthy of philosophical study.  
Some people suspect this may be because many philosophers have constructed 
their self-identity as being, in part, a member of an elite field. As one person suggests in a 
discussion on diversity in philosophy, “Perhaps [the] self-conception of a group as elite is 
a big factor in triggering all the biases against anyone who seems different” (jj [pseud] 
2009). After all, they observe that the field of linguistics shares many traits and skills 
with philosophy, but it does not have the sorts of diversity problems that philosophy does.  
And this pushes us to consider why philosophy may lack social diversity in general, not 
just pertaining to women. As another person in the same conversation notes,  
Focusing on [this] question gets us away from thinking primarily about 
male/female differences in preferences, abilities, etc. The answer to the 
question is a simple one, I think: philosophy as a discipline has not 
embraced the idea of diversity or taken many concrete steps to increase 
diversity, at least relative to other disciplines. […] So we end up with an 
old, white boys’ club that takes few steps to welcome newcomers and 
often actively discourages them. This might not make too much difference 
in undergrad education, and women are decently represented there (though 
racial and ethnic minorities are not), but graduate school is damn hard, and 
being a tenure-track professor is even harder. Feeling excluded, being 
interrupted in colloquia, being given crappy committee work, being left 
out of socializing, having trouble publishing, all takes its toll. 
Philosophical skills are transferable to many other disciplines, so why 
wouldn’t a Latino/a, say, take his or her excellent logic and abstract 
reasoning skills to some other field that is more welcoming? (amy [pseud] 
2009) 
Thus, philosophers should take a more active and deliberate role in presenting the field as 
something worth being interested in, and something willing to open itself to new people, 
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new ideas, and new conceptions of itself. Furthermore, it is imperative that we not regard 
human desire as some mysterious, whimsical, irrational process that we have no power to 
influence. We are not mere bystanders, and thus, it is not enough for us to act as mere 
bystanders, opening some doors for women but not caring about whether there are other 
social pressures that prevent them from walking through those doors. The fact is, the 
numbers will never simply “fall where they may.” They will fall where various cultural 
influences push and nudge them. It is better to have those pushes comes from our explicit 
values instead of the current implicit associations and stereotypes of the culture at large.  
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CONCLUSION  
In this dissertation, I have connected two components, the personal and the 
political, by fleshing out some of the connections between social identity and self-
identity. Specifically, I have discussed how stereotypes in general, stereotype threat 
specifically, and the narratives built off of stereotypes, can negatively impact self-identity 
and well-being. In doing so, I have shown how stereotypes and stereotype threat affect 
our lives beyond the ways we normally think they can. Specifically, I have argued that 
stereotypes in general can undermine groups’ moral status simply by functioning as 
stereotypes, that stereotype threat can have coercive effects on self-identity that 
undermine epistemic agency, and that phenomena such as stereotype threat and implicit 
bias may contribute to women being, as a group, less interested in philosophy than men 
are as a group.  
I also have opened up further areas of investigation concerning the self and social 
identity. First, there is a lot more to discuss concerning the relationship between self-
knowledge, stereotypes, and epistemic injustice. I have outlined one of the ways that 
epistemic injustice can hinder self-knowledge via stereotypes, but individuals do not all 
passively accept this sort of influence on their sense of self. Some individuals, such as 
Neil deGrasse Tyson and Carol Mae Jemison have resisted this influence and excelled in 
counter-stereotypic careers. So there is more to say about how and why people resist the 
coercive effects of stereotypes. Second, there is much more to explore concerning the 
relationship between stereotypes, personhood, and humanity. I discussed briefly how 
self-doubt from stereotype threat may affect an individuals’ sense of self. There might be 
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an even bigger impact with stereotypes that concern a group’s rational capacity, since 
rationality is often considered the bedrock of human personhood. And third, it is likely 
that there are other social psychological phenomena that can also affect our self-identity 
in ways similar to how stereotype threat affects it. For instance, there has been recent 
work on the importance of “gas-lighting,” which is a phenomenon where an individual is 
made to feel (wrongly) like their testimony or perception is inaccurate. While this 
phenomenon is usually discussed in the context of intentional abuse and harassment, it 
has recently been pointed out that people can unintentionally engage in gas-lighting too 
(McKinnon forthcoming. In this way, studying stereotype threat may tell us something 
about what other kinds of phenomena could affect us in similar ways. It might also tell us 
something more general about how “the self” hangs together, and about how we can 
navigate and negotiate ourselves.  
Also, based on what we currently know about both the philosophy profession and 
stereotype threat, stereotype threat is plausibly contributing to a host of problems in the 
philosophy profession. Since there has been some promising research on ways to prevent 
and intervene into stereotype threat we—members of the philosophical community—
have good reasons to at least consider adopting these habits of intervention. Two of the 
most promising interventions are highlighting counter-stereotypic role models and 
encouraging a view of talent as dynamic instead of static. However, as I have argued in 
Chapter One, most individuals in the field who even know about stereotype threat only 
know about its effects on performance, if we know about the phenomenon at all. This has 
led work on stereotype threat and philosophy’s climate for women to focus almost 
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exclusively on how issues of performance may affect women’s ability and desire to 
pursue their studies or a career in the field. What has been missing is a discussion of how 
issues of identity and belonging may also be playing a role in the demographics and 
professional ecology of philosophy. In fact, their role may be of more significance than 
that of underperformance when it comes to issues of underrepresentation and experiences 
of alienation and marginalization. We do not yet have the empirical data to say this for 
sure, but we have good reasons to suspect this may be the case. I contend that these 
reasons are strong enough for us to consider specific sorts of interventions that focus 
more directly on belonging and less on performance. I discuss briefly some of the ethical 
and epistemological issues that we, as teachers and administrators, face in making 
decisions for our classrooms and departments on limited information. Philosophers are 
especially well-equipped to make these sorts of decisions in the face of limited 
information and to reflect on what sort of environments we want to cultivate as a 
profession. 
 For instance, given what we know about stereotype threat and the state of 
philosophy in higher education and professional contexts, we have good reasons to not 
only strive to make the classroom a safer and more welcoming place for members of 
marginalized groups, but to also to dismantle the existing cultural links between 
philosophy and certain social identities. These are identities such as being neuro-typical 
and able-bodied, being white, male, and masculine, being cisgender and heterosexual, 
and being in the middle to upper class.
37
 These links can be dismantled by changing the 
                                                        
37
 I do not take this to be an exhaustive list. 
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large-scale patterns of whose work we study and teach, whose lives we represent in our 
thought experiments, and who we give deference to as philosophical role models and 
authorities. Dismantling these links may not be a panacea for rectifying 
underrepresentation, and it certainly is not the best form of short-term damage control.  
But it may be a necessary step to create a more inclusive and fairer profession by taking a 
more active stance in shaping the cultural associations regarding philosophy, 
philosophers, and who gets to feel at home in academia. The current focus on 
underperformance points our attention towards short-term and local measures that can 
help us insulate our classrooms from this particular side effect of stereotype threat. But 
once we remember the phenomenon’s deeper and longer-lasting effects on our sense of 
belonging and identity, we should distinguish between local initiatives that treat specific 
symptoms of stereotype threat, and larger-scale projects that aim at more robust forms of 
prevention.   
 One such larger-scale project is to dissolve the pernicious stereotypes 
themselves—not just to block or counteract their most obvious and controllable effects. 
Ultimately, our goal should be to dismantle the structures that create and amplify the 
current dissonance between having a certain sort of social identity and engaging in 
philosophy. Not only do our students and colleagues need equal access to the classroom 
and conference podium (as they are), but they also need access to a sense of self where 
they do not have to segregate their identity as Black or as a woman from their identity as 
a philosophy student, teacher, or scholar. They need access to philosophical communities 
that do not expect them to prove their membership more so than they do to anyone else. 
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They need assurance that within a community they dedicate part of their life to, they are 
not at worst, a non-entity, and at best, an eccentricity. They need a philosophical legacy 
that is theirs as much as it is anyone’s. They need a vision of the thing they love where 
they are reflected in it as much as it is now refracted through them. They need themselves 
to be as much a part of what constitutes being a lover of wisdom as that identity 
constitutes their own. Otherwise, some significant part of them will forever be an 
outsider, a guest, or a ghost: wandering on the outskirts, incorporeal, looking in at the 
thing they love and want to touch, but ultimately unable to affect it. They might be 
tolerated in its presence, but they ultimately pass right through it, and it continues 
onward, as if their life and their way of being had never been. 
Furthermore, my discussion of the standard and expanded pictures of stereotype 
threat raises questions about how the Standard Picture came to be a dominant paradigm, 
which in turn raises questions about the sorts of informal models that scientists may use 
in their work. I suspect that some of this informal model-building is done implicitly and 
unconsciously. In particular, I suspect that scientists sometimes employ descriptions of 
phenomena that create “implicit narrative models,” i.e., the sort of loose “picture” that I 
discussed in Chapter One. Therefore, I think the Standard Picture of stereotype threat is 
one such implicit model. These models may also abound in the medical sciences. For 
instance, the common conception of bipolar disorder that considers mania and depression 
to be opposite and mutually exclusive states may be such an implicit narrative model. It is 
also a misleading model, because mania and depression are not, in fact, mutually 
exclusive, or necessarily opposing emotional states. Thinking that they are can lead 
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people to misidentify symptoms of bipolar disorder, so those who engage in science 
education and communication should take care to not entrench such misleading models. 
Furthermore, analyzing informal narrative models may help us explain why so much of 
the philosophical literature on scientific models is a complex weave of conflicting 
accounts of what models are and what they do. It may turn out that explicit and implicit 
models can be very different things, with very different roles. 
Furthermore, I suspect that certain stereotypes, such as those that rank certain 
groups as less rational than others, can be particularly damaging to self-knowledge, 
because such stereotypes are often tangled up with norms of personhood. For instance, 
the stereotype that women and many people of color are overly emotional (and thus 
irrational) is connected to notions that these groups are child-like and sub-human. It also 
is noteworthy that such stereotypes are fairly ubiquitous among stigmatized social 
identities; there exist stereotypes of irrationality based on gender, race, socioeconomic 
status, age, and ability. Might certain stereotypes make an especially severe contribution 
to processes of ontic injustice and dehumanization? I suspect that they do.    
 Lastly, investigating the relationship between self-identity and social identities 
further might reveal certain dimensions of social hierarchy. For instance, it may 
demonstrate the precariousness of our social status as full persons if individuals are not 
always sure whether they have that status or not. Once we have a handle on how 
precarious our sense of self may be, this reveals another importance of others’ 
perceptions of ourselves. We need feedback from others in order to be epistemic agents. 
(Even the greatest mathematicians in the world ask others to check their math.) When we 
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see something that seems out of the ordinary, we ask others “Did you see that? Did you 
hear that?” Without that social feedback, it would be hard for us to gauge the reliability 
of our perceptions and cognition. Another way to put this is that other people help us 
calibrate our knowledge. They can even give us reasons to completely overturn 
something we thought of as rock-solid knowledge. This goes for self-knowledge as much 
as anything else. I can start off thinking of myself as a math person, but if I keep getting 
feedback that contradicts that, I will eventually be faced with a choice: either consider the 
possibility that I am not in fact a math person, or figure out why all these people seem to 
be giving me bad feedback. Not only does this issue of self-knowledge apply to our 
professions, interests, and hobbies, but also to fundamental questions about our social 
ontology: “Am I a good person?”; “Am I a real man?”; “Am I a rational human?”; etc. It 
is important to understand how social identities and individuals’ self-identities impact 
one another.  
 Therefore, philosophy has much to gain by delving further into social psychology 
research on stereotype threat, and there is much that we can illuminate in that research as 
philosophers. And by expanding our understanding of stereotype threat in particular, we 
can better understand some of the most important issues in social epistemology and 
applied ethics that we are grappling with.  
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